Regulation of Multinational Banks in the European Union by Mikkonen, Katri
Regulation of Multinational Banks in the
European Union
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
2006
vorgelegt von
Katri Mikkonen
Referent: Prof. Dr. Gerhard Illing
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Monika Schnitzer
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 26. Juli 2006
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I thank Professor Gerhard Illing for valuable comments, guidance,
and encouragement during all these years.
In addition, several other people contributed to the form and contents of this disserta-
tion. I want to mention Frank Heinemann, whose honest contributions have taken this
work further than it would otherwise be. In addition, I thank Julia Bersch, Camille
Cornand, Christa Hainz, Uli Klüh, Simone Kohnz, Markus Reisinger, Thomas Ronde,
and Stephan Sauer, as well as the seminar participants at the University of Munich,
the EEFS conference in Coimbra, the NOeG conference in Innsbruck, the EEA Annual
Congress in Amsterdam, and the Financial Market Workshop at the Research Depart-
ment of the Bank of Finland, for valuable comments.
Support from Veli-Matti Mattila, Pentti Forsman and Lauri Kajanoja from the Eco-
nomics Department of the Bank of Finland in form of lunch invitations and encour-
agement is warmly appreciated. I am also grateful to Jouko Vilmunen for inviting me
to the Financial Market Workshop at the Bank of Finland. Friendly guidance was also
provided by Professor Pertti Haaparanta.
I thank Brigitte Gebhard for providing me the o¢ ce space and equipment for the most
productive phase of my work, and Agnès Bierprigl for being the friendly helping hand
in all other practical matters related to my Ph.D. studies. I am particularly grateful to
Dirk Rösing for the best information technology support ever. Financial support from
Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation was also greatly appreciated.
In addition, I want to mention the e¤ect of moral support and hilarious spare time
company provided by my colleagues Julia Bersch, Stefan Brandauer, Francesco Drago,
Josef Forster, Hannah Hörisch, Florian Kajuth, Uli Klüh, Simone Kohnz, Stephan
Sauer, Christina Strassmair and Christian Traxler. Without you, it would have been
much more boring. Last but not least, I thank Ramon Olivella for being a true partner
during this stressful nal year. Thank you for your ongoing support!
Katri Mikkonen
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Banks and Regulation in the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.1 Regulatory Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2 Banks in the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.3 Policy Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.1.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Overview of the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.1 Banking Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.2 Banking Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2.3 Regulation of Multinational Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.3 Implications and Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2 Incomplete Contracts, Multinational Bank Closure, and the Choice
of Ownership Structure 27
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 The Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2.1 Economy Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2.2 The Utility Functions of the Bank and of the Regulators . . . . 33
2.3 Monitoring with Exogenous Ownership Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3.1 First Best Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
i
CONTENTS ii
2.3.2 Desired Strategies of the Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.3 RegulatorsDecisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.4 Banks Restricted Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4 Endogenous Choice of Ownership Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.1 First Best and Desired Structures of Ownership . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.2 The Banks Constrained Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5 Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Appendix 2 48
2.A Risky Investments in Both Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.B Monitoring and Choice of Ownership Structure when W<0 . . . . . . 53
2.C Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3 Multiple Regulators, Bank Bail-Outs, and Constructive Ambiguity 62
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 Economy Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3 Regulatory Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3.1 Regulatory Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3.2 Discretionary Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3.3 Commitment Game and the Optimal Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.4.1 Quadratic Costs and Welfare-Maximising Regulators . . . . . . 77
3.4.2 Deposit Insurance versus Systemic Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.5 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
CONTENTS iii
Appendix 3 82
3.A Randomising LOLR Identity in a Dynamic
Game with Incomplete Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.B Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4 Strategic Bank Takeovers and the Cost of Capital 87
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2 Model Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2.1 Shareholders and Depositors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.2 Bank Trade-o¤ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.2.3 Takeover Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3 A Model of Multinational Banking with Linear Costs . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.4 E¤ect of Minimum Capital Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Appendix 4 106
4.A Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5 Concluding Remarks 113
Bibliography 115
List of Tables
1.1 Deposit guarantees in the EU, 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Bank assets and stock market capitalisation in the EU . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Foreign banks and bank capital in some European countries, 2004 . . . 7
2.1 Payo¤s of the welfare-maximising common regulator . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2 Payo¤s of the welfare-maximising regulator, Home Country Control . . 35
iv
Chapter 1
Introduction
In the past years, nancial markets in the European Union (EU) have been under a
profound change. Most importantly, the enlargement of May 2004 brought ten new
member countries into the EU. In particular, eight of them are former socialist coun-
tries that di¤er radically from the old member countries in terms of nancial market
characteristics. The pace of change will go on, as the new members are soon due
to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU), and as the negotiations for further
enlargement of the EU are in an advanced stage.
This study considers the regulation of multinational banks in the EU. The focus on
multinational banks implies that the enlargement will play a central role in the work
at hand: Whereas the old 15 member countries (EU-15) do not generally show large
shares of foreign ownership in their banking sectors, most banks in the Central and
Eastern European new member (CEE) countries are foreign owned1. The enlargement
has thus signicantly changed the structure of the EU banking market and increased
its degree of heterogeneity. In particular, the enlargement has accentuated the role of
regulation of multinational banks for the overall nancial market stability.
The term multinational bank is used in this work to describe a bank that has
operational units in more than one country. This excludes in particular lending in
the international capital markets, and lighter forms of foreign establishments such as
representative o¢ ces. Furthermore, it is assumed that a multinational bank has a
parent bank in one of the countries, which will be called the home country. Following
1The CEE countries comprise the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia. The EU-15 countries comprise Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom (UK).
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the EU legislative terminology, countries where the multinational bank operates, but
that are not home countries, are called host countries.
The ownership structure of the multinational bank will play a central role in the
present work. In short, a multinational bank wishing to settle down in a country can
choose between a branch and a subsidiary form. A branch is an elementary part of the
parent bank, meaning that the assets of the two units are consolidated into one entity.
In contrast, a subsidiary is an independent asset of the parent bank. Most importantly,
a subsidiary can go bankrupt separately of the parent, i.e. without the assets of the
parent bank being touched. The ownership structure has implications on bank risk
taking, and consequently, on the organisation of bank regulation.
Throughout the study, we refer to the general denitions of Goodhart & al. (1998)
for regulation. Accordingly, banking regulation is used as an overall term, which com-
prises rules, supervision, and crisis action. Rules consist of the legislative framework
that is determined ex ante, such as deposit insurance, minimum capital requirements,
or the rules for emergency lending provided by the lender of last resort (LOLR). Su-
pervision refers to the information acquisition process of the regulators, including on-
the-site inspections and information disclosure of the banks, among others. Finally,
crisis action is used for the regulatory interventions during times of nancial distress,
such as bank closure or restructuring, capital injections, and emergency lending.
The study is a theoretical inquiry on the regulation of multinational banks. The
objective of the present chapter is to rst briey describe the EU banking markets
and regulatory framework and review the policy discussion around the EU regulatory
arrangements. After, theoretical literature in banking, regulation, and multinational
banks is outlined, followed by an outlook into the subsequent chapters.
The theoretical analysis comprises Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Whereas Chapter 2 studies
the incentive e¤ect of regulatory arrangements on the choice of bank ownership struc-
ture, Chapter 3 abstracts from liability structure considerations and determines the
optimal division of emergency lending responsibilities in the presence of both national
and supranational regulators. Chapter 4 then turns into the distribution of foreign
direct investment in the market and considers the stability e¤ects of minimum capital
requirements via incentives for international takeovers. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes.
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1.1 Banks and Regulation in the EU
1.1.1 Regulatory Framework
The purpose of the EU is to promote four freedoms: free movements of people, goods,
services and capital, the leading idea thereby being enhanced e¢ ciency through in-
creased competition. The EU banking regulation is therefore designed to implement
the idea of free movement of services: The second banking cooperation Directive2 sets
the cornerstones of bank regulation in EU being the principles of mutual recognition
and home country control. The rst principle states that a bank, having acquired a
licence in any of the member countries, has the right to operate branches in all the
others. The latter one assigns the responsibility of the consolidated supervision of the
foreign branches of a bank to the regulator of the home country. The role of the regula-
tor in the host country is limited to providing relevant information and supervising the
liquidity of the branch. Further, the Directive on the reorganisation and winding-up
of credit institutions3, extends the home country control principle to the bankruptcy
procedure.
The single market equally aims at harmonisation of rules under which the banks
operate. With some few exceptions, every credit institution within the EU is required
to join a deposit insurance scheme. As to international banks, the branches are to be
covered by the home country deposit insurance, unless the branch wants to join the
host country deposit insurance. The minimum coverage is up to EUR 20 000 for each
depositor. As to minimum capital requirements, a universal start capital of EUR 5
millions is dened in the Directive on capital adequacy of investment rms and credit
institutions. The solvency ratio requirements in the EU are compatible with the Basel
requirements, the minimum risk-adjusted solvency ratio being eight per cent. The
Basel II approach will be integrated in the EU legislation as well.4
Although the banking rules in the EU seem to be harmonised in paper, there is some
leeway in their implementation. For example, the deposit insurance coverage regulation
only sets the minimum guarantee level. Table 1.1 demonstrates that the actual deposit
guarantees for the EU countries vary to a signicant degree. Furthermore, note that
despite being members of the EU, some CEE countries are still under transition as
2If not otherwise stated, the EU legislation is to be found in the consolidated Directive 2000/12/EC
on the taking up and pursuit of credit institutions.
3Directive 2001/24/EC.
4For the Basel Accords, see BIS (1988) and BIS (2005).
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to harmonisation of the minimum deposit insurance coverage. In particular, the CEE
countries are members only since May 2004. Before this date, they of course did
not have the obligation to full the EU standards. For example, Slovenia restricted
accession of foreign branches until 1999, and Hungary required that the branches had
capital adequacy similar to subsidiaries until 20045. This transition period was also of
practical importance: for example, no means of fullling minimum capital requirements
or deposit insurance were at place directly after transition6.
Table 1.1: Deposit guarantees in the EU, 2004
Country (EU-15) Guarantee level Country (CEE) Guarantee level
Austria 20,000 Czech Rep 25,000
Belgium 20,000 Estonia 6,391a)
Denmark 40,329 Latvia 8,597a)
Finland 25,000 Lithuania 14,481a)
France 60,980 Hungary 26,651
Germany 20,000 Poland 22,500
Greece 20,000 Slovenia 25,025
Ireland 20,000 Slovakia 20,000
Italy 103,291
Luxemburg 20,000
Netherlands 20,000
Portugal 25,000
Spain 20,000
Sweden 27,714
UK 44,961
a) Shall be raised to EUR 20,000 by 2008.
Source: EC (2006).
In a system that includes multiple regulators, the success of banking supervision
and crisis action is dependent on information acquisition abilities and on the incentives
to pass the information forward or to use it. The streamlined regulation is meant to in-
crease competition within the single market and reduce costs of banking to consumers
and businesses7. However, the home country control principle has some implications
that di¤er from a true single market. In particular, supervision of multinational
banks and crisis action in the EU is not only a national task, but the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) is appointed to guarantee the smooth functioning of the payment
5See BoS (1999) for Slovenia, and Majnoni & al. (2003) and Gelegonya (2003) for Hungary.
6For example, in Estonia, independence led to the Russian banks exiting from the market. There-
fore, the regulator had to rely on an easy licensing policy in order to preserve at least some banking
system in the country in the early years of transition. See Soerg (1999).
7See Begg & Altunbas (2002) and Danthine & al. (1999).
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system8. The fragmented view on regulation can, at rst sight, be compatible with the
idea of a European-wide nancial market only if the cooperation between the national
regulators functions smoothly.
The EU has responded to the need for cooperation by founding various committees.
An overview of the activities of the committees can be found in e.g. ECB (2002). First,
bilateral coordination is organised through the Memoranda of Understanding, which are
in place as a framework for day-to-day matters in supervision of nancial organisations.
Second, the Banking Supervision Committee (BSC) of the European System of Central
Banks, meeting ve times a year, is the formal EMU organisation for multilateral
change of information. Despite its connection to the ECB, the BSC has a EU-wide
mandate in the eld of systemic stability and the smooth functioning of payments
and securities settlement systems. The BSC acts as an interaction organ between the
central banks and the supervisors and as a crisis management coordinator in case of
aggregate shocks. Third, the Groupe de Contact consists of banking supervisors of
the EU countries and handles individual problems at the time they emerge among the
members of the European Economic Area. It equally promotes information exchanges
on general developments in banking regulation.
In addition, from 2004 on, two new committees have been founded that strengthen
the involvement of the European Commission9: The European Banking Committee
that consists of high level representatives from the member countries and from the Eu-
ropean Commission, and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, consisting
of experts from the national supervisors, central banks, and from the ECB, also in
connection to the European Commission.
1.1.2 Banks in the EU
In this section, we briey illustrate the structure of the banking markets in the EU10.
As it will turn out that the CEE countries are the most interesting markets for the
European banking regulation, special attention is paid to them.
Table 1.2 presents gures as to the structure of the nancial markets in years 2001
and 2004. In general, the EU nancial markets are rather bank than stock market
8See Article 105(2) of the Treaty on the EU.
9The legislation as to these committees is to be found in the Commission Decisions 2004/5/EC
and 2004/10/EC.
10A more general analysis can be found in e.g. Allen & al. (2005).
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oriented11. According to the IMF (2005), bank assets comprised 67 and stock market
capitalisation 139 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States
(US) in year 2004. Furthermore, comparison within the EU shows that the CEE
countries are similar to the old member countries in this regard: the stock market
capitalisation always lies below the value of the bank assets. The relation varies from
very bank concentrated Latvia and Slovakia to more stock market oriented Lithuania
and Estonia, for whom the value of stock market capitalisation amounts to over the
half of the value of bank assets. Although the di¤erence between the EU-15 and the
CEE countries has diminished lately, one can see that especially still in year 2001 the
di¤erences between stock market capitalisations of the two regions were large.
Table 1.2: Bank assets and stock market capitalisation in the EU
Bank assets Stock market Total
/ GDP capitalisation / GDP
Country 2001 2004 2001 2004 2001 2004
Eurozone 253 265 70 57 323 322
EU25 275a) 293 82 67 329 360
Czech Rep 115 100 16 37 131 137
Estonia 65 94 25 49 91 143
Latvia 79 101 9 10 88 111
Lithuania 32 47 22 34 54 81
Hungary 68 80 20 26 88 106
Poland 63 68 14 25 77 93
Slovenia 81 94 18 27 98 121
Slovakia n.a. 88 17 11 n.a. 99
a) Without Slovakia. Sources: Eurostat, except ECB (2005a) for bank assets.
However, a closer look reveals that the CEE markets di¤er from those of the EU-15
in many aspects. First of all, Table 1.2 demonstrates the di¤erences in the sizes of
the combined bank and stock markets. In addition, the absolute size di¤erence is still
larger: although the CEE countries comprise eight of the 25 EU member countries,
their combined contribution to the GDP of the EU was around four per cent in year
200412.
A second di¤erence can be detected in Table 1.3, which presents data as to the
scope and form of foreign ownership in the banking sector. Whereas the old member
countries, apart from Finland, are moderately foreign owned, the assets of the foreign
11For a thorough comparison of nancial systems, see Allen & Gale (2000a).
12See Eurostat. Among the CEE countries, Poland is clearly the largest one with 1,9% of the GDP
of the EU; this leaves the mere 2,1% for the seven remaining countries.
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banks account for between 60 and 100 per cent of all bank assets for the CEE countries,
except for Slovenia and Latvia. The early years of transition were typically followed
by a banking crisis, as badly capitalised and managed new banks, largely born under
the lax licensing policy of the early years of transition, were not able to survive in the
market. As the economy started to grow, foreign banks entered the markets.13
Table 1.3: Foreign banks and bank capital in some European countries, 2004
Assets Nr of Nr of foreign Nr of foreign Capital
Country (Foreign banks/Total)a) banks branches subsidiaries adequacyb)
Austria 21,7 796 18 20 14,7
Belgium 19,3 104 45 26 12,3
Denmark 19,5 202 17 10 13a)
Finland 61,7 363 20 5 19,1
France 11,2 897 82 166 10,4a)
Germany 5,5 2148 83 42 13,2
Greece 12,14 62 23 4 11,9
Ireland 30,3 80 32 32 12,6
Italy 9,5 787 104 8 11,5
Netherlands 9,9 461 29 29 11,5
Portugal 23,5 197 27 13 10,3
Spain 9,8 346 61 51 11,6
Sweden 5,9 212 20 23 10
UK 19,2 413 175 95 12,3
Czech Rep 96,2 68 9 22 12,6
Estonia 98,5 9 3 3 13,4
Latvia 48,1 23 1 8 11,7
Lithuania 92,3 74 2 5 12,3
Hungary 62,5 213 0 23 11,2
Poland 67,3 653 3 41 15,6
Slovenia 19,3 24 2 5 11
Slovakia 92,9 21 3 15 19
Sources: ECB (2005a), except for a) : ECB (2005b) and b) : IMF (2005).
An obvious implication that arises from the combination of large foreign ownership
and the smallness of the markets is that the foreign bank units in the CEE must
be small in comparison to the parent banks. For example, the total of the Baltic
assets of Hansapank, the market leader in Estonia, and strongly present in Latvia and
13See Caprio & Klingebiel (1996) and Lindgren & al. (1996) for description of the early banking
crises. As to entrance of foreigners in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia,
see Schardax & Reininger (2001). Barisitz (2002) and Adahl (2002) provide a profound overview on
the history of banking in the Baltic countries.
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Lithuania as well, comprised about seven per cent of the total assets of its Swedish
parent, Swedbank14. The number two in Estonia, Ühispank, made 1,25 per cent out
of the assets of SEB, its equally Swedish parent bank. The gures for the Latvian and
Lithuanian subsidiaries of SEB, of which the latter is again a market leader, were 0,95
and 1,72 per cent, respectively.15 Finally, the market leader in Poland, Bank Pekao
S.A, comprised around ve per cent of the assets of its Italian parent, UniCredito, in
200316.
Table 1.3 also classies the foreign banks according to their ownership structure.
An international bank can choose between a branch and a subsidiary form, the former
meaning that the assets of the foreign and the domestic units are pooled, whereas the
subsidiary is an independent asset that can be liquidated without touching the assets
of the parent bank. Generally, the branch form is thought to be more interesting for
banks, due to more e¢ cient use of equity capital and other gains in operating as a single
unit.17 The single licence principle, meant to enhance the integration and e¢ ciency of
the banking market, grants permission to set up branches in any EU country, whereas
subsidiaries need to be licensed in every country of operation. In addition, according
to the home country control, the latter fall to the responsibility of the host country
regulator. In light of the data presented in Table 3, there seem to be advantages in the
subsidiary form, especially in the CEE countries, that counteract the higher e¢ ciency
of a branch structure.
Finally, Table 1.3 presents the capital adequacy ratios of the banks in the EU. The
eight per cent minimum capital requirement hardly seems to be binding, and even less
so in the CEE countries18. In particular, there seems to be lot of variation, with some
very high levels of capital in some CEE countries. Note that, both in terms of capital
adequacy and foreign ownership, Finland seems to be an outlier among the old member
countries. On the CEE side, Slovenia has both the lowest foreign ownership and capital
adequacy ratio.
14See Swedbank (2004) and Hansapank (2004).
15See SEB (2004) and Ühispank (2004).
16See UniCredito (2003).
17As an example, Nordea (2003) has given these e¢ ciency gains as an explanation for its recent
switch from subsidiary to branch structure.
18The unweighted average of the CEE countries is higher than that of the EU-15.
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1.1.3 Policy Discussion
The discussion around the integration of European banking markets and banking regu-
lation has evolved around the above-mentioned aspects. Two questions will be consid-
ered here in detail: First, whether there are arguments for transferring the regulatory
power to the European level; and second, how explicit should the rules concerning the
division of responsibilities be.
Most of the discussion has concentrated on the regulatory externalities inherent
in multinational banking. The most prominent of these externalities are the systemic
costs of a bank closure or failure that, in case of multinational banks, are not necessarily
limited to the jurisdiction of the regulator in charge. This gives rise to information ac-
quisition problems and conicts of interests. As to the rst of these problems, Wihlborg
(1999) points out that, whereas local regulators may have better access to information
as to actions in their countries, they may have less of an accurate idea of the situation
abroad than a common regulator would. In this regard, as Mayes & Vesala (1998)
put it, there may still be di¤erences according to the ownership structure: as informa-
tion on branch structure banks is provided in a consolidated way in the home country,
assessing the systemic risk within their countries is even more di¢ cult for the host
country regulators. A second problem is the potential interest conicts between the
home and the host country regulators. Eichengreen & Ghironi (2002) point out that
national regulators internalise the cost of failure to a lesser amount than a common
regulator would. As to crisis action, the role of CEE countries as hosts may aggravate
the incentive conict, as the host country banks may be too small to save for others
than local regulators19.
Regulatory competition in Europe and the fear of a race to the bottom has equally
evoked contributions to the political discussion. In principle, the regulatory rules frame-
work is set by the Basel accords and thus treats all countries equally. In reality, however,
Bini Smaghi (2000) points out that e.g. asset risk valuation and minimum deposit in-
surance give a lot of discretion for national regulators. In addition, apart from the
common minimum level, the coverage of the deposit insurance is a national matter.
Huizinga (2002) and Bini Smaghi (2000) point out that there may be distortions in
competition, as domestic and foreign banks that compete in the same market may be
subject to di¤erent deposit insurance schemes, and as more stringent rules on deposit
19Also Mayes & Vesala (1998) discuss the special problems of the small host country in the home
country control framework.
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insurance make it more costly and risky to enter a market as a foreign bank. However,
as Vives (2001) remarks, this may not be a great concern as a foreign branch may join
a more favourable host country scheme.
The externalities argument and fear for regulatory race to the bottom have prompted
many authors to support the idea of supranational regulator for Europe. Whereas Agli-
etta (1999) and Vives (2001) argue for the ECB as the LOLR, Padoa-Schioppa (1999)
calls for a Euro area regulator or at least very close cooperation, as the propagation
of problems will be area-wide. Also Danthine & al. (1999) suggest an independent
Europe-wide, independent regulatory agency. Besides of advantages in form of exter-
nalities such as diminished capture and excessive interventionism, they assume that a
common regulator would increase the speed of reaction. From the regulatory compe-
tition point of view, DiNoia & DiGiorgio (1999) would like the international regulator
to coordinate and to harmonise the legislation.
On the other hand, externalities can be used to advocate for the national regula-
tor. In particular, Vives (2001) argues that crisis management and deposit insurance
considerations should be reunited at the European level, which is di¢ cult without a
European scal authority. A second reason for not creating a common regulator for
the EMU, maintained by Schoenmaker (2000) among others, is the fact that most of
the multinational banking still takes place outside the ECB jurisdiction. The com-
mon regulator would thus not be better able to detect the bulk of the international
activities of the banks, nor to resolve the incentive problems. Finally, although many
authors expect the systemic costs to increase within the common market20, there are
arguments that predict the opposite. First, although some cross-border development
is seen in the EMU, we saw in the previous Section that the banks still operate mainly
nationally, except in the CEE countries. Second, Milne & Wood (2003) argue that
as banks have become more international, the assets have become more diversied at
the same time, which decreases systemic risk. Finally, the small absolute amount of
internationalisation is equally an important argument against a costly restructuration
and has inspired some writers to promote the national regulatory system21.
Besides giving the responsibility to one or another regulatory level, a comparative
advantage view prevails, advocated by Mayes & Vesala (1998), Bini Smaghi (2000),
and Schüler (2003), among others. According to this view, the ECB has a comparative
advantage on assessing the systemic risk, whereas the national regulator is better at
20See Aglietta (1999), Bruni & de Boissieu (2000), Vives (2001), and Schüler (2003).
21See Huizinga (2002), Begg & Altunbas (2002), and Eichengreen & Ghironi (2002).
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credit risk evaluation. Therefore, the former should be appointed to the ECB and the
latter to the national central bank (NCB). In a similar vein, Wihlborg (1999) advo-
cates for a veto right for ECB on LOLR and active coordination of supervision. This
approach however presupposes that the NCBs and the ECB can e¤ectively cooperate
with each other.
Turning to the question how explicit the division of responsibilities should be, not
only policy discussion but also the EU legislation was seen to highlight the impor-
tance of cooperation among the regulators. However, coordination may be impossible
to achieve due to free-riding, as pointed out by Uhlig (2002), or national incentives,
as argued by Aglietta (1999), and Vives (2001). Therefore, the non-specication of
responsibilities may lead to interest-based regulation instead of the coordination solu-
tion.
A second problem, related to division of responsibilities, is that in EMU in partic-
ular, the ambiguity has a special form of leaving the identity of the LOLR open in the
Treaty on the EU. The idea is to compensate for the apparent time inconsistency and
too big to fail problems inherent to banking regulation with ambiguous identity of the
LOLR. Padoa-Schioppa (1999) maintains that the current ambiguity is accurate and
that critics underestimate the Eurosystems capacity to act and overestimate systemic
risk. On the criticsside, Prati & Schinasi (2000) point out that ambiguity as to re-
sponsibilities causes delays, coordination problems, and raises the costs of resolutions
and can damage EMUs credibility. For example, if banks do not believe that the
ECB will decide on the liquidity assistance, they may expect it from the NCB in a
situation where it will not be given and take larger risks. This again increases the risk
of time inconsistency of the LOLR policy. Further, Prati & Schinasi (2000) maintain
that constructive ambiguity as to which LOLR facilities are available may be necessary
to curb moral hazard, but there should be no ambiguity among the policymakers as
to the mechanisms that can be used to manage crisis situations. Also, Bruni & de
Boissieu (2000) are of the opinion that more transparency is badly needed and does
not undermine constructive ambiguity in policy making. In particular, ambiguity as to
the mandates may lead to quarrels and interest conicts between national and central
authorities and regulatory moral hazard of NCBs, if they rely on the ECB willingness
to avoid systemic disruptions. The sceptical view as to the ambiguity on the identity
of the LOLR is equally shared by Aglietta (1999), and Lastra (2000), who point out
the discretionary nature the LOLR policy has been given in the Treaty on the EU.
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1.1.4 Summary
In sum, the proper functioning of the EU banking regulation requires smooth and
timely cooperation. Judging from the current policy discussion, a doubt seems to
prevail whether this is a realistic requirement, given that the incentives of the national
actors cannot always coincide with each other nor with those of a European regulator.
Second, integration in the banking markets seems to have largely happened outside the
common market, the CEE countries having served as hosts of the foreign investment
for a long time before they entered the EU. In addition, as most of this investment
is still made in form of founding subsidiaries, it seems that integration has preceded
legislation and not vice versa. This further highlights the mismatch of banking and
its regulation within the area. Finally, the clear role of the CEE countries as hosts
implies that their special characteristics may matter a lot as to the success of banking
regulation in the EU.
1.2 Overview of the Literature
In this section, theoretical literature on multinational banking and its regulation is
discussed. Before proceeding with the international framework, a short review on the
theory of banking and regulation of banks is presented.
1.2.1 Banking Theory
In the Arreu-Debrew world, the Modigliani-Miller (1958) Theorem states that the
form of nancing is irrelevant for the cost of capital and for the projects the rm will
choose. Consequently, there is no reason for banks to exist. The modern banking
theory, as presented in e.g. Freixas & Rochet (1997), departs from this framework by
assuming informational asymmetries to exist in the market. We concentrate here on
informational problems that lead to the emerging of banks as liquidity creators, either
in the liability side as an insurer of the agentsuncertain liquidity needs, or in the asset
side as credit suppliers.
The rst strand of literature studies the role of a bank as a liquidity insurer for
agents, whose intertemporal consumption needs are uncertain. In Diamond & Dybvig
(1983), the banks act as maturity transformers: due to unforeseen liquidity needs,
agents are not able to privately invest in e¢ cient but illiquid projects, which creates
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a role for a bank that retains the fraction of expected liquidity needs as reserves.
However, this maturity transformation, together with the sequential service rule22 for
deposit payments, exposes banks to depositor runs, which, if they occur, force the bank
to ine¢ ciently liquidate their investments before maturity.
Diamond & Dybvig (1983) abstract from bank risk, and so bank runs are always
of speculative nature and therefore detrimental. If bank risk taking is introduced,
a coexistence of fundamental and speculative bank runs emerges, which may create
a positive role for bank runs as imposers of market discipline. In Calomiris & Kahn
(1991), demand deposits are helpful in disciplining bank managers that would otherwise
act in their own interests. Alonso (1996) abstracts from panic bank runs by assuming
that depositors do not observe the actions of each other and allows the banks to be able
to write contracts that do not allow for bank runs. In the equilibrium, banks sometimes
choose to write contracts with a positive probability of bank run, since it enables them
to use private information to direct behaviour. Finally, in a framework with risky
assets and when the sequential service rule is relaxed, Allen & Gale (1998) show that
bank runs have an advantage of risk sharing between early and late consumers.
The overall benecial e¤ect of a bank run in presence of moral hazard is, however,
not a foregone conclusion. Chari & Jagannathan (1988) show how the coexistence of
informed and uninformed depositors, together with risky bank returns and random
liquidity needs, can produce socially costly bank runs even without the sequential
service constraint. In Chen (1999), bank panics can trigger a costly contagion e¤ect if
depositors interpret a bank run in one bank as a signal on probability of bank failure in
another bank. Jacklin & Bhattacharya (1988) introduce risk aversion and equity and
show that a demand deposits economy is superior to holding equity for low dispersion
of returns, and vice versa.
Finally, some alternative explanations as to banks as liquidity insurers have been
advanced. Gorton & Pennacchi (1990) assume that assets are information sensitive,
and that agents face unforeseen liquidity needs. This leads to coexistence of informed
and uninformed traders. Banks then arise as self-protection of uninformed traders:
banks create liquidity by splitting cash ows into risky and riskless assets (deposits),
and the latter are demanded by the uninformed traders. A bank thus separates an
otherwise pooled market of uninformed and informed traders. Holmström & Tirole
(1998) nd a role for nancial intermediation as a liquidity coordinator, such that the
22Sequential service is here used as a synonym for the familiar rst-come-rst-served rule, according
to which the depositors are paid in the order they demand payments, as long as there are funds that
can be paid out.
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costly liquidity reserves are minimised. In Diamond (1997), banks arise endogenously
as market makers, when there is limited participation in the markets.
The second strand of literature concentrates on the asset side of the banks. If the
returns on investments are not easily observable, the creditor has di¢ culty in nding
out whether the borrower really pays back the agreed amount. Diamond (1984) models
banks as delegated monitorers and shows that the net monitoring costs are minimised
because of a diversication e¤ect within the bank. Delegation then solves either the
costly duplication, or the free-rider problem of no-one monitoring. Further, Besanko
& Kanatas (1993) and Holmström & Tirole (1997) show that, as monitoring is costly,
a bank that can eliminate the moral hazard of the borrower can itself face one. In a
setting where banks have a comparative advantage in monitoring, Besanko & Kanatas
(1993) show how equity and credit both exist in a situation where the banks monitoring
e¤ort directly a¤ects the probability of success of the project. In Holmström & Tirole
(1997), the bank moral hazard creates a reason for bank capital in a setting with
correlated returns within a bank.
Delegated monitoring increases the banks information about its borrowers vis-à-vis
to the others and may lead to relationship borrowing. Evidence of the importance of
bank relationships is provided by Petersen & Rajan (1994). Bolton & Freixas (2000)
create a role for banks as relationship lenders: as banks know their clients and do not
practise ine¢ cient liquidation, relatively risky rms are willing to pay the intermediary
cost of bank nancing. Finally, Diamond & Rajan (2001) combine the relationship
borrowing view with bank runs. In their model, the possibility of a bank run helps
banks to commit to e¢ cient pledging as a relationship lender. In their approach, the
banks act as liquidity creators both by providing liquidity insurance for the depositors
and by being e¢ cient loan collectors, due to the demand deposit contracts.
1.2.2 Banking Regulation
Banking is a highly regulated area of business. On the one hand, the role of liquidity
provider together with the role as maturity shifter in an environment of imperfect infor-
mation is a fragile combination. On the other, bank failures seem to imply signicant
costs to the society. As a consequence, most economies have designed a safety net,
typically consisting of a deposit insurance combined with a method to curb the bank
moral hazard, and of an emergency lending facility, the LOLR. Nevertheless, the high
costs of bank failure may equally lead to enforcement problems in form of regulatory
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forbearance. The next section will consider the literature on the design of the safety
net. In the section after, the incentive problems of the regulator as to the optimal
implementation of the safety net are considered.
Safety Net Design
Although a bank run turned out to be e¢ cient in some cases, the possibility of an
ine¢ cient bank run and the related information and inequality problems as well as the
e¤ect of reduced liquidity creation have resulted in the search for means to avoid it.
Under deposit insurance, the regulatory body guarantees the payment of deposits at
least to some relatively high a limit.23 As modelled in Gorton & Pennacchi (1990), the
introduction of a tax-funded deposit insurance ultimately turns deposits into a riskless
object. If the bank investment is considered to be riskless, there is no additional e¤ect,
and social optimum can be achieved, as is the case in Diamond & Dybvig (1983).
However, if bank invests in risky projects, deposit insurance has an incentive e¤ect, as
the e¢ cient bank runs become eliminated as well. As information on bank risk taking
is often not observable or nonveriable, an agency problem emerges. Similarly, in the
delegated monitoring framework, moral hazard occurs due to costly monitoring cost
that the banks incur and the information that they accrue through monitoring, as in
Besanko & Kanatas (1993). Finally, Dewatripont & Tirole (1994) show that even if
banks are considered as ordinary rms that are highly leveraged, market failure arises
from the collective action problem of the agents, which gives rise to an agency problem
even in absence of deposit insurance. In sum, banks, and in particular insured ones,
seem to be prone to agency problems and therefore need further regulation.
Among the attempts to ex ante improve the social optimality of bank activities in
presence of deposit insurance, minimum capital requirements have attracted a lot of
attention and will be discussed here more profoundly24. Higher bank capital increases
the amount of uninsured funds at stake and therefore increases the incentives of the
bank for prudential behaviour. At the same time, however, they may have some un-
intended side e¤ects on the banks optimisation problem. Koehn & Santomero (1980)
demonstrate how minimum capital requirements can increase bank risk taking, and
23An alternative for deposit insurance has been suspension of convertibility, which equally removes
the incentives of unnecessary withdrawals in Diamond & Dybvig (1983), and decreases the costs of
non-fundamental bank runs in Chari & Jagannathan (1988). However, suspension of convertibility
leads to an inequality problem, as risk sharing is uneven, and consequently has become increasingly
unpopular.
24For problems with fairly priced deposit insurance, see e.g. Chan & al. (1992).
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always increase the dispersion of risk in the banking sector in total. In Bolt & Tieman
(2004), the increased incentives for risk taking arise in a dynamic framework. If the
regulator wants to limit the insolvency risk, he can do it by introducing risk-adjusted
capital requirements, as in Kim & Santomero (1988). Also Giammarino & al (1993)
nd out, in a setting with adverse selection and moral hazard in banking, that an
optimal contract is to some extent risk dependent and equals the probability of failure
across banks. Somewhat di¤erently, Hellmann & al. (2000) show that if banks take
risk in the form of deposit rate competition, a combination of simple minimum capital
requirements and deposit rate controls leads to Pareto-e¢ ciency.
In the above-mentioned literature, capital adequacy ratios are assumed to be con-
tinuously binding for the banks. In contrast, Milne (2002) contests the need for risk
related weighting and shows that, with a penalty associated with ex post breaching
the minimum capital requirement, banks have an incentive to hold capital above the
minimum, which leads to simple capital adequacy requirement possibly being su¢ cient
to improve the banksasset quality.
Besides deposit insurance, another way to curb the e¤ect of sudden liquidity needs
is to introduce emergency lending25. This function of the LOLR is often placed at the
central bank for the practical reason of funds availability. Holmström & Tirole (1996,
1998) and Aghion & al. (2000) give a rationale for tax-nanced aggregate liquidity pro-
vision in case of aggregate liquidity shocks. However, emergency lending is in practice
often targeted to the nancial institutions in trouble. In addition, the Bagehot (1873)
principles on LOLR activity state that emergency lending should be given to illiquid
but only solvent banks. Yet, as Goodhart (1999) points out, a separation between
illiquid and insolvent banks is hardly possible in practice, since emergency lending is
mostly used in a crisis situation that demands fast actions. As in the case of deposit
insurance, emergency lending to individual banks in case of nonobservable di¤erence
between liquidity and solvency shocks, or alternatively, the possibility of a bail-out
of an insolvent institution due to aggregate liquidity reasons, equally reduces bank
incentives to invest su¢ ciently in safety26. Moreover, as there may be additional e¢ -
ciency and regulatory incentive considerations involved, Goodfriend & King (1988) and
Kaufman (1991), among others, have argued that emergency lending should happen
through open market operations only.
A few contributions have arisen lately in order to justify the bailing out of individ-
25See Goodhart & Illing (2002) for a comprehensive reader on LOLR literature.
26See e.g. Freixas & al. (2000b) for discussion.
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ual banks even if the di¤erence between illiquid and insolvent banks is hard to detect.
In Flannery (1996), the need for emergency lending to individual institutions arises
in times of crisis, as banks become less willing to give credit in the interbank mar-
ket. Somewhat di¤erently, Freixas & al. (2000a) construct a model with interbank
payment ows due to spatial consumption uncertainty. In case of liquidation of an
insolvent bank, the central bank intervention in individual banks dependent on the
insolvent banks is socially justied. Cordella & Yeyati (2003) show that a commitment
to an individual bailout may have a value e¤ect that increases the bank incentives to
improve loan quality. In Freixas & al. (2004), emergency lending for individual banks
is justied in crisis periods and in markets where market discipline is high. In these
cases, screening of potential borrowers is the main source of moral hazard, and emer-
gency lending decreases increases for gambling. Finally, Gorton & Huang (2004) point
to the opportunity costs of private agents having large amounts of liquidity at hand.
Because private liquidity is costly, bank bail-outs may be socially optimal.
Constructive ambiguity has been proposed as a mechanism for decreasing banks
risk taking in presence of LOLR policy. This term refers to randomising the rescue of
banks unconditionally and so reducing the expectations of a bail-out27. In a setting
with nonseparable liquidity and solvency risk, Freixas (2000) considers the optimal
LOLR policy. This comprises announcing a limit for the uninsured debt of banks,
above which the bank will never be rescued, and exercising constructive ambiguity for
the rest of the banks. In contrast, neither Cordella & Yeyati (2003) nor Freixas & al.
(2004) nd any justication for constructive ambiguity; instead, commitment to a rule
always dominates in terms of welfare.
Finally, Giammarino & al. (1993) o¤er an interesting insight into regulatory for-
bearance by explaining the phenomenon as part of the optimal regulatory policy. In
their model, the regulator weights o¤ the e¤ects of adverse selection, moral hazard,
and costly regulatory intervention. The optimal policy then implies a higher level of
bank risk in the society than could be possible to achieve. In the following section, we
see how forbearance mostly originates from the incentives of the regulator in theoretic
models, and is therefore not socially optimal.
27See e.g. Goodfriend & Lacker (1999) and Freixas (2000). Note that this kind of randomisation
may include liquidation of solvent but illiquid banks for incentive reasons. Situations where the ability
of the LOLR to commit to such a policy as well as alternative denitions of constructive ambiguity is
questioned are considered in the following Section.
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Regulatory Incentives
In the previous section, optimal safety net design was investigated, given that the reg-
ulator was able to produce the socially optimal regulatory outcome. However, societies
seem to su¤er large losses in case of bank failures. In addition, governments often
inject money into troubled nancial institutions, and there is evidence that not every
governmental restructuration e¤ort has been e¤ective after a bank crisis.28 Finally,
banking regulation is often delegated to some institution, whose interests may di¤er
from those of the social planner.
In this section, contributions related to regulatory incentive problems are consid-
ered. The risk level of the bank portfolio or the true level of assets is typically nonob-
servable or at least nonveriable information, and so they cannot be contracted upon.
Even the denition of bank capital is not entirely free from regulatory discretion. The
incomplete contracts paradigm shows that, even in absence of informational asym-
metries, regulatory problems may arise due to nonveriability. In the following, two
situations are distinguished. First, the regulator is often a separate body from the
social planner and may therefore have biased incentives. Second, there may be some
closure costs for the society, such that the regulators incentives may be altered ex post
and optimal regulatory policy may be time inconsistent. As this is anticipated by the
rational agents, an enforcement problem arises as to the optimal bailout policy.
The possibility of the regulators acting according to their own interest has raised
the question of socially optimal division of tasks between the regulatory agencies29.
In an incomplete contracts setting, Repullo (2000) compares the performance of the
central bank and the deposit insurance corporation as a LOLR with the social optimum,
given their task-related, biased incentives. He shows that the central bank is closer to
the social optimum when liquidity shocks are small, whereas the deposit insurance
corporation is more optimal when these shocks are large enough. This is because, due
to the objective functions of the two agents, the central bank is too soft for small shocks
and too strict for large ones, whereas the deposit insurance corporation is always too
strict. In contrast, Boot & Thakor (1993) model a situation where there is uncertainty
about the regulators detection ability. The regulator, worried about his reputation,
28See Caprio & Klingebiel (1996). Kane (1990) describes the Savings & Loans crisis in the United
States, and the costs related to the length of the insolvency period before closure. Vihriälä (1997)
provides information as to the costs of bank support during the Finnish bank crisis.
29We concentrate here on the agency problem and do not consider here the question whether
nancial supervisory information is helpful in conducting monetary policy. For this issue, see e.g. Di
Noia & Di Giorgio (1999), Goodhart & Schoenmaker (1995), and Peek & al. (1999).
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closes the bank less eagerly than would be socially optimal, because a closure decision
will make the public revise downwards its beliefs on the monitoring ability of the
regulator. As this results from the regulator manipulating the closure decision in order
to inuence its reputation as a monitorer, separation of monitoring and closure tasks
would eliminate the distortion.
The second strand of literature considers the renegotiation problem of bank closure
by a welfare-maximising regulator, when bank closure is costly. Examples of such
costs include the opportunity cost of foregone nancial intermediation, as in Mailath
& Mester (1994) and in Gorton & Winton (1998, 2000), or a systemic cost in form of
chain reaction in the payment system, as in Freixas & al. (2000a) and in Allen & Gale
(2000b). Once a bank has not complied with the rules, the regulators incentives may
di¤er from the ex ante ones, if the net costs of the bailout remain below the closure
costs.
The existence of closure costs and the inability of the regulator to commit to act
against its ex post interests lead to time inconsistency of the regulatory closure policy
in the sense of Kydland & Prescott (1977): Ex ante, it is optimal for the welfare-
maximising regulator to announce the socially optimal closure rule. Ex post, however,
the regulator will face closure costs, which it weights against the costs of letting the
bank operate under the current bank risk. As the bank rationally anticipates this, it
chooses a higher than socially optimal risk level.
A well-known formalisation of the time inconsistency problem of the optimal clo-
sure policy is Mailath & Mester (1994), where expected costs of failure of an imprudent
bank are compared to the immediate costs of closure and to the opportunity cost of
a shrinking nancial sector. Elsewhere, Gorton & Winton (1995, 1998) show how the
time inconsistency problem in the presence of the opportunity cost of lost nancial
intermediation leads to no regulatory restriction being binding for a bank if there are
no other closure costs involved30. Also Dewatripont & Tirole (1994) distinguish be-
tween the shareholder and depositor incentives and show that achieving social optimum
necessitates the regulator to represent the depositors instead of the total welfare. In
their paper, the incentives of the social planner thus have to be distorted towards one
interest group in order to counteract the time inconsistency problem.
In terms of LOLR policy, the time inconsistent regulatory policy manifests itself
as the tendency of unconditional bail-outs of banks that are too big to fail. In other
30The value of the bank in trouble is typically undetermined as there is still a chance that the risky
investment will pay out; the closure costs, on the contrary, may be determined.
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words, there is a threshold, above which a bank is so important for the system that
it is optimal for the lender of last resort to ex post always exercise bailout. This is
of course reected in the banks strategy. In an interbank market model, Rochet &
Tirole (1996) show how optimal incentives for banks imply a rule where the lender of a
bank in distress has to be closed before it becomes insolvent. This policy is, however,
time inconsistent, and so there is too little monitoring in the interbank market. Too
big to fail then emerges as a policy where the borrower bank will be rescued instead of
the solvent but illiquid lender banks. In Freixas & al. (2000a) payment system model,
liquidity provision to the counterparties is not feasible under certain conditions, which
results in predestined bail-outs of money-centre banks.
In the previous section, a notion of constructive ambiguity was presented. As the
concept has originated from practitioners, theorists have tried to nd a suitable de-
nition for it31. Consequently, some solution concepts proposed for correcting the too
big to fail problem have fallen under constructive ambiguity in the literature. One
denition, as proposed in BIS (1997) and in Enoch & al. (1997), is regulatory discre-
tion as to the conditions of emergency lending, in order to increase the uncertainty of
a bank bail-out. Nevertheless, as Freixas & al. (2000b) point out, discretion of this
type again gives rise to a time inconsistency problem, where intervention ex post may
be the incentive compatible action, even though ex ante it would be better to deny
the existence of the safety net. Yet another approach has been to dene constructive
ambiguity as a result of the social trade-o¤ in terms of balancing between systemic im-
plications of a bank failure and moral hazard, as in Bini Smaghi (2000) and Goodhart
& Huang (1999, 2005). Goodhart & Huang (2005) postulate that the central bank
trades o¤ a stochastic loss of shrinking deposits due to bank failures against the bank
moral hazard. The optimal bail-out policy, depending on the insolvency and contagion
probabilities, and in addition, on bank size in a non-monotonic way, is called construc-
tive ambiguity because of its time variance and because of the elimination of the too
big to fail problem. However, the problem of predetermined bailouts remains. The
fundamental di¤erence as to the denition of constructive ambiguity in the previous
section is that here, the LOLR will never liquidate a bank against its own interests.
Hence, if these interests are known to the banks, there will be no ambiguity as to the
bail-out policy.
31See Freixas & al. (2000b) for a discussion.
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1.2.3 Regulation of Multinational Banks
Multinational banking has several consequences on regulation. First, as long as na-
tional regulators continue to exist, there is a mismatch as to geographical regulatory
jurisdictions and the areas of operation of the banks. This gives rise to externalities, but
may also alter the ease of information acquisition. Second, the coexistence of multiple
regulators may lead to regulatory competition and common agency. The multiplicity
of regulators enlarges the strategy space of the social planner and options may become
available that bring the regulatory equilibrium closer to the social optimum. In the
following, each of these aspects will be studied more in detail.
The optimal regulation of multinational banks presupposes taking into account their
di¤erent liability structure, on the one hand, and the diversication e¤ect of holding
assets in several markets, on the other. As to the liability structure, an international
bank can normally choose between a branch or a subsidiary structure. Whereas the
former is an elementary part of the parent bank with pooled assets, the latter is a
separate asset that can be liquidated without involvement of parent assets. Under
limited liability, the subsidiary thus bears similarities with a call option. Kahn &
Winton (2004) consider the welfare e¤ects of a symmetric subsidiary structure, where
each subsidiary is liable up to its own assets only. They nd out that allowing rms
to choose subsidiary structure reduces incentives to risk shifting in the safer subsidiary
and can improve welfare, as limited risk shifting within the riskier subsidiary is often
less costly than risk shifting within a pooled structure. A related result is obtained
by Harr & Ronde (2006) in the banking context, where branch structure banks turn
out to be less prudent than subsidiary structure banks. In a multinational setting,
Loranth & Morrison (2003) compare the liability structures and diversication e¤ects
of the two ownership forms and nd out that minimum capital requirements lead to
underinvestment of multinational banks due to a combination of risk diversication
and capital increase e¤ect on the value of deposit insurance. As a consequence, the
optimal minimum capital requirements are the lowest for the branch bank and the
highest for a domestic bank. In contrast, the optimal minimum capital requirements
in Harr & Ronde (2006) are time variant for the branch structure banks. If the banks
risk level is private information, the banks can be induced to self-selection in structure
by imposing a lower minimum capital requirement for the branch structure bank.
In the above mentioned papers, regulators were assumed to be able to commit to
the optimal regulatory policy. This assumption may be unrealistic in the multinational
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context in particular, as there are many national regulators involved, with possible
systemic e¤ects of their actions outside their jurisdiction. In addition, the time incon-
sistency problem presented in the domestic case equally applies in the international
context. In Repullo (2001), the deposit insurance externality causes the regulator to
be more lenient towards a multinational branch bank than towards a domestic one.
The regulatory e¤ect will be likely to increase the incentives for takeovers, especially
if the target bank is small in its market, if the di¤erence in risk in the two countries
is large, and if the deposit insurance payment is diminished by the inclusion in the
home country deposit insurance system. In a similar vein, Calzolari & Loranth (2005)
consider regulatory incentives in a multinational banks setting when there is imperfect
information as to the banks investment project and regional externalities according
to the home country control principle. Due to di¤erences in regional externalities and
assets available for diminishing deposit insurance payments, incentives for regulatory
intervention by the home country regulator and for regulatory monitoring are generally
higher for branch structure banks than for subsidiary structure banks.
Although regulation of one entity is always appointed to a single regulator accord-
ing to the home country control principle, more than one regulators participate in the
regulatory process of a multinational bank in form of supervisory information exchange
and regulatory rules setting. This can lead to competitive behaviour that reduces reg-
ulatory standards, as in Holthausen & Ronde (2004), DellAriccia & Marquez (2003),
Acharya (2003), and Dalen & Olsen (2003). Holthausen & Ronde (2004) show that
if national regulators pursue their own interests, regulatory cooperation in form of
information exchange prevails only to the extent that the interests of the regulators
are aligned. This creates incentives for multinational banks to strategically allocate
investments across countries in order to avoid closure. DellAriccia & Marquez (2003)
consider banking systems with di¤ering tastes for regulation and show that regulatory
race to the bottom emerges. Moreover, if regulators are welfare-maximising in their
jurisdictions, an additional e¤ect appears in form of promoting the shareholders in the
country via competitive advantage in form of laxer regulation. As in Holthausen &
Ronde (2004), cooperation necessitates su¢ ciently aligned interests. Acharya (2003)
shows that the harmonisation of capital adequacy regulation leads to the implementa-
tion of the worst closure policy among the countries, unless bank closure is centralised.
Finally, Dalen & Olsen (2003) show that despite regulatory race to the bottom in
capital adequacy requirements, the probability of bank failure remains insensitive, as
national regulators compensate by increasing incentives to improve asset quality.
Finally, as to LOLR activity within Europe, the Treaty on the EU does not assign
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an unambiguous responsibility to one regulator but preserves a veto right for the ECB.
The common agency paradigm, developed by Bernheim & Whinston (1986), considers
the coexistence of principals. In a setting where the agents action is nonobservable,
non-cooperation of principals becomes detrimental precisely in cases where welfare
losses due to information asymmetries arise under perfect cooperation. In particular,
separate agendas have no welfare advantage of any kind as to cooperation. In contrast,
if there is risk of collusion between the agent and the principal, common agency can
improve welfare, as in La¤ont & Martimort (1999). For the European nancial mar-
ket context, we are particularly interested in common agency models with overlapping
tasks. Martimort (1999) shows that if there is asymmetric information between the reg-
ulators, separation of regulatory power can be optimal, as it improves commitment by
making renegotiation harder. Finally, Tirole (1994) demonstrates that, under observ-
able but nonveriable information, the time inconsistency problem of the government
can be solved by separation of regulators that have biased objectives and by allocating
the regulatory power in a state-contingent way, based on some contractible variable.
1.2.4 Summary
Three aspects arise from the theoretical considerations presented above. First, for
equality and e¢ ciency considerations, it seems to make sense to incorporate a safety
net into the regulatory framework. However, the strategic e¤ect on bank behaviour
must not be ignored, implying that some control mechanism for bank risk has to be
introduced. Second, an agency problem between the regulator and the social planner
may emerge, or the optimal policy may be time inconsistent. Third, as regulation
of international banks is linked with the separation of regulatory jurisdictions and
regulatory impacts, signicant externalities may arise. This further highlights the
importance of the consideration of regulatory incentives.
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1.3 Implications and Outlook
Based on the current organisation of banking regulation and on the market structure,
three main questions emerge in the context of European banking regulation:
1. Who should regulate? Is the current practise of home country control principle
optimal, or should we move towards integrated regulation in Europe? Given the exist-
ing and well-documented externalities inherent in the combination of in multinational
banking and national regulation, centralising regulation within the EU seems to possess
natural allure.
2. How explicit should the division of responsibilities be? In particular, is the
ambiguity as to the LOLR responsibilities in case of a pan-European bank failure of
constructive nature? If banking regulation is to remain at a national level, how explicit
rules should be designed as to information exchange and coordinated action?
3. Does market structure matter? In particular, what implications and origins may
the strong division of the EU-15 as mainly home countries and the CEE countries as
hosts have?
The modelling approach taken in the subsequent chapters seeks to elaborate on
these questions. Chapter 2 compares the home country control principle with a common
regulator setting and studies the regulatory e¤ect on bank risk taking and on the
structure of ownership of multinational banks. It turns out that the characteristics of
the host market can have important implications on the optimality of the regulatory
system. It is shown that if regulators are welfare maximising, the host country regulator
is less lenient for the foreign subsidiaries than the common regulator, and additionally,
promotes the e¢ cient branch structure better. As a conclusion, if some banks are
represented via subsidiaries, and if the foreign units are small, home country control
principle performs better in terms of welfare than a common regulator.
Chapter 3 asks whether the time inconsistency problem of the optimal emergency
lending policy can be compensated for by appointing an additional, supranational
LOLR. Two scenarios are considered: First, the supranational regulator has the right
to veto the liquidation decision of the national regulator. The second scenario is more
theoretical and asks, given that a mechanism exists where the two regulators are able
to alter the expectations of the banks on bail-out conditions, whether such a mech-
anism can improve welfare. It turns out that both kind of ambiguities are seldom
welfare improving and, in particular, compensate badly for the elimination of the time
INTRODUCTION 25
inconsistency problem. The optimal policy in most cases is shown to be to appoint the
responsibilities to the stricter regulator according to a size and ownership contingent
rule.
Finally, Chapter 4 studies the conditions and the e¤ects of international takeovers
when bank capital is costly due to restrictions in the supply side and when banks care
for their continuation, or charter, values. It turns out that internationalisation increases
bank capital in the market in total. Moreover, with large enough a di¤erence in the
price of capital, a multinational bank imports stability into the host country. Finally,
minimum capital requirements, if they are binding, direct foreign investment towards
less developed markets. The increased incentives for takeovers in case of minimum
capital requirements in the home country, and the greater concentration of interna-
tionalisation in case of host country regulation, do not necessarily conict with the
stability objective of regulation. On the contrary, the stability e¤ect of internationali-
sation is strengthened in the least developed nancial markets, which may be the place
where such an e¤ect is the most desired.
All the three models are dynamic games with strategic interaction between the
regulators and the banks. The bank nances either part or all of its investments with
insured debt and thus faces a limited liability. In addition, in Chapters 2 and 3, the
bank acts as a delegated monitorer. Under nonveriable monitoring e¤ort, it follows
that the bank incentives are suboptimal such that the rm moral hazard will be passed
on in form of a socially insu¢ cient level of monitoring. These factors give rise to the
need of regulation in the models.
The society responds to the need of regulation by appointing an agency that has
the power to close the bank, or as in Chapter 3, additionally to provide emergency
nancing. Chapters 2 and 3 concentrate on the regulatory time inconsistency problem
and look at the e¤ect of regional externalities on regulatory incentives. Chapter 4
abstracts from the regulatory forbearance and asks instead how multinational banking
and the amount of bank capital are linked with each other, and how minimum capital
requirements a¤ect the banksincentives to internationalise.
The main result states that the optimality of a common European regulator re-
quires a more homogenous market than the European market is at the moment. The
multiplicity of regulators enlarges the regulatory strategy space of the social planner
in a benecial way, as it is possible to reduce the problem of regulatory forbearance
with an optimal division of responsibilities and clear mandates. All forms of informal
cooperation, in contrast, are likely to worsen the regulatory outcome from the national
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one. Finally, the extreme concentration of foreign direct investment in Europe may be a
symptom of the prevailing heterogeneity in terms of nancial market development, and
regulation may have enforced the e¤ect further. However, this phenomenon is stability
improving. In sum, the heterogeneity of the European markets and the multiplicity of
national regulators may not be anything to worry about, as long as more attention is
paid to the avoidance of unclear mandates, and as long as the single market in terms
of the level of nancial market development has not truly emerged.
Chapter 2
Incomplete Contracts,
Multinational Bank Closure, and
the Choice of Ownership Structure
2.1 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of the regulatory arrangement on the regulatory incen-
tives, on the risk level of the bank assets, and on the form of ownership of an interna-
tional bank, when the bank in question can control the risk level through monitoring
and choose between branch and subsidiary form.
Bankruptcy legislation denes a branch as part of the parent bank, its assets being
pooled with those of the parent, whereas a subsidiary is an independent asset of the
parent bank. As a consequence, in case of nancial distress, a branch has to be bailed
out by the parent; a subsidiary, however, can fail independently. Banking regulation
in the EU reects this through the principle of home country control, which attributes
the consolidated regulation of the entire multinational branch structure bank to the
country where the bank has been licensed in the rst place, i.e. to the home country.
Subsidiaries, on the contrary, belong to the responsibility of the country where they
operate, the host country.
The model wants to capture some characteristics of banking that are typical for
the new enlarged EU. In almost all of the CEE countries, foreign ownership accounts
for more than half of the banking sector, subsidiaries being the dominant structure in
most countries. In addition, credit risk is often substantial. Moreover, as the banking
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sectors in the CEE countries are small in comparison to those of the EU-15, branches
and subsidiaries in those countries often account for a very small part of the assets of
the parent bank.
Existing policy literature on the organisation of banking regulation in Europe often
advocates for unied regulation in the EMU level, either within the ECB or as an
independent authority1. In particular, Danthine & al. (1999) argue that a common
regulator diminishes excessive interventionism of the national regulators that fail to
internalise the e¤ects outside of their jurisdictions. However, if the common regulator
maximises social welfare, a time inconsistency problem may emerge, as closing the
bank becomes ex post less attractive than what it was ex ante. In this case, the
home country control principle may introduce a positive externality in the form of the
neglect of expected returns and systemic costs that occur outside the jurisdiction of
the regulator in charge.
The aim of the model is to concentrate on the liability structure of multinational
banks and not on internationalisation or diversication motives per se. As a con-
sequence, we do not consider domestic banks. We model a situation where, under
the limited liability due to deposit insurance, an unregulated bank would monitor its
investments less than what would be socially optimal. At the same time, the welfare-
maximising regulators are not able to commit to the socially optimal closure rule:
Although it is ex ante optimal for the regulator to close a bank whose monitoring level
lies below the social optimum, ex post, social welfare is higher for a range of lower
monitoring values if the bank remains open than if it is closed. As a consequence, the
regulatory announcement of the ex ante socially optimal closure policy is not credible.
The bank will take this into account and, knowing that the regulator will allow the
bank to continue, will choose a monitoring level as close as possible to its unconstrained
optimum.
We consider both a scenario where the multinational bank is regulated by a com-
mon regulator and where the home country control principle is applied. In the latter
situation, there are two counteracting externalities at work. First, the home country
regulator does not take into account the systemic costs caused by closure or failure of
an international branch in the host country. Second, the host country regulator does
not internalise the amount of prots going to the foreign owners of the subsidiary. As to
the bank, the monitoring decision is guided by a trade-o¤ between the expected return
1For discussion, see e.g. Aglietta (1999), Danthine & al. (1999), DiNoia & DiGiorgio (1999),
Padoa-Schioppa (1999), Eichengreen & Ghironi (2002), Huizinga (2002), and Schüler (2003).
INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS, MULTINATIONAL BANK CLOSURE, AND THE
CHOICE OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 29
and the costs of monitoring. In choosing between branch and subsidiary structure, the
bank weighs the more e¢ cient monitoring technology in the former case against the
higher value of the deposit insurance in the latter one.
In a setting where the ownership structure is xed, it turns out that neither the
common nor the home country regulator restricts the branch structure bank in its
monitoring choice, if the size of the foreign entity is small. Nevertheless, the smallness
of the branch together with the liability structure implies that the bank internalises
all its e¤ects, and therefore, chooses the socially optimal monitoring level. This would
not happen in the case of an unconstrained subsidiary bank; in addition, the common
regulator now lets the bank operate within a range of monitoring levels below the social
optimum. However, the home country control principle is helpful in overcoming the
time inconsistency problem to some extent: as the host country regulator does not take
all the returns of the international bank into account at the time of decision making,
its closure threat is more restrictive for the bank than that of the common regulator.
Endogenising the choice of ownership structure further emphasises the advantages
of the home country control principle. In particular, if the size of the foreign entity
is small, the home country control principle is more successful in inducing ine¢ cient
subsidiary structure banks to choose the branch form than the common regulator. As
the branch structure here is the more e¢ cient and, additionally, turns out to be the
more stable form of banking for the case of small host markets, stability and e¢ ciency
are complements in our framework.
Like in Diamond (1984) and in Besanko & Kanatas (1993), the bank is modelled
here as a delegated monitorer of a rm investing in risky projects. If this monitorer
faces a limited liability due to deposit insurance, monitoring incentives are decreased,
as pointed out by Besanko & Kanatas (1993) and Holmström & Tirole (1997), among
others. Delegating the monitoring of banks further to a regulator and threatening them
with closure can then help in achieving the rst best. But in presence of nonveriable
information and costs related to bank closure, it gives rise to the time inconsistency
problem as to the socially optimal closure policy. In this strand of literature, Mailath &
Mester (1994) conclude that the closure constraint is rarely binding for the bank: a bank
in operation has a value per se for the regulator, who cannot commit itself to the closure
in case the bank does not choose the socially optimal risk level. Gorton & Winton
(1998) reproduce this result in a transition economy case with capital adequacy ratios.
However, they do not consider foreign ownership in their work. Indeed, the present
paper argues that foreign ownership changes regulatory trade-o¤s in a signicant way.
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In the theoretical literature on multinational banking regulation, recent contribu-
tions from Holthausen & Ronde (2004) and from DellAriccia & Marquez (2003) study
regulatory competition and nd out that heterogeneity of the regulated markets de-
creases welfare in cooperative settings. The former result builds on a signalling game
between regulators, where the international banks prot from the interest conict in
form of lower closure probability. The latter analyse incentives for regulatory cooper-
ation and show that heterogeneity increases the costs of exibility loss. The present
paper is closer to Loranth & Morrison (2003), who distinguish between branch and sub-
sidiary structures in a capital regulation and deposit insurance setting. Whereas they
investigate the relation between capital requirements and under-investment of a multi-
national bank, we concentrate on the e¤ect of the two regulatory arrangements on the
time inconsistency problem of the regulator and on welfare in an international setting.
Calzolari & Loranth (2005) study regulatory incentives to intervene and monitor the
bank and their impact on the ownership structure choice with asymmetric information
on the risk level of the banks investment. The central trade-o¤ is between more avail-
able assets for nancing the deposit insurance in the branch case and the more limited
responsibility to provide deposit insurance in the subsidiary case. However, they do
not take a stand in terms of welfare, nor has the regulator any e¤ect on the risk level
of the investment. Finally, Dalen & Olsen (2003) investigate the e¤ect of regulatory
arrangements and of ownership structure on stability and on e¢ ciency in a symmetric
common agency setting. If regulators extract rents in form of insurance premium, the
probability of bank failure is insensitive to the decentralised nature of bank regulation
due to counteracting e¤ects on capital requirements and investment quality. In case of
time inconsistency, as the regulator is no more capable of enforcing compensation rules,
this insensitiveness no longer applies. The fundamental di¤erence as to my approach
is that, in Dalen & Olsen (2003), a common regulator with branch structure banks
create the highest aggregate e¢ ciency. On the contrary, due to the time inconsistency
problem, the home country control regime is the most e¢ cient form of regulation in
the present paper: it not only induces the socially preferred branch form for a larger
parameter set, but also works more e¢ ciently in regulating the subsidiaries than the
common regulator.
The chapter is organised as follows: The rst section presents the basic model, and
the utility functions of the bank and of the regulators are explained. The choice of
monitoring level with exogenous ownership structure is solved in Section 2.3, and in
Section 2.4, the ownership structure choice is endogenised. Section 2.5 summarises the
main implications for banking regulation in the EU, and nally, Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 The Basic Model
In this section, the basic assumptions concerning the model structure are rst ex-
plained. Before continuing with the solving of the model, the utility functions of the
bank and of the regulators are equally studied in detail.
2.2.1 Economy Structure
The economy consists of two countries with a monopolistic multinational bank that
has a parent bank in the home country and either a branch or a subsidiary in the host
country. We assume that the foreign entity is smaller than the parent bank and scale
the operations in the host country with  , 0 <  < 1.The parent bank maximises the
expected prot of the entire bank. The bank receives 1 +  as deposits, and invests
them into projects in respective countries. In order to keep things simple and not to
introduce the possibility of failure at home, we assume that the bank receives a riskless
income Y at home, with 1 < Y < 2. In the host country, however, the bank invests its
deposits  in a risky project, the probability of success of which depends on the e¤ort
devoted to monitoring by the bank. More precisely, the return in the host country will
be
R =
(
H with probability p
0 with probability (1  p) ; (2.1)
where the bank directly chooses the probability p and 1 < H < 2.2 Increasing the
probability of success through monitoring is costly and has a cost function C (p) = p
2
2
,
where  > 0.
The deposit insurance premium paid by the bank is assumed to be a at rate and
is normalised to zero, as well as the interest rate paid on the deposits.
The di¤erence between the branch and subsidiary structures arises here from two
2This form of simplication is chosen because we are interested in the choice of ownership form
and not in the risk diversication motive of internationalisation in general, like Loranth & Morrison
(2003). In comparison to the branch structure, the advantage of the subsidiary structure is its option
nature, as the parent bank is not liable for losses of the subsidiary. In Section 2.A in the Appendix
it will be shown that allowing for risk diversication weakens this insurance somewhat but does not
have qualitative e¤ects on the results concerning the host country. In the real life, subsidiary form is
popular in particular in the CEE countries, which, taking the high credit risk there into account, may
indeed reect the importance of the option motive.
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factors. First, the assets of the branch bank are pooled, whereas the subsidiary has a
separate treatment in bankruptcy. As a consequence, the value of deposit insurance is
higher for the subsidiary structure bank than for the branch structure bank. Second, I
assume that the branch bank is more e¢ cient in monitoring its assets3. This manifests
itself in the model through smaller monitoring costs for the branch structure bank:
B > S , where the index B indicates the cost function parameter of the branch
form and Sthat of the subsidiary form.
The bank is regulated either by a common regulator or by two regulators that divide
the responsibilities according to the home country principle. A regulator maximises
the expected welfare of its own jurisdiction through deciding whether to close the bank
or to let it continue, based on the probability of success of the risky project in the host
country. In doing so, it compares the following two outcomes:
 If the bank is let to continue, with probability p the regulator does not have to
intervene. With probability (1  p), however, the risky investment yields zero return.
In this case, the regulator has to pay the deposit insurance and the systemic cost S.
 If the regulator decides to close the bank, the bank can be liquidated at a
value L < 1. The deposits beyond the liquidation value will again be paid by the
regulator, as well as the systemic cost S which is assumed to be smaller than in the
case of later bankruptcy. In addition, 0 <  < 1  L.4
In the equilibrium with rational expectations, the regulator knows the chosen mon-
itoring level; however, it is not veriable to a third party. As a consequence, the regu-
lator cannot commit itself to any closure policy through a contract but acts according
to its own interests.
Finally, we assume that it is rst-best e¢ cient to have nancial markets in opera-
tion. Without this assumption, there would be no game.
3One rationale for this goes along the ownership structure literature following Grossman & Hart
(1986) and Hart & Moore (1990). Unlike branch, a subsidiary can be either wholly or partially
owned by the parent. This looser ownership form may lead to less control on residual rights and
less incentives to use the assets e¢ ciently. In a similar vein, literature on spill-overs in foreign direct
investment points out that a less complete foreign ownership may lead to larger technological spill-
overs and thus decreased incentives for the foreign rm to transfer technology into the foreign unit
( see Blomström & Kokko 1998 for a survey). Finally, some anecdotal evidence supports our view.
For example, Nordea (2003), a Swedish bank operating in the Baltic countries, justies its recent
restructuring from a subsidiary to a branch structure bank with e¢ ciency gains.
Note that subsidiary ownership is assumed to be 100 percent foreign in the present model. As
letting the share vary does not change the results qualitatively, it is left out for simplicity.
4The connection between the liquidity value and the share of systemic cost in case of closure
guarantees that an increase in the systemic cost S always increases regulatory incentives to close the
bank.
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2.2.2 The Utility Functions of the Bank and of the Regulators
Before going into solving the model, we briey consider the utility functions of the
bank and of the regulators.
In case of an international bank with a branch structure and with full deposit
insurance, the parent bank maximises the following expected prot:
E (B) = p (W + H)  CB (p) + (1  p) fmaxW; 0g ; (2.2)
where W  Y   1   5. The parameter W is introduced in order to better be
able to distinguish between two cases, depending on whether the bank is able to pay
back the deposits both in the home and in the host country with the riskless returns
from the home country investment or not. If the branch bank can nance its deposits
even in the case of failure in the host country (i.e. W  0), the bank will never go
bankrupt. If, however, the home country return is too small to cover the deposits
in the two countries (W < 0), there is a positive probability that the whole branch
structure bank will fail. In the latter case, the bank is entitled to deposit insurance
and its liability is limited so that the maximum loss it can su¤er is its investment in
monitoring in the host country.
In case of an international bank with a subsidiary structure and full deposit insur-
ance, the expected prot for the bank becomes
E (S) = Y   1 +  [p (H   1)  CS (p)] : (2.3)
Note that the bank can now always retain the safe earnings in the home country
and hence never risks a total bankruptcy nor has a duty to pay the deposits in the host
country from its earnings in the home country. The liability of the subsidiary structure
bank is thus more limited than that of the branch structure bank.
Turning to the regulator, he maximises welfare within his jurisdiction. In the com-
mon regulator case, this means maximising the joint welfare of the two economies. In
the home country control case, the home country regulator is responsible for the entire
5We assume here that the e¤ort cost must not be covered through the income, i.e. the bank can
make a loss as big as the e¤ort cost. This helps us in showing in the Appendix that the banks desired
choice of monitoring is lower than the social optimum equally in the branch case when W<0. Note
that by denition, -1 < W < 1. Note in addition that the limit on liability also depends on e¢ ciency.
In general, the liability of the branch structure bank is always larger than that of the subsidiary
structure bank.
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branch structure bank, whereas the host country regulator controls the subsidiary in
its country.
Table 2.1 shows the payo¤s of the welfare-maximising common regulator. The
regulator determines the lowest monitoring level for which it leaves the bank open,
given the trade-o¤ between the probability and the costs of failure, on the one hand,
and closure costs, on the other. The former costs vary not only depending on whether
the whole bank or just the subsidiary will be closed, but also with the probability of
failure that di¤ers according to the organisational structure. Note in particular that
in the branch case with W  0 the risk of failure is zero, whereas closure is costly.
Table 2.1: Payo¤s of the welfare-maximising common regulator
Branch Branch Subsidiary
W0 W<0
CR, open W+(pH-C(p)) W+(pH-C(p))-(1-p)(1+)S W+(pH-C(p))-(1-p)S
CR, close (1+)(L-1-S)-C(p) (1+)(L-1-S)-C(p) (L-1-S)+Y-1-C(p)
If the home country principle applies, the entire branch bank is regulated by the
home country regulator, whereas the subsidiary falls to the responsibility of the host
country regulator. In addition to the bankruptcy code, the threshold monitoring level
is now inuenced by the identity of the regulator, since he is interested in the returns
and the systemic cost only within his jurisdiction and in the deposit insurance payment
he is responsible for. This leads to the emergence of two externalities: First, in the
branch case, the regulator, although responsible for the entire bank, is not interested
in the systemic cost in the host country. Second, the subsidiary regulator does not care
for the prots of the bank, since they accrue to host country shareholders. In so doing,
the welfare-maximising host country regulator acts in fact like the cost minimising
regulator in Mailath & Mester (1994). The payo¤s in case of the home country control
principle are listed in Table 2.2.
We now turn to solving the model. As the primary interest lies in the CEE countries,
we focus here on the situation whereW  06. The case withW < 0 is studied in Section
2.B in the Appendix. In the following, we rst consider a scenario where the ownership
structure of the bank is exogenously given. The focus will be on the social trade-o¤ of
6In the CEE countries in particular, economies are small as compared to those of the home
countries of the international banks in the area. The assets of foreign branches and subsidiaries,
despite of them often being local market leaders, hardly never exceed ve per cent of the assets of
their parent banks.
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Table 2.2: Payo¤s of the welfare-maximising regulator, Home Country Control
Branch Branch Subsidiary
W0 W<0
(Home country regulator) (Home country regulator) (Host country regulator)
HCC, open W+(pH-C(p)) W+(pH-C(p))-(1-p)S -(1-p)(1+S)
HCC, close (1+)(L-1)-S-C(p) (1+)(L-1)-S-C(p) (L-1-S)
time inconsistency with the common regulator against regulatory externalities in the
case of home country control principle. The e¤ect of regulatory arrangements on the
choice of ownership structure will then be studied in Section 2.4.
2.3 Monitoring with Exogenous Ownership Struc-
ture
In this section, we consider a situation with xed ownership structure and study the
e¤ect of regulation on bank behaviour. This is a multi-stage game with perfect infor-
mation that will be solved through backward induction. The timing of the game is as
follows: The bank rst decides the monitoring level p at cost C(p). The regulator then
makes its closure decision. Finally, prots and losses materialise.
Before solving the game, we briey consider the rst best solution as well as the
maximisation problem of an unrestricted bank and show that the absence of the regu-
latory threat results in too little monitoring from the social welfare point of view. We
then proceed with the multi-stage game by bringing the regulator into the model and
by assuming that it is impossible for him to commit to a closure policy other than what
is ex post optimal for his jurisdiction. We nd out that, due to the time inconsistency
problem, the common regulator indeed does not produce the rst-best closure policy
if a bank failure gives rise to a systemic cost and if there is deposit insurance in place.
The introduction of national regulators and imposition of the home country control
principle shows that delegating the control over the subsidiary to the host country
regulator can improve social welfare.
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2.3.1 First Best Solution
The rst best solution results from maximising the expected utility for the two regions,
which consists of the expected income of the bank less the expected social costs of
failure. In case of a branch structure bank withW  0, the maximisation problem will
be
Max
p
W +  [pH   CB (p)] : (2.4)
Note that if the branch is small enough, the returns generated in the home market
are su¢ cient to cover the payments to the depositors even in the case when the risky
host country investment does not pay o¤. As a consequence, the bank cannot fail and
thus there are no systemic costs occurring at any probability. The resulting equilibrium
rst best monitoring level will be
pFBW0 = BH: (2.5)
In case of subsidiary structure, it is possible to close the subsidiary without closing
the parent bank. However, the closure decision is associated with a systemic cost in
the host country. The social welfare maximisation problem will be of the form
Max
p
W +  [pH   (1  p)S   CS (p)] : (2.6)
The welfare-maximising monitoring level is in this case
pFBS = S (H + S) : (2.7)
Compared to the branch case, there are two e¤ects in action. First, the lower
e¢ ciency is reected by lower beta in the subsidiary case. Second, the positive risk of
bankruptcy of the subsidiary increases the rst best monitoring level. The interaction
of these two terms determines which rst best monitoring level is higher.
We restrict ourselves to cases where an interior solution exists, i.e. we assume that
the chosen monitoring level is always smaller than one at least in the cases of branch
structure with W > 0 and in the subsidiary case7. Intuitively, monitoring technology
7Formally, this translates into assuming that S <
1
H+S and B <
1
H .
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is not so good that it would be rst best e¢ cient to monitor fully, in particular when
the threat of failure and systemic cost is absent in the branch case.
2.3.2 Desired Strategies of the Bank
Before going into the game with the bank and the regulator, we briey consider the
desired asset choices of the subsidiary and branch structure banks.
In the absence of closure threat, the branch bank with W  0 would choose a
monitoring level of
pBjW0 = BH: (2.8)
Note that in our framework, the branch structure bank will choose the socially
optimal monitoring level as long as W  0. As there is no danger of default, the bank
internalises all the e¤ects that it has on the economy, and its prot function coincides
with the social welfare function.
In case of a subsidiary structure bank, optimising without regulatory threat leads
to
pS = S (H   1) : (2.9)
The chosen monitoring e¤ort is now lower than in the branch case for two reasons:
First, due to technology, monitoring is more expensive than with the branch structure.
Second, due to separated assets, the liability of the subsidiary structure bank is more
limited than that of the branch structure bank. In case of bankruptcy, the bank not
only fails to internalise the systemic cost it causes to the society, but also gets a transfer
in form of deposit insurance. Consequently, the chosen monitoring level is below the
social optimum. Lemma 1 reports the standard moral hazard outcome.
Lemma 1 In the branch case with W  0, social welfare will not be a¤ected through
the introduction of the bank. In the subsidiary case, the chosen level of monitoring is
lower than would be socially optimal and lower than in the branch case with W  0.
Proof. See Section 2.C in the Appendix.
The social optimum could thus be achieved through a regulator that closes the
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bank if the chosen monitoring level is below the rst best level8. In the following,
we introduce a regulator into the game. We will see that, in the absence of complete
contracts, the regulator will not be able to commit itself to the social optimum.
2.3.3 RegulatorsDecisions
We now proceed with solving the game by backward induction. In the last stage of the
game, the regulator maximises the welfare of its jurisdiction by deciding whether to
close the bank, given the chosen monitoring level. This results in a threshold monitoring
level below which the bank will be closed. The threshold will depend on the direct costs
and on the expected opportunity costs of closure, on the one hand, and on the expected
costs of failure, on the other. E¢ ciency, on the contrary, does not have any inuence
on this decision, as monitoring costs are sunk for the regulator.
In what follows, the maximisation problem of a common regulator who maximises
the welfare of the two countries is rst presented. After, the home country control
regime is considered.
Common Regulator: In the branch case with W  0, the common regulator will
leave the bank open as long as the continuation value of the bank is positive, i.e.,
W + pH   (1 + ) (L  1  S)  0: (2.10)
We immediately see that this value is always positive and that the branch will
always be left open. Intuitively, the risk of failure of a branch structure bank is zero
when W  0, and therefore, the failure costs never materialise. Closure costs, on the
contrary, are positive.
For the subsidiary, the same procedure will end up with a threshold monitoring
level. In other words, the subsidiary is left open as long as
p  pCRS 
L+ (1  )S
H + S
: (2.11)
Now there is a positive probability of failure with a cost S. Note that because the
regulator has no access to assets at home for paying the deposit insurance, the closure
decision is independent of the size of the subsidiary. Comparison with the rst best
8Note that we do not need to worry here about the participation constraint of the bank, as it is
fullled as long as the social welfare of bank activity is positive.
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solution shows that the threshold with the common regulator is lower than the rst best
probability. This reects the inability of the regulator to commit to the optimal closure
rule: given the direct closure costs and the opportunity costs of foregone investment,
it is still better ex post to let the bank continue for some lower values of monitoring
than the social optimum. As the bank anticipates this, it chooses a monitoring level
as close as possible to its unconstrained optimum, given the ex post closure rule of the
regulator. We can state the following:
Lemma 2 The welfare-maximising common regulator never closes the branch bank if
W  0. On the contrary, the common regulator closes the subsidiary if p < pCRS . The
threshold monitoring level for continuing is lower than the social optimum; hence, the
time inconsistency problem exists.
Proof. See Section 2.C in the Appendix.
By assumption, the regulatory threshold is increasing in the systemic cost S. On
the contrary, the higher the share  of systemic cost in case of closure and the higher
the return H in the host country, the less inclined is the common regulator to close.
Note in particular that a lower liquidity value L reduces the regulatory threshold. This
is related to the standard result of gambling for resurrection, saying that the worse the
initial condition of the bank, the more it pays o¤ for the bank to bet for an insecure,
good outcome9. Here, a lower liquidation value increases the incentives of the regulator
to bet on the good outcome, as the relation of the sure closure costs to expected costs
deteriorates.
Home Country Control: In the branch case, the regulator in charge is that of the
home country, whereas in the subsidiary case, the host country regulator is responsible
for the closure of the subsidiary. We denote the home country regulator with upper
index R1 and the host country regulator with R2.
In the case of a branch structure bank with W  0, the bank will not fail if it is
let to operate, whereas closing the bank will still cause a systemic cost and a deposit
insurance payment. The home country regulator ignores the systemic cost in the host
country, but takes the liquidation values and the deposit insurance into account in both
countries. As a consequence, the regulator lets the bank continue if
W + pH   (1 + ) (L  1) + S > 0: (2.12)
9See e.g. Chari & Jagannathan (1988).
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As in the common regulator case, the continuation value always remains above zero.
In other words, despite the externality of the closure cost in the host country, the home
country regulator always leaves the bank open.
In the case of a subsidiary structure bank, regulation of the subsidiary falls to the
responsibility of the host country regulator. The host regulator lets the subsidiary
continue if
p  pR2S 
L+ (1  )S
1 + S
: (2.13)
Note that this threshold is higher than the one in the common regulator case. This
is because the host country regulator does not take the bank returns, accruing to the
home country shareholders, into account. The society thus benets from the host
country regulator not taking into account the totality of positive factors associated
with the continuing decision, as this externality counteracts the time inconsistency
problem associated with the welfare-maximising regulator. Note that even if foreign
ownership is not complete, this result remains valid as long as some share of the returns
goes abroad.
In the Appendix it is shown that the host country regulator is never too tough, i.e.
never closes when it is not socially optimal. This guarantees that the stricter policy of
the host country regulator always improves welfare. More generally, it also means that
the time inconsistency problem of regulatory policy exists even with a cost-minimising
regulator. This is because the direct losses of closure in terms of systemic cost and
deposit insurance payments are enough to divert regulatory incentives away from the
socially optimal closure policy, despite the absence of opportunity cost considerations
in terms of bank returns.
Proposition 1 In the subsidiary case, the host country regulator is stricter than the
common regulator. Since pR2S < p
FB
S , the host country regulator improves social welfare
if the regulatory constraint is binding.
Proof. see Section 2.C in the Appendix.
Besides the missing e¤ect of bank returns, the comparative statics remain as in the
common regulator case: a larger  induces less strict regulatory behaviour, whereas
increases in liquidity value and systemic cost result in a tighter closure rule.
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2.3.4 Banks Restricted Choice
We now move on to study the banks choice of monitoring level. In the rst stage
of the game, the bank maximises its expected prots, given the closure threat of the
regulator. As the branch structure bank always stays open if W  0 and as the rst
best is achieved, the focus will be on the subsidiary structure bank. The question
whether regulatory requirement is restrictive for the bank turns into asking whether
the monitoring technology of the bank is e¢ cient enough to allow enough monitoring
from the regulatory point of view. Less e¢ cient subsidiary structure banks thus face a
closure threat and modify their choice accordingly.
The subsidiary structure bank maximises its expected prots given the regulatory
closure threshold:
Max
p
Y   1 +  [p (H   1)  CS (p)] s:t: p  pCRS or p  pR2S : (2.14)
We get the following result:
Proposition 2 a) If the following conditions are fullled, the regulator in question is
binding and improves welfare:
pCRS > p

S $ S < CRS  L+(1 )S(H 1)(H+S)
pR2S > p

S $ S < R2S  L+(1 )S(H 1)(1+S) :
b) The host country regulator is binding for a larger set of parameter values than
the common regulator.
Proof. See Section 2.C in the Appendix.
Too ine¢ cient a subsidiary would thus monitor less than the regulator allows and
will as a consequence be pushed to choose between closure and the threshold monitoring
value of the regulator. As the common regulator is inuenced by the bank returns, the
ine¢ cient banks face less stringent restrictions than in case of home country control.
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2.4 Endogenous Choice of Ownership Structure
We now relax the assumption of an exogenous ownership structure. From the welfare
or common regulator point of view, we will see that the e¢ ciency argument in favour of
branch structure remains. From the banks point of view, however, the choice between
a branch and a subsidiary is characterised by trade-o¤between e¢ ciency and insurance:
whereas the branch structure enables a cheaper monitoring technology, the right to an
isolated bankruptcy in the case of subsidiary decreases the liability of the parent bank.
We are interested in nding out the regulatory e¤ect in terms of promoting the more
e¢ cient branch structure.
The timing of the game is now the following: the bank rst chooses whether to
found a branch or a subsidiary, and then makes its monitoring decision. Next, the
regulator decides whether to close the bank or to let it open. Finally, prots and losses
materialise. The only di¤erence to the game in the previous Section is the rst stage,
and so, the results for the regulatory as well as the bank monitoring decisions are still
valid, and we can directly proceed in solving the rst stage of the game. First, however,
the rst best and the unconstrained ownership choice of the bank are presented.
2.4.1 First Best and Desired Structures of Ownership
We rst compare the rst best solutions with branch and subsidiary structure. If
W  0, it is easy to see that the society would prefer the branch option. The result is
intuitively quite simple: the branch structure contains e¢ ciency gains, and if W  0,
there is no risk of failure and no need for closure, and as a consequence, no closure
costs. Flexibility then bears no advantages for the society.10
If W  0, the banks return at home is large enough to cover the losses in the
host country in the branch case. The unconstrained bank has a trade-o¤ between the
e¢ cient monitoring structure, on the one hand, and the right for the deposit insurance
in the host country without touching the assets of the parent bank, on the other.
Comparing the expected returns, we see that the deposit insurance e¤ect weights out
the e¢ ciency gains and the bank prefers the subsidiary structure. In sum, we can state
the following:
10In Section B in the Appendix it is shown that, for W<0, this is not the case: As soon as W<0,
it may be socially optimal to separate the risky investment from the safe parent bank as a subsidiary.
See Kahn & Winton (2004) for a related result.
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Lemma 3 If W  0, the rst best is always to have a branch structure. However, the
unconstrained international bank always prefers the subsidiary structure.
Proof. See Section 2.C in the Appendix.
2.4.2 The Banks Constrained Choice
We now proceed into the solving the rst stage of the multi-stage game with endogenous
ownership structure. If W  0, we saw that the regulator never closed a branch; in
the subsidiary case, however, the regulator was sometimes binding. Moreover, Lemma
3 said that a subsidiary structure bank e¢ cient enough not to be restricted will always
nd branch structure inferior to the status quo. It therefore su¢ ces to compare the
unrestricted maximum in the branch case with the restricted choices in the subsidiary
case. The conditions for the bank choosing the branch structure pin down to
E
 
BjW0

> E
 
CRS

if
S < 
CR(B>S)
S
 (L+ (1  )S)
2
(H + S) [(H + S) (2  BH2) + 2 (H   1) (L+ (1  )S)]
(2.15)
E
 
BjW0

> E
 
R2S

if
S < 
R2(B>S)
S
 (L+ (1  )S)
2
(1 + S) [(1 + S) (2  BH2) + 2 (H   1) (L+ (1  )S)]
:(2.16)
With its closure decision, the regulator a¤ects the banks trade-o¤between e¢ ciency
gains in the branch case and higher value of deposit insurance in the subsidiary case.
As a result, the relatively most ine¢ cient subsidiary banks are induced to choose the
branch structure. We can state the following:
Proposition 3 a) If S < 
CR(B>S)
S , the common regulator is binding and induces
the bank to choose the branch structure.
b) If S < 
R2(B>S)
S , the host country regulator is binding and induces the bank to
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choose the branch structure. In this case, the home country regulator becomes respon-
sible and the bank will choose the social optimum.
c) The home country control system is more successful in inducing the branch struc-
ture: R2(B>S)S > 
CR(B>S)
S . In doing this, the home country control system is welfare-
improving.
Proof. See Section 2.C in the Appendix.
The threshold subsidiary e¢ ciency level for switching to branch is lower than the one
where the regulatory monitoring level becomes binding. In other words, the regulator
forces moderately ine¢ cient banks to choose a higher monitoring level than they would
desire. For the most ine¢ cient subsidiary structure banks, however, the regulatory
requirement induces a switch to branch structure. The regulator thus has a second
channel of operation: besides inuencing the stability of the bank through imposition of
a higher monitoring level, it enhances its e¢ ciency through the e¤ect on the ownership
structure. This further increases stability, as the branch structure banks cannot fail.
Note that in our framework, stability and e¢ ciency become complements.
Finally, we see that a higher liquidation value and a lower share of systemic cost
occurring at early closure shift the threshold e¢ ciency upwards: as both regulators
react by tightening their closure policy on subsidiaries, the branch structure gains
in attractiveness. An increase in B, i.e. an improvement in the branch relative to
subsidiary monitoring technology, increases the opportunity costs of not switching to
branch and therefore increases the threshold e¢ ciency. The e¤ects of systemic cost and
of H for the common regulator are ambiguous. In case of the host country regulator,
however, the e¤ect of increasing H loosens incentives to choose branch structure. As
the host country regulatory threshold is independent of bank returns, the gain in
approaching the desired monitoring level with the subsidiary structure bank outweighs
the higher return in the branch equilibrium.
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2.5 Policy Implications
The purpose of the paper was to focus on the welfare e¤ect of the regulatory structure
in the enlarged EU, while keeping in mind that foreign investment in the banking sector
typically goes from the old member countries to the CEE countries, and that these host
markets are very small. In addition, both subsidiary and branch structures prevail in
the market. Taking these market characteristics into account, we can summarise the
main results of the model so far:
Corollary 1 As long as W  0:
a) The branch structure bank achieves the social optimum; an unregulated bank,
however, prefers the subsidiary structure.
b) The subsidiary will be closed with higher levels of monitoring when the host
country regulator is in charge than when there is a common regulator.
c) No regulator is binding in the branch case. In the subsidiary case, the host
country regulator is stricter and, compared to the common regulator, improves welfare
if S < 
R2
S .
d) Ine¢ cient enough a subsidiary will have an incentive to choose a branch structure
instead. The host country regulator, being more successful in promoting the branch
structure, induces the switch if S < 
R2(B>S)
S .
Hence, if the host market is small in comparison to the parent banks, home country
control may have some advantages after all. The neglect of the welfare-maximising host
country regulator as to prots accruing to the foreign bank counteracts the regulatory
time inconsistency problem arising from closure costs, and therefore increases welfare in
comparison to the common regulator, who internalises all externalities. As regulation
does not matter in the branch case when branches are small, the overall e¤ect remains
favourable for the home country control.
In Section 2.B in the Appendix, the case withW < 0 shows that once foreign branch
units become larger, the picture becomes less clear. First, the common regulator is
shown to be more restrictive for the banks with large branches than the home country
regulator. This means that the welfare e¤ect of the regulatory arrangements depends
on the respective weights of the branch and subsidiary structure banks in the economy.
Second, the social desirability of the branch structure is no more evident, since this
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may bear higher social costs in the end. The optima depend strongly on parameter
values and characterising the equilibrium outcome becomes complicated. Nevertheless,
it may be said that the more there are branches in the economy and the larger they
are, the better the common regulator becomes in terms of improving social welfare.
2.6 Conclusion
Despite vivid political discussion, only few attempts currently exist to formalise the
problematic of banking regulation in the enlarged EU. The striking fact is that, at
present, foreign direct investment in banking in the EU is very much concentrated in
the CEE countries, where the nancial markets are small. In addition, unlike in many
other geographical areas, the subsidiary form is popular. This paper attempted to shed
light on the issue, concentrating on the e¤ect of the di¢ culty of regulators to commit
to a rule that is ex post not optimal on the e¢ ciency-insurance trade-o¤ of the bank
when choosing the ownership form.
The model compared the common regulator arrangement to the home country con-
trol principle, when the regulatory policy is subject to time inconsistency problem.
Like in Mailath & Mester (1994), the lack of regulatory commitment led to a second
best solution even if the regulator was welfare-maximising. It turned out that, if the
host markets were small, imposing the home country control principle instead of the
common regulator improved the second best not only through increased monitoring
e¤ort from the part of the international bank, but also through greater success in
inducing the more e¢ cient and stable branch structure.
The observation that home country control principle improves welfare stands in
conict with the Danthine & al. (1999) proposition of centralising banking regulation
in Europe. Their argument bases on the common regulator standing at an arms
length from the banks and therefore being less inuenced by their expected returns.
The present paper demonstrates that, if there are international banks and if some of
them have subsidiary structures, the present regulatory arrangement may work better
in that sense. In a way, home country control principle more e¢ ciently alienates the
regulator from the bank prots in case of the subsidiary structure than centralised
regulation does, and this externality counteracts the regulatory time inconsistency
problem. This result is, however, sensitive to the assumption of the welfare maximising
regulator. If regulators were cost minimisers instead, no di¤erence would arise between
the regulatory arrangements.
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By introducing the choice of ownership structure into the game, the paper made
the point that stability and e¢ ciency are not necessarily substitutes, as they are in e.g.
Gorton &Winton (1998). This result is crucially dependent on the assumption that the
branch structure is more e¢ cient than the subsidiary structure. Apart from the obvious
e¢ ciency gains in the exible use of capital, the paper relied on the argument that rms
that are less completely controlled by foreigners have higher spill-overs and therefore
fewer incentives to invest in technology. As Müller & Schnitzer (2003) demonstrate,
this argument cannot be taken for granted, as the opposite may be true if the host
country is politically unstable or if spill-overs spur investment in local infrastructure.
These e¤ects may, however, be limited in the CEE countries that are EU members and
have recently shown remarkable convergence in other economic aspects.
The model is a contribution to the discussion on whether banking regulation in
Europe should be unied, while keeping in mind that most foreign direct investment in
the banking sector is currently taking place in the CEE countries and that their special
characteristics might therefore count for the organisation of regulation of multinational
banks. Section 2.B in the Appendix shows that the superiority of the home country
control principle begins to erode once the branch of a bank becomes large enough
to cause bankruptcy of the parent bank. In the literature of regulatory cooperation,
DellAriccia & Marquez (2003) and Holthausen & Ronde (2004) both nd that cen-
tralised regulation is disadvantageous in the case of heterogeneous countries; in the
rst paper, this result arose from the cost of exibility loss, whereas in the second,
banks proted from internationalisation because of interest conicts of the regulators
with non-aligned objectives. In this light, our work o¤ers yet another argument against
uniform regulation of heterogeneous markets, with heterogeneity arising from the size
di¤erence between the home and host country. The home country regulatory incentives
bear externalities, the impact of which increases in branch size. As a consequence, the
situation may change, as host country units grow, and as branch structure banks be-
come more common. Integrated regulation may well be a better solution for branch
structure bank dominated and symmetric nancial markets. Reconsideration should
therefore take place after the single market has truly proved to exist.
Appendix 2
2.A Risky Investments in Both Countries
In this section, the model is generalised to allow for risk both in the home and in the
host country. Risky investment in the home country reduces the option motive for
the subsidiary structure, as risk taken in the home unit increases the risk of failure
of the whole bank. On the other hand, risk diversication steps in as an advantage
of international banking in general. In the following, the general results are briey
explained.
The bank will choose the monitoring level pi for the return structure
Ri =
(
Hi with probability pi
0 with probability (1  pi)
;
and for costs Cio (pi)where i 2 f1; 2g denotes the home country with index 1 and the
host country with index 2, and o 2 fB; Sg denotes the ownership structure "branch"
with index B and "subsidiary" with index S, respectively. Like before, we assume that
the home unit is large enough so that the returns in the good case will cover the de-
posits in both countries: H1   1     0. In addition, note that a bad outcome in
the home country will lead to the failure of the whole bank irrespective of the owner-
ship structure11. Finally, we maintain the assumption of the host country monitoring
technology being expensive enough for the rst best monitoring level there to be below
one.
After some manipulations, the expected return for the branch bank becomes
11This is because, as long as  < 1 and H2 < 2,  (H2   1) < 1 and the returns from the host
country will not su¢ ce for the deposit payments at home.
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E (B) = p1 (H1   1  ) + p1p2H2   C1B (p1)  C2B (p2) :
Maximising as to p1and p2 produces the rst order conditions
p1 = 1B (H1   1  ) + 1BH2p2
p2 = 2BH2p1:
Solving explicitly will result to the equilibrium monitoring levels
p1B =
1B (H1   1  )
1  1B2BH22
p2B =
1B2BH2 (H1   1  )
1  1B2BH22
;
which, under the assumptions made, also full the second order conditions for a
maximum. Like in the base model, a di¤erence to the rst best would spot the need
for regulation. The rst best utility can be written as
E
 
UFBB

= E (B) + (1  p1) [p2H2   (1 + ) (1 + S)] < E (B) :
The rst order conditions yield
pFB1B = 1B (H1 + (1 + )S)
pFB2B = 2BH2:
Note that if p1B = 1, the bank optimum p

2B no more coincides with the rst best
optimum: as the risk of failure in the home country increases that in the host country
unit, too, incentives to monitor in the host country are weakened. A need for regulation
thus emerges here even in the branch case. As to the parent bank, a su¢ cient condition
for p1B < p
FB
1B always is to have 1B <
1
H2
.
Under the assumptions made, the chosen monitoring level at home is higher than
that in the host country.
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For the subsidiary, we get the following expected return:
E (S) = p1 (H1   1) + p1p2 (H2   1)  C1S (p1)  C2S (p2) :
The resulting rst order conditions are
p1 = 1S (H1   1) + 1S (H2   1) p2
p2 = 2S (H2   1) p1;
which yield the explicit solutions
p1S =
1S (H1   1)
1  1S2S (H2   1)2
p2S =
1S2S (H1   1) (H2   1)
1  1S2S (H2   1)2
:
The chosen monitoring level at home is again higher than that in the host country
if 2S <
1
H2 1 , which is already fullled by assumption and by S < B
12.
We can write the rst best subsidiary expected utility as
E
 
UFBS

= E (S)+(1  p1) [p2 (H2   1  S)  (1 + S)]  (1  p2) (1 + S) < E (S) :
The rst order conditions yield
p1 = 1S (H1 + (1 + p2)S)
p2 = 2S (H2 + p1S) ;
which result in the following explicit solutions:
12Note that the second order condition for maximum, 1S2S <
1
H2 1 is equally fullled.
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pFB1S =
H1 + S
1  1SS2
pFB2S = 2SH2 +
2SS (H1 + S)
1  1SS2
:
Note that the rst best optima are now interdependent: the probability of the
separate bankruptcy of the subsidiary not only depends on its own monitoring level,
but also positively on the monitoring level of the parent bank. The cost of this separate
bankruptcy is  p1 (1  p2)S. Compared to the branch bank case, this results in
the rst best being lower in the home country and higher in the host country in the
subsidiary case. As to need of regulation, we immediately see that p2S < p
FB
2S always.
On the contrary, p1S < p
FB
1S only if 2S <
H1+S 1S(1 1SS2)(H1 1)
1S(H1+S)(H2 1)2
.
The results will be summarised in the following proposition.
Lemma 4 (A) Assume the monitoring technology in the host country is expensive
enough such that pFBB < 1. Dene 1B  1H1 1 +2(H2 1)2 and 1S 
1
H1 1+2(H2 1)2
,
where 1B > 1S. Assume in addition that iS < iB. Then,
a) for both branch and subsidiary banks, p1 > p

2;
b) if 1B  1B, p1B = 1 and the results of the base model applies for both the
branch and the subsidiary bank;
c) if 1S  1S, p1S = 1 and the results of the base model applies for the subsidiary
bank;
d) in other cases, p1B =
1B(H1 1 )
1 1B2BH22 and p

1S =
1S(H1 1)
1 1S2S(H2 1)2
. As at least p2B <
pFB2B and p

2S < p
FB
2S , there is need for regulation.
Introducing risk in the home country complicates the analysis of the regulatory
game signicantly. As to the branch bank, the question of interest remains basically
the same as before, namely, whether the common regulator closes the entire bank for
higher or for lower levels of monitoring than the home country regulator would. As
before, a threshold in monitoring level emerges, below which the bank will be closed.
However, the thresholds of the two units are now intertwined such that there is a
linear and negative relation between the monitoring level at home and the threshold
monitoring level in the host country. The main conclusion is that the common regulator
is stricter in closing an international branch bank than the home country regulator,
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unless the systemic cost becomes very large. In that case, the home country regulator
who, despite of not taking the systemic costs in the host country into account, puts
more weight on the systemic cost in its closure decision will become stricter.
For the closure of a subsidiary structure bank, the regulatory game becomes com-
plicated, as the regulator now can close either the entire bank or the subsidiary. In par-
ticular in the home country control case, the previous decision falls to the responsibility
of the home country regulator, whereas the latter decision belongs to the competence
of the host country regulator. We concentrate here on the host country perspective,
asking at what threshold monitoring level the subsidiary will be closed, either as a
consequence of a separate or of a total closure. The e¤ect of introducing risk in the
home country is that the probability of closure not only depends on the investment in
the host country, but also on the additional closure risk coming from the home unit.
If we assume that H2  H1, the results for the subsidiary structure bank can be
summarised as follows:
 The common regulator chooses to close the whole bank instead of just closing a
subsidiary if p1 lies below a critical level.
 In case of the home country control, the home country regulator is more eager
to close the whole bank than the host country regulator the subsidiary for some
intermediate levels of p1.
 For most of the values of p1, the home country control principle produces stricter
regulation than the common regulator; however, there are at most three inter-
mediate intervals of p1 where common regulator is stricter than the regulator
appointed by the home country control principle.
Thus, although introducing risk into the home country investment complicates the
picture in a signicant way, the main lines of our argumentation remain.
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2.B Monitoring and Choice of Ownership Struc-
ture when W<0
In this section, solutions for the branch structure bank with W < 0 are derived and
they are compared with the subsidiary solutions in the paper. If W < 0, the branch is
large enough to endanger the existence of the whole bank. This means that the liability
of the bank is limited and it is entitled to deposit insurance in case of bad outcome.
The trade-o¤ of the regulator also changes, as the bank may now fail with a positive
probability.
First Best Solution
If W < 0, the branch is large enough to cause the failure of the entire bank. As
a consequence, the society faces a positive probability that there are deposits payable
that will not be covered by the bank prot; in addition, a systemic cost occurs in case
of failure. The rst best maximisation problem becomes the form
Max
p
W +  (pH   CB (p))  (1  p) (1 + )S:
Compared with the equation 2.4 in the paper, there are two e¤ects in action that
decrease social welfare. First, W < 0 by denition, and second, the risk of failure
introduces an expected systemic cost. Maximising with respect to p produces
pFBW<0 = B

H +
1 + 

S

:
Note that, because of the systemic risk, pFBBjW0 < p
FB
BjW<0. In addition, it is clear
that pFBS < p
FB
BjW<0 . This is due to the greater e¢ ciency of the branch structure as
well as the greater exibility of the subsidiary structure in the way that the parent
bank can continue its activities and the systemic cost in the home country will thus be
saved, which lowers the social cost of bankruptcy.
Desired Strategy of the Bank
The unconstrained maximising in the branch case with W < 0 has the solution
pBjW<0 = B

H +
W


;
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where the second term in brackets, W

, is negative by denition. As the right to
deposit insurance limits the banks liability and as the systemic cost of failure is not
internalised by the bank, however, the chosen monitoring level is lower than what
would be socially optimal: pBjW<0 < p
FB
BjW<0. We can state the following standard
moral hazard result:
Lemma 5 (A) Social welfare declines through the introduction of the bank in the
branch case if W < 0.
Proof. See Section 2.C.
In addition, as the branch bank with W  0 always chose the social optimum, we
can state that pBjW<0 < p

BjW0. Thus, without a regulatory closure threat, the bank
with limited liability (W < 0) will choose a lower level of monitoring than the bank with
unlimited liability (W  0). In other words, monitoring level is size dependent. Note
that in the rst best solution, the larger branch implied larger risky investment and
larger risk for the society, and therefore, the rst best monitoring level was increasing
in size. In presence of deposit insurance, the risk of failure is shifted to the regulator,
and the gap between the rst best and the desired monitoring level increases as the
bank becomes larger.
Finally, if W < 0, the branch bank, unlike the subsidiary bank, stands in danger
to loose the prots in the home country due to the pooled asset structure. This
vulnerability translates into an unregulated branch bank choosing a higher monitoring
level: pBjW<0 > p

S.
RegulatorsDecisions
In deciding whether to close the branch structure bank or to let it continue, the
regulator trades o¤ the indirect costs of closure in form of forgone investment in both
countries and the immediate systemic cost in both countries against the risk of failure
of the entire bank. As long as W  0, the latter part of the trade-o¤ was absent and
the regulator always let the bank open. This will change with W < 0.
Common Regulator: For the branch bank with W < 0, the condition for con-
tinuing will be
p  pCRBjW<0 
(1 + ) (L+ (1  )S)  Y
H + (1 + )S
:
In Section C it will be shown that this is lower than the rst best solution. This
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means that the common regulator is not successful in inducing the rst best monitoring
level, as it also accepts lower levels. Note that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
the common regulator to be willing to close the bank at some monitoring levels is
L > Y
1+
  (1  )S. We can state:
Lemma 6 (A) The threshold probability for continuing is lower than the social opti-
mum for the branch bank with W < 0. The time inconsistency problem exists.
Proof. See Section 2.C.
Home Country Control: In the case of the branch structure bank with W < 0,
the continuation threshold becomes
p  pR1BjW<0 
(1 + )L+ (1  )S   Y
H + S
:
Compared with the common regulator case, the home country regulator ignores the
systemic e¤ects S in the host country. Therefore, the common regulator is always
stricter than the home country regulator, that is, pCRBjW<0 > p
R1
BjW<0. A necessary and
su¢ cient condition for the home country regulator to be willing to close the bank at
some monitoring levels is L > Y (1 )S
1+
.
Proposition 4 (A) In the branch case with W<0, the common regulator is stricter
than the home country regulator.
Proof. See Section 2.C.
Note that although the common regulator is here stricter, the host country regulator
is still stricter in regulating the subsidiary structure banks. In other words, if regulation
were binding, the subsidiary structure banks would have a higher monitoring level than
the large branch structure banks.
Banks Restricted Choice
The branch structure bank maximises its expected prots given the closure threat:
Max
p
p [Y   1 +  (H   1)]  CB (p) s:t: p  pCRBjW<0 or p  pR1BjW<0:
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Proposition 5 (A) a) If the following conditions are fullled, the regulator in ques-
tion is binding and improves welfare:
pCRBjW<0 > p

BjW<0 $ B > CRB 
[(1+)(L+(1 )S) Y ]
[H+(1+)S][H+W ]
pR1BjW<0 > p

BjW<0 $ B > R1B 
[(1+)(L+(1 )S) Y ]
(H+S)[H+W ]
.
b)The common regulator is binding for a larger set of parameter values than the
home country regulator.
Proof. See Section 2.C.
Endogenous Choice of Ownership Structure
If W < 0, the choice of ownership structure becomes somewhat complicated. Al-
ready in the rst best, the optimal choice depends on parameters. This is because,
unlike small branch banks that never fail, large branch banks introduce a risk of fail-
ure. This results in the rst best trade-o¤ between the better e¢ ciency of the branch
bank, on the one hand, and the risk of systemic cost in both countries instead of just
one in the subsidiary case, on the other. The bank, from its part, weights the greater
e¢ ciency of the branch structure against the higher value of the deposit insurance in
the subsidiary case.
In the following, a sketch of the solution is presented. Going into more details is
tedious and does not bring insights that are relevant for our point.
First Best: IfW < 0, the society faces a trade-o¤between exibility and e¢ ciency
in production technology. In particular,
UFBBjW<0   UFBS > 0 if

 
pFBBjW<0   pFBS

H    CB  pFBBjW<0  CS  pFBS 
>
 
1  pFBBjW<0

S +
 
pFBBjW<0   pFBS

S:
The e¢ ciency gains of the branch structure, depicted on the left side, have to cover
the expected loss in the form of higher systemic cost. This translates into a threshold
e¢ ciency level:
UFBBjW<0   UFBS > 0 if S < 
FB(B>S)
S 
(H + (1 + )S)2
 (H + S)2
B  
2S
(H + S)2
:
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Note that it is no more obvious that the rst best solution is to implement the more
e¢ cient branch solution. As W < 0, a failure will imply the loss of the whole branch
structure bank, whereas the subsidiary structure secures the parent bank through iso-
lation of assets. The society as a whole saves in systemic costs. Therefore, in order to
compensate this probable loss, the branch structure bank needs to be e¢ cient enough
to be the rst best solution.
This result is similar to the Kahn & Winton (2004) result, adjusted for banking
groups by Harr & Ronde (2006). According to them, as soon as the risk in banking
increases su¢ ciently, it is socially optimal to let the bank choose a subsidiary structure
for the riskiest investments, as it limits risk shifting and therefore improves welfare.
The Banks Desired Choice: If W < 0, the bank has a trade-o¤ between the
e¢ ciency and the value of deposit insurance. In particular:
E
 
BjW<0

> E (S) if

 
pBjW<0   pS

H    CB  pBjW<0  CS (pS)
>
 
1  pBjW<0

(Y   1) +  pBjW<0   pS:
The e¢ ciency gains of the branch structure have to cover the expected loss in terms
of the value of the deposit insurance for the bank. We get
E
 
BjW<0

> E (S) if S < 
(B>S)
S 
(H +W )2 + 3 (Y   1)
2 (H   1)2 B 
2 (Y   1)
 (H   1)2 :
In sum, both the bank and the society prefer the branch structure when the e¢ -
ciency gains are large enough, and the subsidiary structure, when they are not. De-
pending on whether 
(B>S)
S > 
FB(B>S)
S or the other way around, we get a middle
area where the bank action di¤ers from the socially optimal ownership structure. In
particular:
 If (B>S)S < 
FB(B>S)
S , there exists an area S 2


(B>S)
S ; 
FB(B>S)
S

where
the rst best solution is the branch structure bank, but the unregulated bank
will choose the subsidiary structure. Here, we need regulation to push the bank
towards the branch structure, i.e. the home country control works better.
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 If (B>S)S > 
FB(B>S)
S , there exists an area S 2


FB(B>S)
S ; 
(B>S)
S

such that
the rst best solution is the subsidiary structure bank, but the unregulated bank
will choose the branch structure. Regulation is needed to enhance the choice of
subsidiary structure, i.e. the common regulator works better.
At this point, the analysis gets beyond the point we wanted to make and we stop
here. The general message of this section is that the common regulator scheme gets
more interesting when the size of the foreign unit of an international bank becomes
large.
2.C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
We rst want to state that pS < p

BjW0 . Assume the opposite: p

S > p

BjW0 $
S (H   1) > BH. As B > S and H > H   1, it is obvious that this is not true.
Thus, pS < p

BjW0.
As the social welfare function is concave in p, deviating from the socially optimal
monitoring level will lead to a decrease in welfare.
In the case of branch structure with W  0, pFBBjW0 = pBjW0 = BH. In the
subsidiary case, if pS  pFBS $ S (H   1)  S (H + S), which is a contradiction.
Thus, pFBS > p

S.
Proof of Lemma 5(A)
In the case of branch structure with W < 0, if the desired monitoring level would
be equal to or higher than the social optimum, pBjW<0  pFBBjW<0  !
B
 
H   1 + Y 1

  B  H + 1+ S $ S  W1+ . Since by denition W < 0,
this is a contradiction and pFBBjW<0 > p

BjW<0.
Proof of Lemma 2
In the branch case withW  0, the condition for continuing becomes p  pCRBjW0 
(1+)(L S) Y
H
. As, by denition, W  0 and L < 1, it follows that (1 + )L   Y <
 W < 0. Therefore, pCRBjW0 < 0 and the regulator never closes the bank when W  0.
In the subsidiary case, we get pCRS  pFBS $ L+(1 )SH+S  S (H + S) $
S  L+(1 )S(H+S)2 . Assuming that that it is always rst-best e¢ cient to leave the bank
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open, i.e. UFB
 
pFB

> UCLOSE (0), leads to the following restrictions on the cost
parameter:
S > S 
2 [L+ (1  )S]
(H + S)2
:
This restriction is contradictory to the condition derived above. As a consequence,
pCRS < p
FB
S , and the time inconsistency problem exists.
Proof of Lemma 6(A)
Assuming again that the social maximum of the closure strategy is smaller than
the maximum of the continuing strategy leads to the following restriction on the cost
parameter:
B > B 
2 [(1 + ) (L+ (1  )S)  Y ]
(H + (1 + )S)2
:
In the branch case with W < 0, if pCRBjW<0  pFBBjW<0 $ (1+)(L+(1 )S) YH+(1+)S 
B
 
H + 1+

S
 $ B  [(1+)(L+(1 )S) Y ](H+(1+)S)2 .This is contradictory to B > B.
Thus, pCRBjW<0 < p
FB
BjW<0 and the time inconsistency problem exists.
Proof of Proposition 1
In the subsidiary case, if the common regulator is stricter than the host country
regulator, pCRS > p
R2
S $ L+(1 )SH+S > L+(1 )S1+S $  H + 1 > 0. This is a
contradiction, and as a consequence, pCRS < p
R2
S .
Turning to the question whether the host country regulator might be too strict, we
need to check whether the threshold is higher than the social optimum. The threshold
is below the social optimum if S >
L+(1 )S
(H+S)(1+S)
. This value is always below S; as a
consequence, the cost function in the model is such that the requirement is fullled
and the host country regulator is never too strict.
Proof of Proposition 4(A)
In the branch case with W < 0, if the home country regulator is stricter than the
common regulator, pR1BjW<0 > p
CR
BjW<0 $ (1+)L+(1 )S YH+S > (1+)[L+(1 )S] YH+(1+)S $
(1 + )L   Y   (1  )H > 0. By assumption,  < 1   L. Plugging the maximum
value in results in L  Y + (1 H)L > 0, which is a contradiction. Thus, pR1BjW<0 <
pCRBjW<0 .
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Proof of Proposition 2
a) Whether the constraint is binding boils down to whether pCRS > p

S. The condi-
tion will be: L+(1 )S
H+S
> S (H   1) $ S < L+(1 )S(H+S)(H 1) . Similarly, pR2S > pS $
L+(1 )S
1+S
> S (H   1) $ S < L+(1 )S(1+S)(H 1) .
b) We want to show that 
R2
S > 
CR
S . Assume the contrary: 
CR
S > 
R2
S $
L+(1 )S
(H 1)(H+S) >
L+(1 )S
(H 1)(1+S) $ 1 > H. which is by assumption not true. It follows
that 
R2
S > 
CR
S .
Proof of Proposition 5(A)
a) As in the previous proof, we want to nd the condition for pCRBjW<0 > p

BjW<0:
pCRBjW<0 > p

BjW<0 $ (1+)[L+(1 )S] YH+(1+)S > B
 
H   1 + Y 1

 $
B <
[(1+)[L+(1 )S] Y ]
[H+(1+)S][(H 1)+Y 1] .
Similarly,
pR1BjW<0 > p

BjW<0 $ (1+)L+(1 )S YH+S > B
 
H   1 + Y 1

 $
B <
[(1+)L+(1 )S Y ]
[H+S][(H 1)+Y 1] .
b) The statement boils down to claiming that 
CR
B > 
R1
B . Assuming the contrary
leads to 
CR
B < 
R1
B $ (1+)L+(1 )S Y(H+S) > L+(1 )S(H+(1+)S) . This has already been
proved to be a contradiction in the proof of Proposition A1. Hence, 
CR
B > 
R1
B .
Proof of Lemma 3
The statement UFBBjW0 > U
FB
S follows directly from the concavity of the social
welfare function and from Lemma 1. Whenever W  0, the expected payo¤s for the
banks are E

BjW0

= W + B
2
H2and E (S) = Y   1 + S2 (H   1)2. It follows
that E

BjW0

  E (S) > 0 if B > 2H2 +
 
1  1
H
2
S. Under the assumption
B <
1
H
this is never true. Thus, if W  0, the bank will always prefer the subsidiary
structure.
Proof of Proposition 3
We want to show that 
R2(B>S)
S > 
CR(B>S)
S . The opposite would mean

CR(B>S)
S > 
R2(B>S)
S $ 1H+S   11+S > 0 $ H < 1, which is a contradic-
tion. Therefore, 
R2(B>S)
S > 
CR(B>S)
S . Again, a comparison between E

BjW0

and
E
 
CRS

is su¢ cient.
As to welfare, we know that UFBS > U
R2
S due to concavity and U
R2
S > U
CR
S due to
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concavity and from Proposition 1. Finally, through Lemma 3 we know that UFBBjW0 >
UFBS .
Chapter 3
Multiple Regulators, Bank
Bail-Outs, and Constructive
Ambiguity
3.1 Introduction
The handling of bank crises in the EU is in principle a national task, the ECB having
reserved itself the right to intervene if it suspects that the smooth functioning of the
payment system is in danger1. This formulation avoids explicit criteria for the division
of the LOLR responsibilities and creates uncertainty as to the roles of the national
regulators (NCBs) and of the ECB.
The present arrangement has been justied through constructive ambiguity2. This
term is normally used in the context of optimal LOLR policy and refers to the voluntary
uncertainty as to the conditions of emergency lending to individual banks, which aims
at curbing bank moral hazard inherent to a predictable LOLR policy3. Nevertheless,
many authors so far have raised doubts whether the notion of constructive ambiguity
is transferable as to the identity of the European LOLR4.
This chapter asks whether the inability of the LOLR to commit to a socially optimal
policy can be compensated for by appointing two regulators with di¤ering objectives
1See Article 105(2) in the Treaty on the EU.
2For discussion, see e.g. Padoa-Schioppa (1999) and Prati & Schinasi (2000).
3As the LOLR cares for systemic consequences occurring due to a closure or a failure of a bank,
it faces di¢ culties in committing not to rescue banks that are too big to fail.
4See Aglietta (1999), Bruni & de Boissieu (2000), and Lastra (2000), among others.
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instead and, in particular, by not dening their roles clearly5. In presence of the time
inconsistency problem of the LOLR policy and of regulatory externalities arising from
the regulatorsregional interests, we consider the welfare e¤ect of ambiguity as to the
identity of the LOLR and determine the optimal rule for the division of responsibilities.
Ambiguity is then considered to be constructive if it increases social welfare. The focus
is on the underlying structure of the regulatory game between the NCB and the ECB.
In particular, the present arrangement will be approximated in two ways: rst, as a
Stackelberg regulatory game with an incomplete contract on identity; and second, as
an optimal rule on the division of the roles, given the existence of the two regulators
and their utility functions.
In most cases, the ECB intervention turns out to be welfare improving, if the
responsibility division is dened as a size and ownership structure contingent rule. In
contrast, ambiguity is found to be constructive for a very limited group of relatively
ine¢ cient banks, under the assumption that regulators are cost-minimising instead of
welfare-maximising. For all other cases, a clear division of responsibilities, contingent
on size and ownership structure, dominates ambiguity.
In the model, the bank maximises its prots by choosing how much to invest in
monitoring its borrowers, taking the regulatory response into account. In particular,
due to externalities in form of deposit insurance as well as systemic costs of failure,
the banks unconstrained choice of monitoring level lies below the social optimum.
This creates the need for bank regulation. Furthermore, the bank is subject to an
unforeseen, random liquidity shock in the sense of Diamond & Dybvig (1983) and
Holmström & Tirole (1996). If such a shock occurs, the bank can either terminate the
illiquid investment project, or ask the regulator for an emergency credit.
A regulator decides whether to give emergency lending to the bank, trading the
immediate costs of not doing so against the cost of lending and the expected costs of
bank failure. The magnitude of these costs depends on the jurisdiction of the regulator
and on the banks ownership structure: Whereas the ECB internalises the systemic
cost of the whole area, the NCB internalises it only within its country. Further, the
NCB is responsible for, and thus internalises, the deposit insurance of the entire branch
structure bank; if, however, the bank has a subsidiary structure, the NCB has to pay
for the deposit insurance in the home country only.
The chapter asks whether the problem of time inconsistency, caused by the inability
of the regulator to commit to the socially optimal policy, can be addressed by an ap-
5Throughout the chapter, we use LOLR and regulator as synonyms.
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propriate division of tasks between the ECB and the NCB, and in particular, whether
non-specication of responsibilities can be welfare-improving. In the rst setting with-
out commitment, the question is whether the incompleteness of the contract on identity
of the LOLR is justied by the nonveriability of the determinants of the policy choice6.
Yet, this is in general not the case: as long as the actions of choosing the identity and
the bank risk taking are substitutes in terms of welfare, leaving the contract open for
the identity choice will produce the worst outcome in terms of payo¤s, as the threshold
of the most lenient regulator becomes the e¤ective regulatory restriction. This can be
welfare-improving only for ine¢ cient subsidiary structure banks for which the NCB is
too strict.
In the second setting, the LOLRs are assumed to be able to commit to a division
of responsibilities. It turns out that, under certain conditions, the optimal rule can
indeed be to exercise ambiguity in the sense of not specifying the identity of the LOLR.
However, the optimal rule of whether to exercise ambiguity or not is contingent on the
e¢ ciency of the banks, which is hardly veriable information. As a consequence, the
implementation problem, inherent to the optimal policy with a single regulator, still
remains. In addition, the necessary conditions also lead to questions on implementabil-
ity. In particular, it is not enough to leave the identity of the LOLR unspecied if this
does not change the expectations of the bank as to the e¤ective regulatory threshold
from those of the two regulators in the direction of the rst best. For example, allowing
the regulators to negotiate whenever a bank belonging to the constructive ambiguity
class needs liquidity assistance does not produce this result, since the bank still expects
to be rescued at the lower regulatory threshold. Simply randomising would not change
the expectations either, since the ex post threshold would be either one of the two
thresholds.
Finally, a crucial element needed for constructive ambiguity in both settings is
the existence of ine¢ cient closures. If the regulators are welfare-maximising instead
of cost-minimising, the regional regulatory externalities are not alone su¢ cient for
generating too strict regulation from the part of the NCB, which would justify ECB
intervention when it is the laxer regulation, i.e. in the case of large subsidiary structure
banks. Therefore, the size and ownership structure contingent rule of appointing the
regulation of branch banks and of small subsidiary banks to the ECB, and of the large
subsidiary banks to the NCBs, may indeed be optimal after all.
6This could happen if the incompleteness of the contract on identity allows for better punishment
of the rst player from the part of the second player, as e.g. in Bernheim & Whinston (1998).
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If constructive ambiguity as to identity is to improve the banksprudential behav-
iour, the rst best regulatory policy is not attainable by the single regulator. Here,
closure costs and the nonveriability of the bank risk level together lead to the di¢ culty
of the regulator to commit to the optimal policy, as in the Mailath & Mester (1994)
paper on time inconsistency of the optimal closure policy. In the LOLR literature,
time inconsistency of optimal policy manifests itself in particular as a tendency of the
LOLR to unconditionally bail out banks that are too big or too important to fail, as
in Goodhart & Huang (1999, 2005), and Freixas (2000), among others7.
The issue of multiple regulators has been studied in the common agency literature,
originated by Bernheim & Whinston (1986). In particular, they ask whether non-
cooperation can be of benet in a setting where the agents action is nonobservable. It
turns out that common agency never improves upon the coordinated solution; however,
common agency is detrimental in cases where the informational asymmetries lead to
the rst best not being obtainable in the coordination case. Further work in settings
of multiple regulators with overlapping tasks by e.g. Martimort (1999) and La¤ont &
Martimort (1999) show that separation of regulators can be optimal if information is
asymmetric between the regulators. Whereas separation of regulators makes the rene-
gotiation proofness restriction stricter in Martimort (1999), in La¤ont & Martimort
(1999), separation acts against collusion. We ask instead whether there is an alterna-
tive mechanism that would enable the regulators to commit to veriable aspects and
whether we can nd a justication to ambiguity in this way. The closest approach
to ours is Tirole (1994), who shows how biasedness of regulators and state-contingent
allocation of power may improve welfare under nonveriable information. As in our
work, Tiroles (1994) result bases on the ability of agencies with biased objectives to
commit to policies that under some circumstances are closer to the social optimum
than the time consistent policy of the social planner. Similarly, we derive an optimal
division rule, contingent on the size and on the ownership structure of the bank. In
a related setting, Repullo (2000) models LOLR behaviour without commitment and
asks whether the task should be allocated to a central bank or to a deposit insurance
corporation. The optimal division of responsibilities is a rule, contingent on the size of
the liquidity shock.
An elementary part of the present work is to ask whether the optimal rule can be one
that leaves the responsibility division open. This is related to the constructive ambigu-
ity concept of the optimal LOLR policy, aimed at improving the prudential behaviour
7See also Rochet & Tirole (1996) and Freixas & al. (2000a). Goodhart & Illing (2002) provide a
comprehensive reader on LOLR literature.
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of the banks. As the term constructive ambiguity has originated from practitioners,
a multiplicity of theoretical denitions prevails. One interpretation is to dene con-
structive ambiguity as a mixed strategy, as in e.g. Goodfriend & Lacker (1999). The
evidence on constructive ambiguity of the LOLR policy in this sense is mixed: Whereas
Freixas (2000) nds randomisation of bail-outs optimal for some banks, Cordella & Yey-
ati (2003) and Freixas & al. (2004) nd that a publicly announced, conditional rule
always dominates over ambiguity. Alternatively, constructive ambiguity has been de-
ned as a contingent rule with regard to policy that is subject to regulatory discretion8.
Goodhart & Huang (2005) then nd evidence for constructive ambiguity of the opti-
mal LOLR policy as a time and shock contingent rule that balances the moral hazard
e¤ect against costs of failures at the macro level. The present work acknowledges the
multiplicity of denitions by considering both types of constructive ambiguity.
The chapter is organised as follows: First, the structure of the economy and the
timing of the game are explained in Section 3.2. Then, Section 3.3 goes on with the
characterisation of the discretionary and the commitment games, after which the main
results are presented. After, Section 3.4 considers the robustness of the results and
Section 3.5 addresses the problems with the implementation of the optimal solution.
Finally, concluding remarks are made.
3.2 Economy Structure
In the economy, international banks maximise their prots by choosing the monitoring
level of their investment, p, which directly determines the risk level of their assets,
(1  p).9 This decision has a convex cost C (p), with C 0 (p) > 0 and C 00 (p) > 0. The
choice of p is perfectly observable but nonveriable, so no contracts can be written
on it. The bank invests in a project that has a return H > 1 with probability p
and zero otherwise, and nances its operations with deposits 1 that are fully insured
by the NCB. In addition, a bank failure will cause a systemic cost s 2 (0; 1) in the
8See BIS (1997), Enoch & al. (1997), Freixas & al. (2000b), Mishkin (1999), and Lastra (2000),
among others.
9One possibility is to interpret (1  p) as the perceived probability of the entire bank going bank-
rupt, i.e. the aggregate risk. In the end, this is the only risk that interests the regulator calculating
the expected costs of failure or closure of the bank and the cost of emergency loan. The scope of
internationalisation n would then just approximate the international magnitude of these costs. An-
other interpretation, as our LOLR is interested in total bank failure, would be to state that (1  p)
represents the probability that the parent bank goes bankrupt. In EU in particular, where most of
foreign ownership in the banking sector takes place in the CEE countries and hardly ever exceeds ve
per cent of the total assets of the parent bank, this may be the relevant regulatory concern.
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country where it operates; if the bank operates in n countries, the systemic cost will be
ns10. The limited liability and the externality in form of the systemic cost lead to the
standard moral hazard result, where a bank, if not regulated, chooses a higher than the
socially optimal risk level. In addition, the bank is subject to an unforeseen liquidity
shock v 2 (0; n). It is assumed that if the bank does not get emergency nancing, it
will have to terminate the illiquid investment project, which will lead to bank failure.11
In order to mitigate the moral hazard arising from the limited liability, there is
a regulator in each country, and in addition a common regulator for the whole area
(ECB). Each regulator is assumed to care about the systemic cost of closure or failure
within its own jurisdiction only. In addition, the national regulator (NCB) cares about
the deposit insurance payable according to the home country control principle, which
states that the deposit insurance of an entire branch structure bank belongs to the
responsibility of the home country regulator, whereas for the subsidiary structure bank,
the home country regulator only has to pay for the home unit.
The task of the regulator is to choose whether to extend the emergency credit v or
not to the bank asking for it: the regulatory action aREG 2 fL;Cg, where L = lend v
and C = do not lend v. This decision is based on the trade-o¤ between the direct
closure costs and the expected costs of a later failure of the bailed-out bank, which
include the loss of v. As will become clear later on, this trade-o¤ depends on the
monitoring level p, and, for the ECB and for the NCB regulating a branch structure
bank, additionally on the international size of the bank, n.
In order to derive some welfare results, let us dene the expected welfare of the
social planner as follows:
USOC  n (p (H   1)  C (p))  (1  p) (n+ sn+ v)
= E ()  (1  p) (n+ sn+ v) ; (3.1)
where E () denotes the expected return of a bank. The expected welfare of the
social planner thus consists of the expected bank return and of the expected external-
10The systemic cost is an externality to the banking system, for example, in form of some contagion
or ine¢ ciency e¤ect. For examples, see Mailath & Mester (1994) or Gorton & Winton (1995).
11One could also imagine an endogenous choice in n with a convex cost K (n). This would give
rise to an internationalisation motive in order to avoid regulation in monitoring levels and strengthen
a rule appointing the regulation of large subsidiaries to the NCB instead of the size-inuenced ECB.
The results would not, however, be changed signicantly; the present approach is chosen due to its
simplicity.
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ities of a bank failure. The rst order condition determines the rst best monitoring
level pFB for a bank:
pFB =
8<:
h
(C)p
i 1 
H + s+ v
n

if
h
(C)p
i 1 
H + s+ v
n

< 1
1 otherwise:
(3.2)
The rst best monitoring level is thus lower, the more costly the monitoring tech-
nology, and the lower the return on the project, the systemic cost, and the liquidity
shock per bank unit. The rst best closure rule would be to close all banks for which
p < pFB.
In the following, we concentrate on the banks for which the unconstrained max-
imisation of the expected return produces a monitoring level p < 1, that is, that
exhibit the moral hazard phenomenon12. The banks that do not full this assumption
do not need to be regulated, since the rst best is already achieved. In addition, we
only consider banks that are hit by the liquidity shock. The timing of the game is as
follows:
1. Bank chooses p 2 [0; 1] :
2. Bank asks for v.
3. Regulary game will be played; aREG 2 fL;Cg :
4. If aREG = L; returns on the investment will be realised.
3.3 Regulatory Game
In what follows, we start by approximating discretionary LOLR behaviour with a
Stackelberg game, where rst the NCB decides whether to extend the emergency loan
or not. After, the ECB has a veto right to overrule the NCBs decision in case the
NCB did not lend. We then compare the welfare implications of the game to the case
rst with NCB only and then with an optimal rule on responsibilities in presence of
the two incentive-driven regulators. In all games, the equilibrium concept will be the
subgame perfect equilibrium that will be solved by backward induction13. Yet, before
continuing with solving the game, the regulatory payo¤s and thresholds are presented.
12The technical requirement for the cost function is then [Cp]
 1
(p) < 1H 1 .
13For the game theoretic solution concepts, see Chapters 3 and 8 in Fudenberg & Tirole (2000).
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3.3.1 Regulatory Thresholds
The lending decision of the regulators is characterised by a trade-o¤ between the direct
cost of immediate closure and the expected costs of lending, of the deposit insurance,
and of the systemic consequences, in case the bank project will not succeed. These
costs di¤er for each regulator and from the total social costs due to the externalities
bound to the di¤ering legal responsibilities. The more the regulator internalises the
externalities of the bank activity, the more reluctant it is to close a bank, and the more
prevalent is the time inconsistency problem. Regulatory externalities thus counteract
the time inconsistency problem of the social planner.
As a supranational regulator, the ECB internalises the systemic cost everywhere.
However, it does not take into account the consequences of its actions to the deposit
insurance costs that belong to the responsibilities of the NCBs. The expected payo¤s
for the ECB are as follows:
aECB = L : UECB =   (1  p) (v + ns)
aECB = C : UECB =  ns: (3.3)
It results that the ECB rescues the bank i¤
p  pECB  v
v + ns
: (3.4)
This ECB threshold increases in v and decreases in n and in s. In particular,
banks with a large scope of internationalisation face a lower ECB threshold than less
international ones.
We now turn to the NCB decision. Besides not internalising the systemic cost
(n  1) s abroad, the NCB bears the cost of deposit insurance in case of failure or
closure of the bank. As the latter cost varies according to the form of ownership of
the bank, we need to di¤erentiate between branch and subsidiary structure banks. A
branch structure bank belongs to the deposit insurance scheme of the home country,
whereas a subsidiary structure bank is insured in the countries of operation, thus merely
leaving the parent unit for the home country NCB.
In case of a branch structure bank, the decision of the NCB that is responsible for
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the deposit insurance of the entire bank will result from the comparison of the following
alternative payo¤s:
aNCB(B) = L : UNCB(B) =   (1  p) (v + n+ s)
aNCB(B) = C : UNCB(B) =   (n+ s) : (3.5)
Consequently, the NCB will give the emergency loan to a branch structure bank i¤
p  pNCB(B)  v
v + n+ s
: (3.6)
This threshold is again increasing in v and decreasing in n und in s. Comparison
with the ECB threshold in Equation (3.4) immediately shows that, as the cost of
deposit insurance always exceeds the systemic cost by assumption, the NCB is always
a more lenient branch bank regulator than the ECB.
If we assume a subsidiary structure instead, the NCB only has to pay for the deposit
insurance in its own country. In deciding whether to grant the emergency loan, the
NCB makes the following consideration:
aNCB(S) = L : UNCB(S) =   (1  p) (v + s+ 1)
aNCB(S) = C : UNCB(S) =   (s+ 1) : (3.7)
As a consequence, the NCB will give the emergency loan to a subsidiary structure
bank i¤
p  pNCB(S)  v
v + s+ 1
: (3.8)
Like before, this threshold is increasing in v and decreasing in s. In contrast, due
to the limited deposit insurance responsibility, the NCB threshold is independent of
the international size of a subsidiary bank. Consequently, the NCB threshold for the
subsidiary bank is higher, ceteris paribus, than that for the branch bank as soon as the
bank becomes international.
Before going on, let us briey consider the relation of the regulatory thresholds to
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the rst best monitoring level, which determines the condition for too strict regulation.
Lemma 7 The regulator is too strict, i.e. ine¢ cient closure can happen only if the
bank is ine¢ cient enough. For the ECB, this means pFB < vv+ns , and for the NCB,
pFB <
v
v+n+s
in the branch bank case and pFB < vv+s+1 in the subsidiary case.
Hence, the most ine¢ cient banks for which it is still socially optimal to let them
operate face a possibility of ine¢ cient closure due to the externalities not taken into
account by the regulator. Note that these externalities indeed do not have this e¤ect
for all banks: the time inconsistency of the closure policy counteracts externalities and,
as a result, e¢ cient enough banks face rather too lax a closure policy. For example,
banks for which pFB = 1 will never face ine¢ cient closure. In the general setting, it is
not possible to exclude the existence of banks that face too strict regulation; however,
we will later discuss some restrictions that will eliminate this parameter space.
3.3.2 Discretionary Game
We now proceed with solving the discretionary case, where the ECB has a veto right to
overrule the NCBs closure decision. This multi-stage game is a dynamic contracting
problem where the bank rst chooses the level of monitoring. If a liquidity shock
occurs, it then asks for emergency lending from the NCB, who decides whether to lend
to the bank or not. In case of no lending, the ECB considers whether it is worthwhile
to rescue the bank, and in case of a positive response, acts as a LOLR.
Through backward induction, the ECB threshold in the last stage is as in Equation
(3:4). In the previous stage, the NCB makes its move, given the expected reaction of
the ECB. Consider rst the regulation of a branch structure bank. Instead of using
the decision rule in Equation (3:6), the NCB takes into account the possibility that the
ECB will lend in the later phase. The expected payo¤s in case of closure now depend
from the ECB action and become
aNCB(B) = C : UNCB(B) =   (n+ s) if p < pECB
aNCB(B) = C : UNCB(B) =   (1  p) (n+ s) if p  pECB: (3.9)
Using again backward induction, we see that the NCB is able to force the ECB to
nance the emergency loan whenever p  pECB. The NCB is thus free-riding on the
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cost of ECB. However, a parameter space pNCB(B)  p < pECB remains where only
the NCB is willing to save the bank. The subgame perfect equilibrium for a branch
structure bank is given in the following Lemma.
Lemma 8 In the case of a branch structure bank, the ECB will give the emergency
loan if p  pECB, whereas the NCB will give the loan if pNCB(B)  p < pECB.
Both the NCB and the ECB thresholds depend negatively on the international size
of the bank. However, because of the deposit insurance cost exceeding the systemic
cost by assumption, the NCB threshold is always situated below the ECB threshold
for a branch structure bank. As the combined regulatory restriction is continuous in
p, the NCB threshold is the only binding restriction for a branch structure bank.
Similarly, the expected NCB payo¤s for not lending in case of a subsidiary structure
bank are
aNCB(S) = C : UNCB(S) =   (s+ 1) if p < pECB
aNCB(S) = C : UNCB(S) =   (1  p) (s+ 1) if p  pECB: (3.10)
Now, an implicit rule, contingent on the international size of the bank, emerges:
The NCB acts for subsidiary structure banks that are smaller than the threshold size
s+1
s
and have a monitoring level low enough such that the ECB will not save the bank,
the ECB intervening for the larger or more stable banks. The interest of the NCB
in saving less stable small banks than the ECB is a consequence of the ECB ignoring
the deposit insurance cost. However, as the bank enlarges its activities abroad, the
systemic cost e¤ect is multiplied. As a consequence, the ECB threshold monitoring
level decreases, reaching the NCB threshold at n = s+1
s
. After this level, the ECB
becomes the sole emergency lender.
Lemma 9 In the case of a subsidiary structure bank, i) the NCB will give the loan if
n < s+1
s
and pNCB(S)  p < pECB; ii) the ECB will give the loan if p  pECB.
Note that although the NCB threshold is not dependent on n, the regulatory de-
cision is continuous in p, and so, if choosing n were costless, the bank could opt for
any p it would wish through increasing n enough in order to transfer the responsibility
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to the ECB, whose decision is again sensitive to the bank size. In that case, the only
relevant restriction would be the ECB threshold.
Comparing the regulatory restrictions in the discretionary case leads us to the
conclusion that, ceteris paribus, the subsidiary structure bank encounters stricter reg-
ulation than the branch structure bank, no matter who the regulator for the subsidiary
bank is. For the national regulators, this is due to the branch bank regulator having to
pay the deposit insurance for the whole bank, whereas the subsidiary bank regulator
only pays for the home unit.14 In contrast, the ECB intervention lowers the regula-
tory threshold for large subsidiaries, but now, the deposit insurance e¤ect of the NCB
regulating the branch bank dominates the systemic cost e¤ect of the ECB, responsible
for the subsidiary bank.
Finally, we formulate the bank maximisation problem in the rst stage of the game:
Max E () s:t:
p  min fpECB; pNCBg
E ( (pREG))  E ( (0)) (3.11)
The welfare consequences of the introduction of the ECB and of the discretionary
regulatory game are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Assigning the LOLR responsibility according to the incentives of the
regulators
a) has no welfare e¤ect for branch banks, and for small subsidiary banks with n 
s+1
s
;
b) decreases welfare for subsidiary structure banks with n > s+1
s
, for which pFB >
(C 0) 1
h
C(pNCB) C(pECB)
pNCB pECB
i
, or for which pFB < (C 0)
 1
h
C(pECB)+1+s+
v
n
pECB
i
and C(pECB)
pECB
<
H   1 < C(pNCB)
pNCB
; and
c) increases welfare for all other subsidiary structure banks with n > s+1
s
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The rst point of the Proposition is a straightforward consequence of Lemmas 8
14Repullo (2001) has a similar deposit insurance e¤ect, but he only compares international branch
bank regulation to that of a domestic bank.
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and 9. In the branch bank case where the ECB turned out to be the stricter regulator,
there is no change in the regulatory restriction, and hence, the veto right of the ECB
does not have any welfare e¤ects. The same applies for subsidiary structure banks with
n  s+1
s
.
In the subsidiary case with n > s+1
s
, the NCB, not taking the e¤ects of its actions
abroad into account, may turn out to be too strict for some banks from the social
welfare point of view. Here, the ECB intervention can indeed improve welfare if the
bank has a low rst best level of monitoring, i.e. is ine¢ cient enough. A necessary
condition for this is that pFB < pNCB. In the aggregate, however, this e¤ect has to be
balanced against the welfare-decreasing e¤ect of more e¢ cient banks that face more
lenient regulation, as well as against that of ine¢ cient banks that are encouraged to
enter the market at the lower threshold but contribute negatively to welfare.
It is worth noting that the eventual welfare improvement of the discretionary game
as to a single regulator does not originate from banks taking less risk in form of higher
monitoring level; on the contrary, it results from the possibility to prevent too strict a
national regulator from closing viable subsidiary structure banks. This will be the case
only if the problem of too eager regulation exists in the rst place, i.e. the externality
of not considering the bank return has to dominate the time inconsistency problem.
Then, the bank action and the choice of the identity of the regulator are strategic
complements in welfare, so the bank action in the rst stage of the game induces a
socially more optimal regulatory response.
3.3.3 Commitment Game and the Optimal Rule
The design of the ECB veto right discretionary game drew on the formulation of the
Treaty on the EU. In the following, we present an alternative approach to ambiguity
that may be compatible with the prescription in the Treaty. In particular, the regulator
is supposed to be able to commit to a rule on the identity of the LOLR, including the
commitment to not specifying the identity. In other words, we ask whether and under
which conditions it may be optimal not to explicitly appoint the LOLR responsibility
to any of the regulators. The following lemma states the rst necessary condition for
constructive ambiguity.
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Lemma 10 For ambiguity of LOLR identity to be welfare improving, it must be that
E [pREG] 2 (min fpECB; pNCBg ; max fpECB; pNCBg) :
Proof. See the Appendix.
The necessary condition in Lemma 10 appears to be quite restrictive. For example,
merely randomising which threshold is binding will not produce a role for constructive
ambiguity. The reason is that as the banks just adjust their expectations as to the
probability of a threshold being binding, they always choose either one of the thresh-
olds. In this case, however, it would always be welfare-improving to announce the
threshold that is closer to the rst best.15 Similarly, allowing the regulators to enter
into negotiations on terms of rescue only lead the bank to expect rescue at the lowest
regulatory threshold level.
Nevertheless, let us assume from now on that a mechanism that fulls the necessary
condition exists. As an approximation of ambiguity, let us assume that the bank
attributes a weight z on the ECB and (1  z) on the NCB, so that the bank forms its
expectations such that the expected regulatory threshold becomes E (pREG) = zpECB+
(1  z) pNCB. The optimal policy is then the solution of the following maximisation
problem:
Max USOC (p; z) s:t:
p 2 argmaxE ()
p  pREG 2 [pECB; pNCB]
E [ (E (pREG))]  E ( (0))
USOC [E (pREG)]  0: (3.12)
Note that the individual rationality constraint on the line 4 of Equation (3:12) is
always fullled in p 2 (0; pREG) if the rationality constraint for the society is fullled.16
The solution is summarised in the following proposition.
15For illustration, the randomising game of incomplete information is presented in Section 3.A in
the Appendix.
16This is because, as long as p  1, USOC = E ()  externalities  E ().
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Proposition 7 a) As long as pECB; pNCB  pFB, the optimal rule of the commitment
game is a corner solution with pREG = max fpECB; pNCBg;
b) If pNCB < pFB < min fpECB; C 1 [pECBH   s]g, or
pECB < pFB < min

pNCB(S); C
 1

pNCB(S)H   (s+1)(s+
v
n)
v+s+1

, the optimal rule is
to choose z = pFB pNCB
pECB pNCB , in which case E (pREG) = pFB;
c) In all the other cases, the optimal rule is to choose pREG = min fpECB; pNCBg.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Hence, the coexistence of the ECB and the NCB can indeed improve upon the NCB
also in cases where the NCB was too lenient due to the time inconsistency problem
in the rst place. For those branch structure banks for which the NCB would be too
lenient but the ECB is too strict, ambiguity is constructive. In addition, ambiguity
allows improving upon the discretionary solution for those subsidiary structure banks,
for which the NCB is too strict and the ECB too lenient.
Ambiguity in identity is constructive only in the case that either one, but only one,
of the regulators is too strict and practises ine¢ cient closures of banks that would have
a positive social value at the rst best. This happens for banks that are relatively
ine¢ cient. Therefore, if a mechanism exists to alter the expectations of the bank away
from the regulatory thresholds, one too tight a regulator makes the rst best solution
achievable. In the case of both regulators being too strict, the bank will be kept open
only if the rationality constraint of the social planner is fullled at the lower regulatory
threshold. The optimal rule for those banks thus coincides with the discretionary
solution.
Note that the commitment game always improves upon the discretionary game.
This is not surprising because, if the discretionary solution would be optimal, the
social planner could choose it in the commitment game; however, the possibility to
commit enlarges the strategy space of the social planner.
Commitment to ambiguity in identity thus allows in theory to compensate some-
what for the time inconsistency problem. However, the welfare improvement applies
only for a limited class of banks for whom one of the regulators is too strict, as in
Lemma 7. Next, we demonstrate how sensitive the result of constructive ambiguity is
with the help of some robustness checks.
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3.4 Robustness
The existence of constructive ambiguity was shown in a fairly general time inconsistency
framework. In order to see how robust the results are, we restrict the setting through
rst introducing a specic cost function for monitoring, and then assuming that the
regulators actually maximise welfare within their jurisdictions according to the home
country control principle. We then drop the assumption of the deposit insurance costs
exceeding the systemic costs and see how this a¤ects the results.
3.4.1 Quadratic Costs and Welfare-Maximising Regulators
Whereas the specication of the cost function restricts the level as to which the banks
can improve their e¢ ciency, assuming welfare-maximising regulators changes the regu-
latory trade-o¤ by decreasing the externalities that counteract the time inconsistency
problem. The following corollary sums up the results.
Corollary 2 Assume a quadratic cost function C (p) = p
2
2
, or alternatively, welfare-
maximising regulators within their jurisdictions. Then it is true that
a) The discretionary game reduces welfare as to the single regulator case;
b) The optimal rule for all banks is pREG = max fpECB; pNCBg.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for the quadratic cost function result is that, the cost function having
relatively little curvature, it is relatively expensive for the banks to monitor. Con-
sequently, no improvement of the e¢ ciency parameter  is su¢ cient to bring those
banks into producing social surplus. In particular, if the NCB threshold lies above the
rst best monitoring level, the banks have no incentives to be in action either, since
their individual rationality constraint is not fullled. However, this is not necessarily
the case for the ECB threshold; therefore, the ECB intervention that decreases the
regulatory threshold for the large subsidiary banks induces some of them into action.
Nevertheless, as the social rationality constraint however remains negative, the e¤ect
on welfare is in this case decreasing.
As to the welfare-maximising regulators, we see that regional externalities alone are
not su¢ cient for constructive ambiguity in identity to emerge. As in Mailath & Mester
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(1994), a welfare-maximising regulator internalises all benets from bank actions. The
reason why the regulators do not become too strict is that the expected bank return
now increases the value of continuation. Combined with the e¤ect of closure costs that
works to make closure even less attractive, the time inconsistency problem dominates
the regulatory externalities e¤ect.
3.4.2 Deposit Insurance versus Systemic Costs
So far, we have assumed that the deposit insurance payments exceed the systemic costs.
However, as only part of the bank liabilities may be insured, and as the deposit insurer
may be able to collect some liquidation value in order to diminish the deposit insurance
payments at the time of bank closure, it may be reasonable to consider the opposite
case. Consequently, we now drop the assumption of s < 1. Thus, in what follows, the
deposit insurance payment, not the liabilities in total, is normalised to one. However,
we still assume that both costs increase proportionally to the level of international
activities. We now consider the e¤ect on the results presented in the paper.
If the systemic cost e¤ect is larger than the deposit insurance cost, the ECB in
particular becomes more sensitive to the time inconsistency problem. It follows that
the subgame perfect equilibrium in the discretionary game divides the regulation of the
branch bank as follows: if n < s
s 1 , the NCB will give the loan i¤ pNCB(B)  p < pECB,
and the ECB will give the loan i¤ p  pECB. As to the NCB threshold for a subsidiary
structure bank, the relation between the ECB and NCB thresholds remains the same
as before.
In sum, changing the relation of the deposit insurance to the systemic cost qual-
itatively a¤ects only the regulation of large branch structure banks, which becomes
more lenient. As a consequence, the ECB veto right may have welfare e¤ects not only
in case of large subsidiary banks, as in Proposition 6, but through the regulation of
large branch banks, the direction of this e¤ect depending on the e¢ ciency of those
banks. In the similar vein, an additional condition for constructive ambiguity should
be included in Proposition 7, concerning the large banks whose rst best monitoring
level is situated between the too strict NCB and the too lenient ECB.
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3.5 Implementation
We saw that the second best rule includes constructive ambiguity for a category of
banks that are relatively ine¢ cient, but e¢ cient enough to be kept in action, and not
the most ine¢ cient ones in the market. The question arises how this constructive am-
biguity could be implementable. Already, Lemma 10 points to problems in mechanism
design, as it is di¢ cult to nd a mechanism that changes the banksexpectations from
the ECB and NCB thresholds.
Second, the optimal policy was contingent on the e¢ ciency of the banks. However,
it is questionable whether the e¢ ciency of the banks is veriable information, on which
the regulators can commit. Surely, e¢ ciency is a more permanent feature than the risk
level of the bank assets. But as we search for a tool to mend the problem of non-
veriability in monitoring via policy based on veriable aspects, caution is needed.
Third, Section 3.4 demonstrated that constructive ambiguity only exists under fairly
strict conditions. In particular, distortionary regulatory incentives that lead to ine¢ -
cient bank closures are needed, and bank monitoring has to be expensive enough.
Suppose that the social planner is able to observe the overall e¢ ciency of its banking
sector The following Corollary then proposes a third best rule.
Corollary 3 a)If there are a lot of ine¢ cient banks in the economy, the fourth best
rule is to give the ECB a veto right;
b) If most of the banks are e¢ cient enough, implement the rule
pREG = max fpECB; pNCBg :
Following from Lemmas 8 and 9, the third best solution is a rule contingent on
the size and the ownership structure of the bank. In general, it may be assumed that
most of the banks are e¢ cient, and that the improvement on the banksrisk behaviour
dominates the e¤ect of decreased social welfare due to stricter regulation of less e¢ cient
banks. Therefore, appointing regulation to the regulator with the maximum threshold
will be socially optimal in most cases. In practice, this implies exactly the opposite
of the discretionary solution: Depending on whether the deposit insurance costs are
assumed to be higher or lower than the systemic costs arising from a bank failure,
either all or just small branch banks, and small subsidiaries, should be regulated by
the ECB, whereas the regulation of large subsidiaries should be appointed to the NCB.
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3.6 Conclusion
The objective of the chapter was to consider the notion of constructive ambiguity in
identity and to ask whether it could compensate for the time inconsistency problem
of regulating observable but nonveriable bank risk taking. In so doing, the paper
comments on the political discussion evolving around the Treaty on the EU that gives
some leeway as to who is to act as the LOLR in Europe.
It turned out that the ECB intervention can indeed improve social welfare, if it is
introduced as a size and ownership contingent rule. Ambiguity, on the contrary, was
welfare-improving for a very limited class of relatively ine¢ cient banks, and detrimental
in case of all the other banks.
When evaluating the regulatory mechanism, the social planner faces a trade-o¤
between the e¤ects of the time inconsistency problem, on the one hand, and the pos-
sibility of an ine¢ cient bank closure due to cost-minimising regulators, on the other.
Since leaving the bank open almost always contains a positive probability that the bank
will not go bankrupt, the time inconsistency problem is inherent to regulatory policy
as long as there are closure costs present, for which the regulator cares. As in Tirole
(1994), the magnitude of the e¤ect can be decreased by appropriate regulatory design,
i.e. by appointing responsibilities to regulators that are only partially concerned about
the closure costs.
The chapter showed that, if banks indeed prefer a monitoring level that is inferior to
the social optimum, and if the rst best regulation is not achieved in terms of closure
policy due to closure costs, commitment to a rule is superior to a policy where the
contract on identity is left open in case of most banks. As the bank, by choosing a lower
monitoring level, induces the laxer regulator to take action, there is no justication for
incomplete contracts in those cases where the two actions are strategic substitutes
in welfare. In general, it was shown that a necessary condition for ambiguity to be
benecial, i.e. to improve the risk behaviour of the bank in terms of welfare, was that
it has to create an expected threshold that di¤ers from those of the two regulators.
Furthermore, this threshold has to represent a pareto improvement when compared
to the ECB and NCB thresholds. This is the case only for banks for which one, but
only one, regulator is too strict due to regulatory externalities that counteract the
time inconsistency problem. It was further shown that if the regulators are welfare-
maximising, or if the cost function has a quadratic form, these banks do not exist, and
ambiguity in identity does not have any constructive role in terms of improving welfare.
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Finally, the weight put on systemic costs against the deposit insurance concerns of the
regulators only slightly a¤ected the results. The optimal rule, applicable for the most
cases, appoints the regulation of branch banks and of small subsidiary structure banks
to the ECB, whereas the large subsidiary structure banks should be regulated by the
NCBs.
This chapter looked at ambiguity in identity in the most intuitive way, given the
current legislation and the political discussion around it. Alternative approaches, left
for future work, would include introducing information asymmetries between the regu-
lators, or risk of collusion. A relevant and interesting modication would be to consider
constructive ambiguity in regulatory identity as a self-selection mechanism in presence
of hidden information on bank risk taking.
Appendix 3
3.A Randomising LOLR Identity in a Dynamic
Game with Incomplete Information
I will approximate the mixed strategy concept of policy ambiguity as to the identity
question with a dynamic game of incomplete information, where the identity of the
LOLR is chosen by nature. Note that this is not constructive ambiguity in the sense
of mixed strategy, as would be in the case of a national regulator randomising on
lending policy. Rather, the bank does not know which game is played, the one with
the national regulator or the one with ECB. There is incomplete information as to
which node the bank is situated after the random choice of regulator. The bank then
attributes probabilities to these nodes and calculates the expected return.
A mixed strategy assumes perfect information on payo¤s of the other player; on
the contrary, in the European LOLR identity game, the type of the regulator is not
known, and the payo¤ of the regulator changes according to its type. Note that a
mixed strategy may very well be implemented in case of a single regulator deciding
whether to give emergency lending or not: here, the expected payo¤ of the regulator
of course remains the same throughout the game.
The maximisation problem is as follows:
MaxUSOC (p; z) s:t:
p 2 argmaxE ()
p  pREG 2 fpECB; pNCBg
E [ (pREG)]  E [ (0)]
USOC (pREG)  0:
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Given that the social rationality constraint is fullled, the bank chooses the regula-
tory threshold that is closer to the rst best monitoring level as long as the probability
of that regulator exceeds a particular level. Therefore, the optimal solution is either
z = 0 or z = 1. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this problem is to choose the
regulator that maximises social welfare; there is no role for ambiguity.
3.B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 6
The bank maximises its prot given the regulatory reaction in stage three:
Max
p
E () s:t:
p  min fpECB; pNCBg :
This is a concave maximisation problem with a linear constraint, so the solution
will be
p =
(
p  (C 0) 1 (H   1) if (C 0) 1 (H   1)  min fpECB; pNCBg
min fpECB; pNCBg otherwise:
In order to derive the welfare e¤ect, we need to distinguish between the cases where
the regulator with the smaller threshold is the NCB and where it is the ECB. If the
minimum threshold is that of the NCB, there is no welfare e¤ect at all since, from
backward induction, the only e¤ective threshold is the NCB and the emergence of the
ECB does not change anything in regulation in that case. So, from the part of branch
banks and small subsidiary banks, there is no change in welfare. For large subsidiary
structure banks, however, we have a welfare e¤ect, since the more lenient regulator
is the ECB. In terms of an individual bank, since the maximisation problem of the
society is single peaked and since for the society it is desirable to get as close to pFB as
possible, the only way for the ECB intervention to be welfare improving is to get a bank
closer to pFB. This happens if USOC (pECB) > USOC (pNCB). In addition, as for some
banks it may be that E [ (pNCB)] < E [ (0)] but E [ (pECB)]  E [ (0)], only those
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banks for which USOC (pECB) > 0 improve welfare, as the ones with USOC (pECB)  0
decrease it.
The former inequality will be fullled if
pFB < pFB  (C 0) 1

C (pNCB)  C (pECB)
pNCB   pECB

:
Note that an improvement in welfare implies that pNCB > pFB.
If pNCB > pFB, ECB may improve welfare by letting surplus generating banks to
operate that under NCB would have been eliminated from the market. Nevertheless,
it is also possible that welfare decreasing banks that previously were discouraged to
operate by the NCB now enter. The welfare decreasing banks are those for which the
individual rationality constraint is fullled at pECB but not at pNCB, and for which
additionally the social rationality condition is not fullled at pECB. This turns into
pFB < (C
0) 1

C (pECB) + 1 + s+
v
n
pECB

\ C (pECB)
pECB
< H   1 < C (pNCB)
pNCB
:
Thus, the welfare e¤ect of discretion is positive for subsidiary banks with n > s+1
s
,
for which pFB < pFB  (C 0) 1
h
C(pNCB) C(pECB)
pNCB pECB
i
and which belong to the complement
of the above mentioned set; for all other subsidiary banks with n > s+1
s
, the welfare
e¤ect is negative.
Proof of Lemma 10
Assume the social welfare maximising problem with pREG 2 fpECB; pNCBg. This is
equivalent to the game of incomplete information in Section 3.A in the Appendix, where
it was shown that the social welfare will be maximised through appointing regulation
to the regulator whose threshold is closer to the social optimum.
Assume the social welfare maximising problem with pREG 2 [0;min fpECB; pNCBg)
or pREG 2 (max fpECB; pNCBg ; 1] : In the rst case, it is incentive compatible for both
regulators to close the bank at pREG, and in the second case, to leave the bank open.
Therefore, these values are not attainable for the social planner.
Therefore, if it is possible to get a solution where the incentives of the regulators
are combined such that pREG 2 (pECB; pNCB), there may be a chance for constructive
ambiguity.
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Proof of Proposition 7
The optimal rule on regulatory identity is the solution to the following maximisation
problem:
Max USOC (p; z) s:t:
p 2 argmaxE ()
p  pREG 2 [pECB; pNCB]
E [ (E (pREG))]  E ( (0))
USOC [E (pREG)]  0:
We can eliminate the individual rationality constraint on line 4 through the fact
that it is fullled as long as the society rationality constraint on line 5 is fullled. The
society rational constraint is fullled at pFB as long as pFB  C[(C
0) 1(H+s+ vn)]+s+
v
n
H+s+ v
n
.
As the maximisation problem of the society is concave, it follows that as long as this
condition is fullled, the social and individual rationality constraints are fullled for
all pREG  pFB.
a) As USOC is increasing in p as long as pREG < pFB, for those banks, there is no
interior solution in z that improves upon the corner solutions z = 1 if pECB > pNCB
and z = 0 if pECB < pNCB.
b) If one of the regulatory thresholds exceeds pFB, it becomes possible to achieve
the rst best. Choosing z as given above produces E (pREG) = pFB, which means
that the individual and society rationality constraints are again fullled as long as
pFB  C[(C
0) 1(H+s+ vn)]+s+
v
n
H+s+ v
n
. Combining this with the requirement that pREG > pFB
for one threshold we get the ambiguity condition: Ambiguity increases welfare i¤
pNCB < pFB < min fpECB; C 1 [pECBH   S]g, or i¤
pECB < pFB < min

pNCB(S); C
 1

pNCB(S)H   (s+1)(s+
v
n)
v+s+1

.
c) In all the other cases, either the society rationality constraint cannot be fullled,
or, as pFB < pREG, it is optimal to choose the regulator with the lower threshold.
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Proof of Corollary 2
Quadratic cost function: If C (p)  p2
2
, the condition USOC (pFB)  0 can be
expressed as   2[v+n+ns]
n(H+s+ vn)
. For pECB > pFB to be true, it must be  < v(v+ns)(H+s+ vn)
,
and pNCB(S) > pFB implies  < v(v+s+1)(H+s+ vn)
, which both do not full the social
rationality constraint. As the restriction for the NCB threshold in case of branch
structure bank is even tighter, the same applies to it. It follows that all socially
desirable banks have pREG < pFB. For these cases, the optimal rule was pREG =
max fpECB; pNCBg.
As to the individual rationality constraint, the requirement E ( (pECB))  0 can
be expressed as   v
2(H 1)(v+ns) . Now, this is compatible with the requirement of
pNCB(S) > pFB i¤ n >
v(2 H)+Hs+sv+s2+H+s+
p
[v(2 H)+Hs+sv+s2+H+s]2+8sv(H 1)(2+s)
4s(H 1) . Re-
member however that for these banks, USOC (pFB) < 0. In the aggregate, they thus
reduce welfare in the discretionary game.
Welfare-maximising regulators: Assume the regulators maximise welfare within
their jurisdictions, i.e. take the expected bank returns into account. The utilities for
the ECB are as follows:
aECB = L : UECB = n [p (H   1)  C (p)]  (1  p) (v + ns+ n) = USOC
aECB = C : UECB =  nC (p)  n  ns:
As UECB(OPEN) = USOC , and as UECB(OPEN) (p = 0) < UECB(CLOSE), for every
bank for which USOC (pFB)  0, it must be that pECB < pFB. The same applies for
pNCB(S) and for pNCB(B). The consequences are as in the case of the quadratic cost
function.
Chapter 4
Strategic Bank Takeovers and the
Cost of Capital
4.1 Introduction
It is nowadays common procedure in theoretical banking literature to assume that
bank capital is costly. As a consequence, banks, if not subject to minimum capital
requirements, often prefer to nance their activities with deposits only1. In real life,
however, one observes that many banks hold more capital than demanded by the
regulator.
At the same time, foreign direct investment in the banking sector is unevenly dis-
tributed around the world2. The phenomenon is clearly present in the EU: Whereas
foreigners own almost entire banking sectors in some CEE countries, foreign ownership
of banks is still relatively rare in the old EU member countries. A broader look at
the nancial markets of the two EU areas reveals further di¤erences. In particular,
although the whole of Europe is rather bank concentrated when compared to the US3,
the signicance of stock markets in the CEE countries is even smaller than those of
the EU-15.
The objective of the model is to consider the e¤ect of restricted capital supply and
of banking regulation on the international structure of banking markets and on stabil-
ity. For this purpose, a model on nancial structure decision of a domestic and of an
1Examples include Bolton & Freixas (2000) and Hellmann & al. (2000).
2For evidence on the dispersion of the foreign direct investment in banking, see e.g. Berger & al.
(2000) and Clarke & a. (2003).
3See e.g. Allen & Gale (2000a).
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multinational bank is proposed. The banks face a trade-o¤ between the costly capital
and the probability of being allowed to continue and preserve the charter value. In par-
ticular, it is assumed that the direct link between the price of capital and the solvency
probability is disconnected, i.e. that the market specic factors dominate the bank
specic ones. This is justied with supply side considerations such as heterogeneous
liquidity needs of the agents who decide whether to hold shares or deposits, and with
some asymmetric information prevailing, as in the Gorton & Pennacchi (1990) lemons
cost model. Moreover, these liquidity needs may di¤er across societies, according to
their wealth or to some factors related to the nancial market structure.
The second focal point of the modelling approach at hand is the e¤ect of inter-
national takeovers. In particular, incentives of a bank to acquire a foreign bank and
the link to the bank capital choice and to stability are studied. Furthermore, we are
interested in the e¤ect of minimum capital requirements on those incentives.
It turns out that takeover incentives imply a dispersion of foreign direct investment
such that a division of the market to home and host countries occurs. What is more,
introducing minimum capital requirements amplies this e¤ect, directing foreign direct
investment towards the less developed markets. Finally, as this leads to an increase in
bank capital in markets where it has a relatively larger negative e¤ect on the probability
of bank failure, this amplication is stability increasing.
In the model, bank capital is costly, and deposits are subject to a comprehensive
deposit insurance. As a consequence, a higher level of capital increases the costs of
nancing by decreasing the value of the deposit insurance, and, absent other e¤ects,
the bank would consequently prefer deposits to capital. However, the opposite side of
the capital trade-o¤ results from the probability of being able to preserve the charter
value, which increases in capital, as the regulator will close the bank as soon as the
random return does not cover the deposits payable.
Internationalisation of the bank via subsidiary structure works as an option for the
bank: since the subsidiary is considered as an asset of the parent bank, it is allowed
to go bankrupt independently, the parent being liable only to the extent of capital
invested in the subsidiary. As a consequence, the probability of preserving the charter
value in the home country is isolated from the probability of success in the host country.
The probability of preserving the charter value in the host country is now, however,
dependent on the risk in the home country, as the failure of the home unit implies
failure of the host unit as well.
It turns out that the bank faces a trade-o¤ between capital and deposits such that
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it may choose an interior point. Moreover, internationalisation changes the liability
structure of the bank, on the one hand, thereby creating incentives to shift bank capital
from the host to the home unit. On the other, as it turns out that the takeover decreases
the price of capital for the host country unit, the increase in allocative e¢ ciency induces
the bank to raise the overall amount of capital. Whether this trade-o¤ leads to more
or less capital in the host unit after the takeover depends on the di¤erence in the price
of capital between the two markets. Introducing minimum capital requirements in the
home country is then shown to increase takeovers, as multinational banks prefer to hold
more capital than domestic ones. Introduction of minimum capital requirements in the
host country directs foreign direct investment in banking towards the least developed
markets, as multinational banks prefer to hold more capital in relation to the price of
acquisition, the less developed the market.
Due to its concentration on the supply side of bank capital, the model belongs
to the strand of literature that considers a bank as liquidity provider for depositors.
The seminal Diamond & Dybvig (1983) contribution combines consumersunexpected
liquidity needs with an exogenous cost of early liquidation of an investment project
and creates a role for the bank as a liquidity insurer. Within this framework, the
price advantage of deposits as to capital has been modelled by Gorton & Pennacchi
(1990), who introduce imperfect information on assets and show that bank deposits
arise endogenously as a solution for uninformed traders to protect themselves against
the informed traders in the market. Relatedly, the cost of bank capital has been
modelled as an information cost in Bolton & Freixas (1998, 2000).
The banks capital decision has been studied by Gorton & Winton (1995, 2000),
among others, who use the idea of liquidity in Gorton & Pennacchi (1990) to derive
the cost of bank capital from the role of demand deposits as the ideal medium of
exchange. The bank, wishing to preserve its charter value, decides on equity in a
general equilibrium framework with information sensitive bank capital and liquidity
constrained agents. Concentrating on the banks asset side, Diamond & Rajan (2000)
derive the price of bank capital from its negative e¤ect on liquidity creation in terms
of the banks ability to collect loans e¤ectively. Under asymmetric information, capital
then protects against ine¢ cient bank runs. Most of the work on bank capital however
assumes a constant cost on it. Bolt & Tieman (2004) derive an interior solution in
a dynamic framework related to Hellmann & al. (2000), where more capital raises
the expected life span of the bank. Equally in a dynamic setting, Milne & Whalley
(2001) nd that minimum capital requirements at the end of the project result in banks
holding capital bu¤ers over the minimum. A di¤erent approach is taken by Froot &
STRATEGIC BANK TAKEOVERS AND THE COST OF CAPITAL 90
Stein (1998), who interestingly show how the banks capital decision can be linked
with the amount of nontradeable risk and a¤ects the banks degree of risk aversion.
Finally, Dietrich & Vollmer (2004) have studied the capital decision of the bank in the
Diamond & Rajan (2000) framework and show that with risky renegotiations and a
risk averse bank with decreasing absolute risk aversion, the bank may choose capital
in excess of regulatory requirements as a negotiation tool against the borrower.
The incentive e¤ect of minimum capital requirements on bank behaviour has been
studied mainly in terms of bank risk taking. Koehn & Santomero (1980) nd out
that minimum capital requirements can increase bank risk taking, and increase the
dispersion of risk in the banking sector in total. Kim & Santomero (1988) then derive
theoretically correct risk weights for bank assets and correct for the unintended nega-
tive e¤ect on stability. Equally, Giammarino & al. (1993) study the optimal regulation
of bank capital and show that high asset quality should induce lower minimum capital
requirements. Milne (2002) contests this view and shows that with a penalty associ-
ated with ex post breaching the minimum capital requirement, banks have an incentive
to hold capital above the minimum, which leads to simple capital adequacy require-
ment possibly being su¢ cient to improving the banksasset quality. With a slight
change in point of view, Hellmann & al. (2000) show that if deposit rates can be set
freely, minimum capital requirements increase incentives of banks to o¤er high deposit
rates, which can endanger stability. They show that a combination of minimum capital
requirements and deposit rate controls leads to Pareto-e¢ ciency. Finally, in a multina-
tional setting, Loranth & Morrison (2003) nd out that minimum capital requirements
lead to underinvestment of multinational banks due to a combination of risk diversi-
cation and capital increase e¤ect on the value of deposit insurance, and therefore, they
should be adjusted for the risk diversication e¤ect inherent to multinational banking.
In contrast to the bank capital regulation literature mentioned above, our work
concentrates on the e¤ect of minimum capital requirements on the takeover incentives
and further on stability. Unlike in Koehn & Santomero (1980) or in Hellmann & al.
(2000), it turns out that the result, i.e. the increased incentives for takeovers in case of
minimum capital requirements in the home country and the greater concentration of
foreign ownership in case of host country regulation, does not necessarily conict with
the stability objective of regulation. On the contrary, the stability e¤ect is strengthened
in the least developed nancial markets, where such an e¤ect is most welcome.
Finally, the empirical literature on the incentives for foreign direct investment in the
banking sector has traditionally divided the causes into push factors that depend on the
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home country, and into pull factors depending on the host market4. The present work
stresses the importance of the nancing conditions in both countries. At a theoretical
level, Repullo (2001) considers the determinants of international takeovers and nds
out that the smaller the target bank and the riskier its investments relative to the
parent bank, the more likely the takeover is to happen. Moreover, a takeover is almost
always welfare improving. However, he does not consider subsidiary structure, and
as there is no capital in the model, liquidity shortages in the host country or capital
requirements cannot play any role.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: The general model and the bank trade-
o¤ is rst presented in Section 4.2. After that we proceed with linear capital costs in
Section 4.3 and show that, with the linear cost of capital, bank capital in the economy
is increased after the takeover, and derive explicit solutions. Section 4.4 then considers
the e¤ect of minimum capital requirements. Finally, we conclude.
4.2 Model Structure
In the following, a banking model with an at least weakly increasing and weakly convex
cost of capital function and with a charter value is proposed. The purpose is, rst,
to show the e¤ect of these elements on the banks maximisation problem and, second,
to demonstrate the departure from the assumption that the banks nancial structure
is always determined by the regulatory minimum capital requirement. In this section,
the role of the agents in the economy is further explained, after which we proceed with
the trade-o¤ of a domestic bank. Finally, the takeover condition used in the model is
presented.
4Clarke & al. (2003) provide a survey on the topic. Berger & al. (2003) and Clarke & al. (2003)
nd evidence on the importance of the legal and nancial market conditions in the host market as a
driving force behind foreign bank entry, and Claessens & al. (2001) on the higher prot opportunities
as a reason for entry especially in the less developed economies. In terms of pull factors, Berger &
al. (2000) stress the role of the regulatory and nancial market framework in the home country. For
banks investing in the CEE countries in particular, de Haas & van Lelyveld (2003) nd evidence of
them not being capital-constrained, which points towards favourable nancial conditions in the home
country.
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4.2.1 Shareholders and Depositors
A key argument is that the bank has to not only acquire deposits but also equity from
the nancial markets. This has consequences in terms of the cost of bank capital, but
also in terms of actions that the bank can undertake. In the case where the realised
return does not cover all claims payable, the depositors have the senior claim, followed
by the shareholders. The last claimant is thus the bank itself, wanting to preserve its
charter value by continuation of activities. This continuation is only possible if the
depositors, represented through the regulator, and the shareholders agree.
The crucial assumption made here is that the bank has to compensate not only
for the risk of bankruptcy but also for the liquidity risk of the shareholders. This risk
increases in bank capital. In the following, it will be assumed that the liquidity risk
always dominates the solvency risk considerations of the shareholders in the sense that
the cost of capital is at least weakly increasing and convex in the level of capital for
any society. In other words, 0 (K)  0 and 00 (K)  0. In addition, it is assumed that
 (0) = 0.5
The deposits are fully insured in the model and can be withdrawn at any time. They
are thus the ideal asset for the agents having a high probability of unforeseeable liquidity
needs. As the international subsidiary structure bank belongs to the jurisdiction of the
home country regulator for its domestic unit and to that of the host country regulator
for its subsidiary, the regulator has a right to the returns within the country in order
to diminish the deposit insurance payments, but does not have access to the returns
in the other country.
4.2.2 Bank Trade-o¤
When raising capital, the bank has a trade-o¤ between the probability of preserving
the charter value C, on the one hand, and the cost of capital due to the liquidity and
solvency risks of the shareholders, on the other. The charter value can be thought
of reecting the value of information inherent to relationship banking and cannot be
alienated from a specic bank6. We assume that the banker is able to extract this value
5One can think of a Gorton & Winton (1995, 2000) type of economy, where bank capital bears
a lemons share due to asymmetric information as to the bank return, and heterogeneous liquidity
needs make it more protable for one part of the population to hold deposits instead of shares, given
the price in the market.
6See e.g. Petersen & Rajan (1994) for evidence on the value of bank relationships. An alternative
treatment for the charter value would be to consider it as the present value of the expected future
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as a payment. The investment yields a random return eR, which is not inuenced by
the nancial structure choice.7 The timing of the domestic banking game is as follows8:
1. The bank acquires capital K and deposits D  1 K and invests in a project.
2. Returns materialise.
3. The regulator closes the bank if the random bank return does not cover the
deposits payable.
4. Depositors and eventually shareholders are compensated.
The banks payo¤ structure is determined as
 =
( eR + C    (K)K   1 if eR  1 K
0 if eR < 1 K : (4.1)
The return on investment eR is assumed to be a random variable, distributed uni-
formly in [0; 2]. The cut-o¤ value reects the regulatory bank closure in the case that
the return will not cover the deposits payable. Under the distributive assumptions,
the probability of bank survival, Pr ob
 eR  1 K, becomes 1+K
2
. The conditional
expectation of the return, E
 eR j eR  1 K then becomes 3 K
2
. The conditional
expectation decreases in the amount of capital: given that the amount of capital is
low, the bank needs a relatively high return in order to be able to cover the deposits
payable and not to be closed, and vice versa. The bank maximises its expected return:
Max
K
E () =

1 +K
2

3 K
2
+ C    (K)K   1

: (4.2)
Note that the probability of success is a positive function of K, whereas an increase
in K decreases the value of the bank in terms of lower conditional expected returns
and the cost of capital. Maximising over K produces the following trade-o¤:
returns. This approach would lead to an interior solution in bank capital for the domestic bank. The
introduction of the multinational bank would, however, make the model intractable, not the least
because of the complications in the shareholdersdecision process as to the closure of the subsidiary.
7Note that we depart from e.g. Koehn & Santomero (1980) and Kim & Santomero (1988) and
Loranth & Morrison (2003), who all consider the e¤ect of capital on risk taking incentives. Our goal
is to study the e¤ect on incentives to internationalise.
8Again, the multinational banking framework requires us to remain in a single period framework
for analytical tractability. For repeated games in banking with charter value, see e.g. Hellmann & al.
(2000) or Bolt & Tieman (2004).
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0 (K) =
C  K   (1 + 2K)  (K)
K +K2
: (4.3)
That is, in the optimum, the bank equals the marginal cost of capital with the net
marginal utility of holding it. The latter is increased in the charter value of the bank:
as increasing K increases the probability of success, the value of this e¤ect depends
on the charter value. The marginal utility is diminished by the change in conditional
expectations on the return and by the increased probability that the shareholder com-
pensation  (K) will become due, as the probability of the good outcome increases.
The solution of the maximisation problem is characterised in the following Lemma:
Lemma 11 With 00 (K)  0, the banks maximisation problem is concave for K  0
and has an interior maximum K 2 (0; 1) for some parameter values.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma says that, even though capital is costly, it may be that the bank chooses
to hold some of it. In particular, the potential regulatory requirements on the amount
of capital are no more necessarily binding.
Two features are necessary for achieving the interior maximum. First, the bank
would choose the minimum level of capital, unless there was an advantage from con-
tinuing that is not negatively inuenced by higher capital level.9 In this model, the
charter value plays the role of this additional benet. Second, and maybe surprisingly,
the mere existence of charter value is not enough to move the result from the corner
solutions, but the need to compensate the shareholders for liquidity risk is crucial.10
Intuitively, increasing capital just above zero has a sure and relatively high cost, but
the increase in the probability of success is minimal. On the other hand, decreasing
capital just below one has a small utility in terms of saving the cost of it that will be
dominated by the decrease in the probability of success. In sum, both the charter value
and market specic costs for capital are needed for an interior solution.
9Recall that the conditional expected return was decreasing in capital.
10More formally: If the only concern would be the solvency risk, the price the shareholders would
demand would be 1 K1+K with a decreasing derivative
@
@K =
 2
(1+K)2
, and the model would result into
corner solutions K 2 f0; 1g with a minimum in K = 1  C.
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4.2.3 Takeover Condition
We next proceed with considering the incentives for international acquisitions. If the
takeover is to be protable for the raider bank, the expected return of the international
bank must exceed the sum of the opportunity cost of operating as a domestic bank and
the compensation due to the host country shareholders. As we have perfect information
in the model, this is equivalent to saying that the takeover takes place if the value of the
multinational bank is larger than the summed-up value of the two domestic banks11.
More precisely, the home bank will take the host bank over i¤
E (C)  E () + E () :12 (4.4)
Later on, it will turn out that we can reformulate the takeover condition as a decision
rule contingent on the price of capital in the host markets.
In the following, the basic model is used to analyse the inuence of the cost of
capital on internationalisation of the banking sector and on stability. For the sake of
analytical tractability, we assume the cost of capital -function to be linear from now
on.
11Perfect information has the consequence that the minimum bid price of the share, i.e. the price
that the raider at least has to pay to the host country shareholders, is equivalent to the expected
return per share with the current capital level
12The results of the paper are not dependent on how the surplus is divided between the buyers and
the sellers. To see this, note rst that the equilibrium capital levels are determined independent of
the takeover condition. Second, all the other e¤ects are marginal e¤ects that are valid for a bid price
PB 2 [E () ; E (C)  E ()].
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4.3 A Model of Multinational Banking with Linear
Costs
In this section, the banks basic maximisation problem is augmented with multinational
banking. The multinational bank is assumed to have a subsidiary structure and to
maximise the expected return by choosing the level of capital in both countries13. We
look at a multi-stage game with domestic and foreign shareholders, depositors, two
domestic banks that eventually form an multinational bank, and two regulators that,
besides providing full deposit insurance, decide whether the bank belonging to their
jurisdiction is allowed to continue its activities or not. The timing of the game is now
the following:
1. The bank acquires capital and deposits and invests in a project.
2. The bank decides whether to buy a subsidiary or not; if yes, capital is acquired
at home and the foreign shareholders are compensated.
3. Returns materialise.
4. The regulator closes the bank if the random bank return does not cover the
deposits payable within its jurisdiction.
5. Depositors and eventually shareholders are compensated.
Here, the price of capital is assumed to be a constant ; as a consequence, 0 (K),
00 (K) = 0, and the cost of increasing the amount of capital becomes linear. The
expected prot maximisation problem of the domestic bank is
Max
K
E () =

1 +K
2

1 K
2
+ C   K

; (4.5)
and the maximum is found in
K =
(
C 
1+2
if C < 1 + 3
1 otherwise
: (4.6)
13The di¤erence between the subsidiary and the branch structure is that, in the former case, the
subsidiary is a separate asset of the parent bank, whereas in the latter case, the assets of the parent
and the branch are pooled. The regulation according to the home country control principle reects
this di¤erence by appointing the responsibility of the branch structure bank entirely to the home
country regulator, whereas the responsibilities are divided in case of the subsidiary structure bank.
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The optimal capital level increases in the charter value C, as more capital increases
the probability of preserving the charter value. On the other hand, increasing capital
also increases the costs, which is why the optimal capital level decreases in price .
The constant 1 in the denominator reects the e¤ect of capital on the expected return,
conditional on the bank being left open.
A multinational bank invests the capital received from the home country sharehold-
ers to a subsidiary abroad. Since the parent bank is fully isolated from the bankruptcy
procedure of the subsidiary, the subsidiary is similar to an option for the parent bank.
In case of bankruptcy of the parent bank, of course, the subsidiary has to be liquidated.
The multinational bank maximises over two capital levels, in the home and in the
host country. The expected return maximisation problem becomes
Max
K;K
E (C) =

1 +K
2

1 K
2
+ C   K

+

1 +K
2

1 K
2
+
1 +K
2
C   K

; (4.7)
where the variables with asterisk refer to the host country. Note that, compared
to the domestic banks maximisation problem in the host country, the expected value
of the charter value of the subsidiary has now decreased: Whether the bank is able
to preserve the charter value in the host country not only depends on the success of
the subsidiary, but also of the success of the parent bank. Yet, a bad outcome in the
subsidiary does not have an e¤ect on the parent bank balance sheet, so the probability
of success of the parent remains directly unaltered by the international linkage.14 Note
in addition that, as the international takeover means buying shares from the host
country shareholders and selling them to the home country ones, the cost of capital for
the subsidiary depends on the conditions at the home capital market. Optimisation
results in the following rst order conditions:
14Note that the failure of the home unit cannot be avoided by a prot transfer from the host
country unit. This is because the shareholders are separated from the bank and have a priority as a
claimant over the bank who wants to preserve its charter values. Consequently, the return in the host
unit above the deposits payable will be claimed by the shareholders.
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KC =
C   
1 + 2
+
(1 +KC)C

2 (1 + 2)
KC =  

1 + 2
+
(1 +KC)C

2 (1 + 2)
= KC   2C
2 (1 + 2) + C
: (4.8)
Note rst that, by the implicit function theorem, @KC
@KC
, @K

C
@KC
= C

2(1+2)
> 0. The
capital levels in the home and host countries are thus complements, as an increase in
capital in either of the two units increases the total expected value of the bank, which
again increases the capital in the other unit, and vice versa. There is thus an indirect
link from the capital level in the host unit to that of the home unit, which equally
inuences the probability of success of the home unit. We additionally make here the
standard assumption of C

2(1+2)
< 115.
Second, it is clear that the multinational bank invests more capital at home than
a domestic bank would. This is because of the option nature of the subsidiary: more
capital invested at home increases the probability of preserving the charter value in
the subsidiary. The reverse is, however, not true: increasing capital in the subsidiary
inuences the probability of preserving the charter value in the subsidiary, but not
that of preserving the charter value of the parent bank. Indeed, the insurance e¤ect of
increasing capital in the host unit is decreased by the possibility that a failure of the
mother bank will cause the bankruptcy of the subsidiary as well, independent of the
performance of the latter.
Finally, we can already state that, were there no di¤erence in cost of capital between
the home and host markets, a multinational bank would invest more capital altogether
than the separate domestic banks. This is because the marginal utility of an increase in
KC is higher than the marginal loss of decreasing KC , as the former helps in preserving
both C and C, but the latter has no e¤ect on the probability of saving C.
Solving explicitly for the capital levels produces:
KC =
C2 + 2 (1 + )C + 4 (1 + 2) (C   )
4 (1 + 2)2   C2
KC =
2 [(1 + + C)C   2 (1 + 2)]
4 (1 + 2)2   C2 : (4.9)
15This serves to exclude the possibility that the indirect inuence on domestic capital via the foreign
unit will exceed the direct e¤ect (and vice versa), but also happens to be the SOC for a maximum.
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We now turn to the question under which conditions the takeover is to happen. The
takeover condition for the linear cost of capital model is characterised in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 12 i) The international takeover takes place i¤
 > A p(A  C) (A+ C + 1), where
A  1 + (C )(1 4(1+))C
2(1+2)
+ [(C )(1 4(1+))+2(1+2)]C

2(1+2)
KC + (1 + 2)K
2
C and A  
C  0.
ii) A necessary condition for a takeover is that  > .
iii) The takeover becomes more protable, ceteris paribus, the lower the  and the
higher the C is.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, the takeover condition implies that only banks that can buy capital cheaper
than the target banks will become raiders. Intuitively, Lemma 12 simply says that if
countries can be classied as to the degree of e¢ ciency of their nancial markets, the
countries with the most e¢ cient nancial markets will have the most raiders, whereas
the countries with the least e¢ cient nancial markets will become host countries. In
addition, there is an intermediate interval in nancial market e¢ ciency, where the
countries show little international activity16.
After having determined the equilibrium capital levels and the conditions for takeover,
we can derive some results as to bank capital in the market. Let us dene  
+ (1 KC)C

(1+(1+KC)C)

+ 1
2

. The results are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 i) A multinational bank with a subsidiary structure invests more capital
in the home country than a domestic bank would: KC > K.
ii) The total sum of capital of the multinational bank is higher than the sum of the
capital of the two domestic banks: KC +KC > K +K
.
iii) The capital level in the foreign unit is higher after the acquisition i¤  > .
The higher the  and the lower the C, the higher is .
16Since the measure is relative, the intermediate nancial markets may show some internationali-
sation, as the banks originating from the most e¢ cient countries may invest in them if there are no
banks to be acquired in the less developed nancial markets, and as the banks from the intermediate
markets may invest in the least developed countries.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The takeover condition excludes all takeovers that are not protable. The rst
two points refer to the banks that remain in the set of international banks after this
elimination. The third point denes the price di¤erence above which, despite the lia-
bility structure of the multinational bank driving capital into the parent unit, the host
country unit holds more capital after than before the takeover. It is thus possible that
the trade-o¤ between cheaper capital and the increased risk on capital is dominated by
the rst e¤ect. This may also explain why, despite of apparently little obvious reason,
capital is widely held above the regulatory limit in the CEE countries in particular.
The higher the di¤erence between the two capital markets and the higher the charter
value of the home unit of the bank, the larger is the parameter space for which the
international takeover increases capital in the host country.
Finally, we are interested in the stability consequences of takeovers. In the following,
stability is dened as the probability of not being liquidated by the regulator. Due to
the liability structure, stability in the host unit is inuenced by the probability of
success of the home unit. In addition, due to the complementary link between the two
capital levels, capital held in the host unit equally a¤ects the stability of the parent
bank.
Dene S  1+2C
2(KC+KC+KCKC)
  1
2
. Then, the following Proposition sums up the
e¤ect of an international takeover on stability.
Proposition 9 An international takeover increases the stability of the parent unit. For
the host unit, the probability of success is higher than before acquisition i¤  > S; in
this case, the multinational bank imports stability to the host country.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The increased stability in the parent unit is a direct consequence of its inuence
in preservation of charter values that is higher for the multinational bank than for do-
mestic banks. Whether the stability of the host country unit is increased or decreased,
depends on the bank trade-o¤between the lower share price  and the increased fragility
in the case that KC < 1. If the improvement in the allocative e¢ ciency in the form of
lower cost of capital dominates the e¤ect of the introduction of the more fragile bank
structure, the international takeover increases capital in the host unit enough such that
the multinational bank imports stability to the host country.
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4.4 E¤ect of Minimum Capital Requirements
So far, the only task allocated to the regulator was to close the bank, if the random
return did not su¢ ce to cover the deposits payable. Assume now that, in order to
reduce the probability of this outcome, the regulator introduces a minimum capital
requirement that has to hold when the project starts; otherwise, the bank will be
closed1718. In this section, consequences for the amount of capital held, for takeover
incentives, and for stability are considered. The results concerning the rst two aspects
are summarised in the following Proposition.
Proposition 10 i) Minimum capital requirements increase capital of domestic banks
in their respective countries, and of the multinational bank in both countries;
ii) An introduction or an increase of a minimum capital requirement in the home
country always increases the incentives for takeovers;
iii) An introduction or an increase of a minimum capital requirement in the host
country always increases the incentives for takeovers for banks with K < KC . In
addition, for banks for which K > KC, an introduction or an increase of a minimum
capital requirement increases takeover incentives if K

> K
crit
, and decreases them
otherwise. The higher the , the larger is the parameter space for which an introduction
or an increase of a minimum capital requirement increases takeover activity.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the Proposition, K
crit  (1 KC)C
4( )   12 . The rst result restates the equation
(4:8) for an international bank with binding capital requirements. Bearing in mind that
the capital levels of the parent and of the subsidiary were complements, the optimal
response of a multinational bank to a binding capital requirement in one unit is to
17In a repeated game, this means that if the bank return is su¢ ciently low as not to cover the
deposits and the minimum capital, the bank has to acquire more capital from the market before
being allowed to launch a new project. An alternative would be to demand that the capital adequacy
requirement has to be fullled continuously. This modelling approach would lead to the banks holding
a capital bu¤er as in e.g. Milne & Whalley (2001). However, in our setting, this regulatory approach
is dominated by the chosen one in terms of welfare due to the impact of ine¢ cient closures. Intuitively,
even if the bank chose K = 1, it would be closed if eR < K.
18Note that we do not have to worry about the banks participation constraint here: As the
expected social welfare consists of the expected bank returns and of the negative externalities in
terms of expected deposit insurance payments, the expected bank return is always positive as long as
it is socially optimal to let the bank operate.
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increase capital in the other one as well. Nevertheless, since the resulting amount of
capital is not the optimal solution to the banks maximisation problem any more, the
expected return of the multinational bank will decrease.
Points ii) and iii) consider the e¤ects of the introduction of minimum capital require-
ments for the two countries separately. First, note that within the model, minimum
capital requirements a¤ect the incentives of the banks to internationalise. In particular,
capital adequacy ratios in the home country always increase the takeover activity, since
this may help the bank escape a restriction by reorganisation to a multinational bank,
as the higher value of continuing induces the bank voluntarily to hold more capital
within the multinational structure.
Second, the e¤ect of the introduction of minimum capital requirements in the host
country on the takeover activity depends on the price di¤erence between the home and
the host countries. For those host countries that have a relatively low price of capital,
minimum capital requirements reduce the incentives of foreign bank entrance, since the
price di¤erence is not large enough to compensate for the loss in terms of higher capital
requirements. Yet, for the host countries for which the price of domestic capital is high,
incentives for foreign bank takeovers are increased, as the compensation payable for
the host country shareholder becomes smaller. For those markets, the capital increase
in the host bank may just simply result from the unrestricted maximisation of the
multinational bank, whereas the domestic shareholders may have been unable to get
the funds necessary to full the minimum capital requirement.
If we assume a common capital adequacy ratio introduced in both countries instead,
it is either binding for both countries, or for the host country only (since   ). The
total e¤ect then is driven by the e¤ect of capital requirements introduced in the host
country.
The result can be interpreted as the capital adequacy ratios rst increasing takeover
activity, and second, directing foreign direct investment towards the least developed
nancial markets. The latter e¤ect leads to polarisation of internationalisation of the
banking sector.
Finally, we are interested in how minimum capital requirements a¤ect the stability
of the banks. The stability consequences are summarised in the following Corollary.
Corollary 4 i) An increase in capital requirements in the home country a) increases
the probability of success of the domestic banks in the home country; and b) of the
existing multinational banks both in the home and in the host country; and c) through
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the increased takeover incentives as in Proposition 2.
ii) An increase in capital requirements in the host country a) increases the proba-
bility of success of the domestic banks and of the multinational banks both in the home
and in the host country, and b) increases the overall probability of success of banks via
directing takeovers to countries with higher .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Now, an increase in capital requirement works through three channels. First, there
is a direct e¤ect of increasing the bank capital in the country of the capital require-
ment. Again, an increase of capital requirement has a linear e¤ect on the stability of a
domestic bank as well as on the home unit of a multinational bank, whereas the e¤ect
on a subsidiary is diminished through the parent units probability of failure. Second,
for multinational banks, there is a complementarity e¤ect, due to which the amount
of capital in the other country will be increased as well, which equally increases the
stability of the unit.
Third, a capital requirement in either country can either decrease or increase in-
centives to internationalise, as we saw from Proposition 10. In particular, for an intro-
duction or increase in the home country, the e¤ect on internationalisation is positive,
whereas the e¤ect of an introduction or an increase in the host country is positive only
for the relatively least developed countries. Together with the notion that an interna-
tional takeover increases stability in the least developed markets, a minimum capital
requirement in the host country further increases bank stability by directing takeover
activity towards those markets.
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4.5 Conclusion
The aim of the model was to analyse the banks nancing decision in a setting where
the shareholders care about their liquidity needs, and to link this to the context of
multinational banking, where shareholders do not necessarily reside in the country of
operation. Within this framework, the consequences for the stability of the nancial
markets and the e¤ects of minimum capital requirements were then considered.
Endogenisation of takeover activity in the model resulted in the division of the
market into home and host countries. What is more, introducing minimum capital
requirements increased takeover activity and directed it towards less developed markets.
This latter amplication e¤ect was shown to be stability increasing. Thus, unlike in
Koehn & Santomero (1980) or in Hellman & al. (2000), the indirect e¤ect of minimum
capital requirements on bank incentives is not necessarily at odds with the stability
objective of the regulator.
In more detail, it turned out that, with a weakly increasing and convex cost of
capital, the bank faces a trade-o¤between the probability of saving its charter value and
the cost of capital, such that an interior solution in bank capital emerged. Moreover,
a multinational bank acquired more capital in the home country than a domestic bank
did, shifting some from the host country unit to the home country unit. In addition,
if a takeover was to happen, the di¤erence in the cost of capital must be such that the
overall amount of capital of the multinational bank was higher than that of the two
domestic units before the takeover.
Stability of the parent unit was shown to increase as a consequence of the takeover,
whereas the e¤ect on the stability of the subsidiary was ambiguous. Indeed, despite
the shift of capital from the host country unit to the home country unit, the increase
in allocative e¢ ciency in form of lower price of capital could be so high that even
the stability of the host unit was increased. Finally, minimum capital requirements in
the home country increased incentives for takeovers, whereas, if introduced in the host
country, they directed foreign direct investment in banking towards the least developed
nancial markets. This was shown to increase overall stability.
The model has two empirical implications. First, according to the model, multi-
national banks that have a subsidiary structure should hold more capital than their
domestic equivalents. Second, the markets should exhibit a large concentration in for-
eign direct investment, the most e¢ cient markets being the home countries and the
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least e¢ cient ones the host countries. The latter phenomenon has been documented
by e.g. Berger & al. (2000), who attribute it to the more advantageous regulatory
conditions in the home market. Our work suggest a closely related explanation in form
of a mixture of more advantageous home country nancial markets and the amplifying
e¤ect of internationally common minimum capital requirements.
As is the case with many related contributions, the work at hand models the supply
of bank capital only rudimentarily. In this regard, further research will be needed. In
addition, the internationalisation of the bank was assumed to happen in the form of
a subsidiary structure. Introducing branch structure into the model would bring more
insights in terms of results and empirical implications, but would also require some
further simplications, in order to keep the model tractable.
In this chapter, we concentrated on the supply side of the bank capital market.
Alternatively, one could consider the asset side of the banks, as in Diamond & Rajan
(2000, 2001). In their models, demand deposits create liquidity for the depositors, and
the rst come, rst served -system gives an incentive to meet unveriable needs in
the asset side of the banks. Our main focus was, however, to consider multinational
banking, which clearly necessitates some supply side considerations. The impressive
presence of foreign banks in the CEE countries, coupled with the small market value
and low liquidity of the local stock markets, served as a powerful inspiration for us
along the way. Also, this is why we think that further work on a theory of bank capital
concentrating on the restrictions on the supply side is useful.
Appendix 4
4.A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 11
Function E () is continuous with a continuous derivative. The rst derivative of
the banks maximising problem is @E()
@K
=  (K)(2K+1)
2
  
0(K)(K2+K)
2
  K
2
+ C
2
. The
second order derivative @
2E()
@2K
=  0 (K) (2K + 1)   
00(K)(K2+K)
2
   (K)   1
2
< 0 for
all K  0, given that 0 (K) ; 00 (K)  0. The maximising problem is thus concave
for K  0, and achieves its maximum in K 2 (0; 1) i¤ @E()
@K
jK=1< 0. This is true if
0 (1) >  3(1)
2
+ C 1
2
.
Proof of Lemma 12
i) The explicit takeover condition TC takes the form
TC  1
2
  C

4
+
C   
2
(KC  K) 

1 + 2
4
 
K2C  K2

+
C
4
KC
+
C   2
4
KC  

1 + 2
4

K2C +
KCK

CC

4
 (C
   )
2
K +
(1 + 2)
4
K2 > 0:
Arranging this for  (and remembering that @K
@ ;
@KC
@ ;
@KC
@ = 0) we get a quadratic
condition:
  + 2A + [A  (1 + C)C] > 0, where
A  1+(1+K

C)(C )(1 4(1+))C
2(1+2)
+(C   2+ (1 + 2)KC)KC . The solution for this
condition is then A p(A  C) (A+ C + 1) <  < A+p(A  C) (A+ C + 1) .
STRATEGIC BANK TAKEOVERS AND THE COST OF CAPITAL 107
If we now have A < C, the takeover condition is always negative. If we have A  C,
it follows that A +
p
(A  C) (A+ C + 1) > A > C, which can be true only for
banks for which K = 0. If we exclude these banks, the remaining condition for a
takeover becomes  > A p(A  C) (A+ C + 1).
ii) The takeover condition can be turned into
E (KC ) + E

KC

  (1 KC)(1+K

C)C
4
> E () + E (). As E () and E ()
reach their optima at K and K, respectively, the left hand side is always inferior to
the right hand side with equal prices. Thus, a necessary condition for the condition to
hold is that  < .
iii) Comparative statics on the takeover condition with regard to C:
@TC
@C
= 1
2
(KC  K) +

C  (1+2)KC
2
+
(1+KC)C
4

@KC
@C
 

C  (1+2)K
2

@K
@C
+

(1+KC)C
 2 2KC(1+2)
4

@KC
@C
.
As C  (1+2)KC
2
+
(1+KC)C
4
= @E(C)
@KC
, C  (1+2)K
2
= @E()
@K
and
(1+KC)C
 2 2KC(1+2)
4
= @E(C)
@KC
and as @E(C)
@KC
= @E()
@K
= @E(C)
@KC
= 0 in the opti-
mum, it follows that @TC
@C
= 1
2
(KC  K) > 0.
Comparative statics on the takeover condition with regard to :
@TC
@
=  1
2
(KC  K +K2C  K2)  12KC
+

C +(1+2)KC
2
+
(1+KC)C
4

@KC
@
 

C +(1+2)K
2

@K
@
+ C
 2+KCC
4
@KC
@
. As we
know that KC > K, the rst term of the equation is negative, as well as the second
one. In order to determine the signs of the remaining terms, we rst calculate the
derivatives:
@K
@
=   1+2C
(1+2)2
< 0
@KC
@
=
[4(1+2)2 C2][2C+4(2C 1 4)] 16(1+2)[C2+2C(1+)+4(1+2)(C )]
[4(1+2)2 C2]2
> 0 i¤
 4 (1 + 2)2 [12 (C   )  4 [C     (1 + 2)]]  8C (1 + 2) (3 + 2)
  (2C + 4 (C   ) + 12 (1 + 2))C2 > 0. As this is not true, @KC
@
< 0.
@KC
@
=
[4(1+2)2 C2][3C 4] 16(1+2)[(2+3+C)C 4(1+2)]
[4(1+2)2 C2]2
> 0 i¤
4 (1 + 2) [C   4C   6  5] 16 (1 + 2)2 3C3 > 0. As this is not true, @KC
@
< 0.
In addition, we know that @KC
@
  @K
@
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=
 8(1+2)3(3+2)C (1+2)2(2C+4(C )+12(1+2))C2 [8(1+2)2 C2]C2
(1+2)2[4(1+2)2 C2]2
< 0 (since by as-
sumption, C < 2 (1 + 2)). This means that
@KC@   @K@  > 0.
As

C +(1+2)KC
2
+
(1+KC)C
4

 

C +(1+2)K
2

=
2(1+2)(KC K)+(1+KC)C
4
> 0, it
follows that

C +(1+2)KC
2
+
(1+KC)C
4

@KC
@
 

C +(1+2)K
2

@K
@
< 0 too.
Finally, as to the last term in the equation, C
 2+KCC
4
> 0 i¤
KC >
2 C
C . Assuming the opposite and plugging the value of KC into equation
(4:8), we see that if KC <
2 C
C , K

C <  2+C
+2 C
2(1+2)
= 0. Thus, if the bank is willing
to invest any capital into the foreign unit, it must be that C
 2+KCC
4
> 0, and it
follows that C
 2+KCC
4
@KC
@
< 0. As a consequence, @TC
@
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 8
i) The amount of capital held at home is larger in the case of a multinational bank
than in that of a domestic bank since KC =
C 
1+2
+
(1+KC)C
2(1+2)
> C 
1+2
= K.
ii) We saw already from Lemma 12 that a necessary condition for a takeover was
 < .
The sum of capital held in the multinational bank is larger than the sum of the two
domestic banks i¤
KC+K

C > K+K
  ! C 
1+2
+
(1+KC)C
2(1+2)
  
1+2
+ (1+KC)C

2(1+2)
> C 
1+2
+C
 
1+2  !
 >   (K

C+KC)C
[2C+1+(KC+KC)C]
(1 + ).
As the necessary condition for a takeover is stricter than the condition for the in-
ternational bank holding more capital than the two domestic banks together, it follows
that for every international bank, KC +KC > K +K
 holds.
iii) For KC > K
, it must be that   
1+2
+ (1+KC)C

2(1+2)
> C
 
1+2  !
 >   + (1 KC)C
1+(1+KC)C

+ 1
2

.
Comparative statics as to C:
@
@C
= @

@KC
@KC
@C
. As @

@KC
=
 
+ 1
2
 h  C(1+4C)
(1+(1+KC)C)2
i
@KC
@C
and as
@KC
@C
= 4(1+2)
4(1+2)2 C2 > 0,
@
@C
< 0.
Comparative statics as to :
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@
@
= 1 +
h
(1 KC)C
1+(1+KC)C
i
+
 
+ 1
2
 "@ (1 KC)C1+(1+KC)C 
@KC
#
@KC
@
= 1+
h
(1 KC)C
1+(1+KC)C
i
+
 
+ 1
2
 h  C(1+4C)
(1+(1+KC)C)2
i
@KC
@
. The two rst terms of the equa-
tion are positive. Since the coe¢ cient of the third term is negative and since we know
from the proof of Lemma 12 that @KC
@
< 0, it follows that @

@
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 9
The probability of success of the home unit is in the case of subsidiary structure
dependent only on the performance in the parent unit, which is determined by 1+K
2
.
As
@( 1+K2 )
@K
> 0, an increase in capital in the home unit increases the probability of
success and therefore stability.
Subsidiary: The probability of success in the host country unit is higher for a
subsidiary than for a domestic bank i¤ 
1+KC
2
 1+KC
2

>
 
1+K
2
  !  > S  1+2C
2(KC+KC+KCKC)
  1
2
.
Proof of Proposition 10
i) See equation (4:8).
ii) From Proposition 8 it follows that KC > K always. As a consequence, a capital
adequacy ratio in the home country is either binding only for a domestic bank or for
both the domestic and the multinational bank. For every K > K, the e¤ect of an
increase in capital on the takeover incentives is
@TC
@K
=   (C )
2
+ (1+2)K
2
> 0 if K > C 
1+2
 K for the domestic bank, and
@TC
@K
= (C )
2
+
(1+KC)C
4
  (1+2)K
2
< 0 if
K > C 
1+2
+
(1+KC)C
2(1+2)
 KC for the multinational bank.
If the capital adequacy ratio is binding only for the domestic bank, the e¤ect of an
introduction or an increase on the takeover incentives for every K > K is
  (C )
2
+ (1+2)K
2
> 0.
If the capital adequacy ratio is binding for the domestic and for the multinational
bank, the e¤ect of an introduction or an increase on the takeover incentives for every
K > KC > K is
  (C )
2
+ (1+2)K
2
+ (C )
2
  (1+2)K
2
+
(1+KC)C
4
=
(1+KC)C
4
> 0. This means
that, independent of whether the domestic bank only or both the domestic and the
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multinational bank are restricted by the capital adequacy ratios, the e¤ect on the
takeover activity is positive.
iii) If CAR is introduced in the host country, we now have three possibilities: either
the CAR is binding for the domestic bank only, or for the multinational bank only, or
for both.
If the CAR is binding for domestic bank only, it must be that K < KC . In this
case, the e¤ect of the CAR is simply the e¤ect of increasing K over the optimum of
the domestic bank. With a concave maximisation problem, this will reduce the value
of the domestic bank. It follows that if
K
 2 (K; KC ], then @TC@K =  
(C )
2
+ (1+2
)
2
K

> 0.
If the CAR is binding for the multinational bank only, it must be that KC <
K. The e¤ect of the CAR is then that of increasing KC over the optimum of the
multinational bank. Here, too, with a concave maximisation problem, this will reduce
the value of the multinational bank. it follows that if K
 2 (KC ; K], then
@TC
@K
 =
(C 2)
2
+ KCC

4
  (1+2)K

2
< 0.
If the capital adequacy ratio is binding both for the domestic and for the multina-
tional bank, the total e¤ect of an introduction or an increase of a CAR on the takeover
condition is
@TC
@K
 =
(C 2)
4
  (1+2)K

2
+ KCC

4
  (C )
2
+ (1+2
)K
2
> 0 if
K

> K
crit  (1 KC)C
4( )   12 .
If K < KC , K
crit
< KC . To prove this, assume the opposite:
K
crit
> KC  ! (1 KC)C

4( )   12 > (1+KC)C
 2
2(1+2)
 !
 <  + (1 KC)C

(1+KC)C+1

+ 1
2

. But this is the condition for K > KC , so we have
a contradiction. From this and from the result for the situation where the CAR is
binding only for the domestic bank, it follows that, if K < KC , then
@TC
@K
 > 0 always.
If K > KC , K
crit
> K. To prove this, assume again the opposite:
K
crit
< K  ! (1 KC)C
4( )   12 < C
 
1+2  !  >  + (1 KC)C

(1+KC)C+1

+ 1
2

.
But this is again the condition for K < KC , so we have a contradiction. From this
and from the result for CAR being binding only for the multinational bank, it follows
that there exists a K
crit
> K > KC such that if K

< K
crit
, then @TC
@K
 < 0, and if
K

> K
crit
, then @TC
@K
 > 0.
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Note in addition that@K
crit
@ =
@K
crit
@( ) =   (1 KC)C

4( )2 < 0, so the less developed the
nancial markets of the host country and the larger the di¤erence in price between the
home and host country, the larger is the parameter space for which an increase in CAR
increases takeover activity.
Proof of Corollary 4
i) An increase in K has a direct impact on the probability of success of the domestic
banks, since @
(1+K)
2
@K
= 1
2
> 0. This is also the e¤ect on the probability of success of the
parent bank of an existing multinational bank.
For the host unit of a multinational bank, the increase of capital in the home country
equally increases the probability of success:
@

1+K
2

1+KC
2

@K
= 1
2

1+KC
2

+

1+K
2

1
2
@KC
@K

> 0.
Finally, capital requirements in the home country increase incentives for takeovers.
This increases stability in the home country, if KC > K, and increases stability in the
host country, if
 
1+KC
2
 1+KC
2

> 1+K

2
. As in the Proof of Proposition 9, this will be
the case i¤  > S  1+2C
2(KC+KC+KCKC)
  1
2
.
ii) An increase in K

has a direct linear impact on the probability of success of the
domestic banks like in the home country: @
(1+K)
2
@K =
1
2
> 0. For a subsidiary, however,
the dependence on the probability of success of the home country unit diminishes the
e¤ect of K

on the probability of success of the subsidiary:
@

1+KC
2

1+K

2

@K
 = 12
 
1+KC
2

+

1+K

2

1
2
@KC
@K


> 0. In addition, the host country
capital requirement increases the probability of success of the home country unit via
complementarity:
@

1+KC
2

@K
 = C

2(1+2)
> 0. As assumed before, this complementarity
e¤ect is below the direct e¤ect, i.e. C

2(1+2)
< 1
2
.
Finally, capital requirements in the host country increase incentives 1) for takeovers
for which KC > K
, and
2) for takeovers for which KC < K
 and K

> K
crit
, and
3) decrease takeover incentives for K

< K
crit
, as in Proposition 10. For those
subsidiaries that will be taken over, the probability of success is higher if, as before,
 > S . For the subsidiaries that will become domestic banks again, the opposite
is true. As @K
crit
@ =
@K
crit
@( ) < 0 and as
@S
@K < 0, the minimum capital requirement
increases stability by decreasing takeover incentives in countries where they decrease
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stability (case 3) and by directing takeovers to countries where foreign banks are more
stable relative to domestic banks (cases 1 and 2).
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
The aim of the study at hand was to investigate regulation of multinational banks,
with an emphasis on the EU banking markets. To begin with, Chapter 1 showed that
foreign direct investment in the EU is very much concentrated in the CEE countries,
which are small economies, with relatively even smaller nancial sectors. What is more,
besides the branch structure banks, which are allowed to operate under a single licence
within the EU, the fragmented subsidiary structure still remains popular among the
multinational banks. Together, these facts point to the direction of the single banking
market having not yet developed fully.
Bearing this fragmented market structure in mind, three models, studying the roles
of regulatory externalities and the banks liability structure, the ability of ambiguity
as to mandates to compensate for the regulatory time inconsistency problem, and the
e¤ect of minimum capital requirements on the market structure, were then developed.
Chapter 2 showed that retaining regulatory power at the national regulators may make
sense, especially if regulators su¤er from time inconsistency problem and tend to exer-
cise forbearance. However, as pointed out in Chapter 3, ECB participation, if properly
designed as an ownership structure and size contingent rule, can be welfare-improving,
since it enlarges the strategy space of the social planner. Yet, the welfare improvement
requires that the agencies are given clear and publicly announced mandates. Finally,
Chapter 4 showed that the high concentration of foreign direct investment within the
EU may reect the di¤erences in the levels of development of the nancial markets
and may be reinforced by the minimum capital requirements at place. However, the
increase in international takeovers will be the more stability enhancing, the larger the
gap in funds availability.
The work at hand gives rise to some tentative policy conclusions with regard to the
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organisation of banking regulation in the EU. In general, as long as the markets are
fragmented and heterogeneous, regulatory power should be left at the national level. In
particular, the regulation of multinational subsidiary structure banks should remain at
the national authorities. In contrast, as soon as the average branch size becomes large
enough, transfer of regulatory power to the ECB in case of branch structure banks may
be reasonable. Finally, Chapter 3 points at a need for a reformulation of the Article
105(2) in the Treaty on the EU. In particular, ambiguity should be replaced with clear
and public mandates in order to avoid strategic reliance on the ECB rescue from the
part of the multinational banks.
Modelling the phenomenon of international banking quickly results in complex
frameworks. As a consequence, the results are not obtained without compromises.
One clear drawback is the lesser focus on the risk sharing aspect of internationalisa-
tion. The theme was only handled briey in the Appendix of Chapter 2, where it
was shown that allowing for risk diversication e¤ect did not qualitatively change the
main results of the model. Future research will be needed in determining the relations
between internationalisation, and systemic as well as credit risk. Another aspect is
the interaction of banks and capital markets. In particular, deriving the cost of bank
capital is an interesting task that deserves more attention than it was given in the
present work. Finally, banks are ever less often just banks but nancial conglomerates
that may have unforeseen possibilities to risk shifting via liability structure and inter-
nationalisation. Although the importance of these aspects is fully acknowledged, they
are left for future research.
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